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ABSTRACT 
Context-awareness enables applications and services to better fulfil the needs of 
users by adapting to their situation and their preferences. However, the use of 
contextual information is complicated by privacy concerns. A subject’s context 
is personal and needs to be regarded as sensitive. Hence, contextual information 
must only be used with the consensus of the subject and according to their 
privacy preferences.  
This thesis examines the development of privacy-friendly context-aware 
systems. In particular the focus is on (A) improving the overall level of privacy, 
(B) evaluating access control mechanisms, (C) providing development support, 
and (D) offering protection to third-party infrastructures. The hypothesis 
investigated is whether these objectives can be achieved through the use of a 
privacy enhancing infrastructure. 
As part of the investigation two conceptual models are presented describing the 
assumptions made about context and privacy. Also presented is a decentralised 
privacy enhancing infrastructure developed and implemented to determine the 
validity of the hypothesis. Along with the infrastructure mechanisms for privacy 
protection including authentication, access control, and anonymity are 
discussed. A general data format for context communication in the 
infrastructure is also presented. 
Finally the thesis presents the findings uncovered during the investigation and 
evaluation of the hypothesis. This includes a qualitative analysis of whether the 
privacy enhancing infrastructure meets the key objectives, a user survey 
examining the performance of two candidate access control mechanism,  a 
performance measure of the infrastructure when run with resource constrained 
devices, and a comparison with the approaches taken in related work. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND 
The vision of ubiquitous computing is no longer pursued only by a handful of 
people. It is now actively being researched on a much larger scale. Various 
prototype systems have been developed and deployed that provide a wide range 
of services in many different environments. 
This chapter introduces the area on which this thesis focuses, namely privacy in 
context-aware ubiquitous computing. It outlines and discusses some of the 
previous work done in the fields of ubiquitous computing, context-awareness, 
and privacy. The intention is to give a broad overview to the fields and to 
present the work that has inspired further research. Each section will try and 
capture a different aspect of the research area. 
1.1. Introduction 
Context-awareness has the potential of providing significant benefits. By 
utilising contextual information applications and services can adjust to our 
situation and preferences, thus enabling new functionality and an improved user 
experience to be provided. For example, context-awareness enables a city guide 
application to not only list restaurants but also make recommendations on places 
that are both nearby and that serve food to your taste. Influenced by the vision 
of ubiquitous computing, these solutions are to be pervasive, providing 
unobtrusive services when and where appropriate. 
Whilst beneficial, the use of contextual information is not without controversy. 
Privacy is of great concern in context-aware systems. Contextual information is 
by nature personal and sensitive and when collected over time it reveals an 
individual’s behaviour and preferences. This can be exploited by dishonest 
individuals. Given the existing misuse of personal information on the Internet, it 
  
 
2 
is believed these concerns are well founded. Hence, contextual information 
must be carefully handled and protected. 
Consequently, the work presented in this thesis focuses on the area of privacy 
protection and context-awareness. In particular, the thesis examines an 
infrastructure approach to providing development support for privacy-friendly 
context-aware systems. 
1.2. Ubiquitous computing 
The concept of ubiquitous computing was first thought of at the Electronics and 
Imaging Laboratory at Xerox Palo Alto Research Centre (PARC) in late 1987 
[Weiser, Gold et al.1999]. It has since gathered momentum and is now widely 
researched. This section will summarise the initial work done at Xerox PARC. 
The original proposal leading to the birth of ubiquitous computing was for the 
creation of wall-size computer displays. These displays intended to be capable 
of providing both data output and input, yet be as easy to use as whiteboards. 
This idea inspired the new vision of computing, where computers are invisibly 
spread throughout our environment. Another contributing factor was the work 
done by anthropologists in the area of Work Practices and Technology at 
PARC. Their studies, into how people use computers, led M. Weiser and others 
to think more about the situations in which technology is used rather than on 
technology alone. Together this gave birth to the Ubiquitous Computing 
program in the Computer Science Laboratory (CSL) at PARC. 
The initial goal of this program was to solve some of the problems they felt 
personal computers exhibit including that computers are too hard to use, they 
need too much attention, and they isolate us from other people [Weiser, Gold et 
al.1999]. Although on first inspection these appear to be issues regarding the 
graphical user interface, it was apparent at PARC that it was the result of the 
whole machine and its usage [Weiser 1993]. To quote M. Weiser “The 
challenge is to create a new kind of relationship of people to computers, one in 
which the computer would have to take the lead in becoming vastly better at 
getting out of the way, allowing people to just go about their lives” [Weiser 
1993]. Their answer to this challenge was the development of three new 
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computing devices known as tabs, pads, and boards. Weiser describes tabs as 
inch scale devices approximating active post-it notes,  pads as foot scale devices 
behaving like notepads, and boards as yard scale devices as the equivalent to 
whiteboards [Weiser 2002]. Examples of these new types of devices are the 
ParcTab, ParcPad,  and LiveBoard. 
Although the initial goal of the Ubiquitous Computing program was thought of 
as an answer to the many problems with personal computers, the contributions 
that this research program has made are far more important. It resulted in the 
creation of a completely new research area and defined ubiquitous computing as 
we know it. 
1.3. The Active Badge System 
One type of context that has been widely researched is location. An early and 
widely know example of a context-aware, more specifically location-aware,  
system is the Active Badge system [Harter, Hopper 1994] developed at Olivetti 
Research Limited, later AT&T Laboratories Cambridge. 
An active badge is a small wireless device that transmits a unique identifier at 
specified intervals over infrared. It is a square device about 55 x 55 x 7mm with 
a weight of 40g [Want, Hopper 1992] and it has two buttons, two leds, and a 
speaker [Harter, Hopper 1994]. The active badge location system uses infrared 
as well as radio technology to sense the location of these badges, which can be 
worn by people or attached to objects. The system works by having a fixed 
network of infrared sensors that are positioned at known locations. This network 
of sensors constantly listens for incoming signals from active badges. When an 
active badge is within range of a sensor the signal it transmits will be received 
and since the location of the sensor is known, the system can establish the 
identified badge’s location and thus also the associated person or object. Active 
badges can with this technique provide “room scale location” [Harter, Hopper 
1994 (p.2)].  
Better granularity of the location is described to be achievable by using a denser 
network of sensors and reducing the transmitter power of the badges. Harter and 
Hopper also describe another hybrid infrared radio technique employed by the 
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Active Badge system to improve the location granularity in certain areas 
[Harter, Hopper 1994]. This works by embedding a passive radio receiver into 
the badges and by placing radio transmitters around objects of interest. The 
transmitter sends out an identifiable signal that is directed such that it forms a 
field around the object. A badge entering the field then adds the received signal 
to the transmission it sends to the infrared sensors. Thus the badge can be 
located to be within the field, achieving what they call “desk scale location” 
[Harter, Hopper 1994 (p.3)].  
The initial application developed for the active badge system was intended to be 
used by the receptionist at Olivetti Research Limited to help with the 
forwarding of telephone calls [Want, Hopper 1992]. The application displays a 
list of people’s names along with their last known location and the telephone 
extension there. It also displays a measure of how accurate the location 
information is or how old the information is if data is not being updated. The 
system also handles the processing of simple user commands. Among the 
interesting ones described are WITH which lists the badges near a supplied 
badge name, LOOK which lists the badges near a supplied location, and 
HISTORY which produces a report containing information about the 
whereabouts of a supplied badge name during the last hour. 
It is stated that over 1500 badges and 2000 sensors have been deployed 
(November 1993) [Harter, Hopper 1994] and that the system has been accepted 
and is used daily by the staff at Olivetti Research Limited [Want, Hopper 1992]. 
As such the active badge system has demonstrated the feasibility of deploying 
location sensing in working environments. However it is also described that 
despite its successful internal deployment, people from outside are sceptical 
about whether they would like such a system in their office due to privacy 
concerns. Hence privacy is an issue that most definitely needs to be addressed 
and even more so when considering more accurate location systems like the 
successor of the active badge, the bat system [Addlesee, Curwen 2001].  
  
 
5 
 
1.4. The Context Toolkit 
The work on context-awareness done at Georgia Institute of Technology 
focused on improving the development support for context aware applications 
through the development of a conceptual framework. This section will present 
some of this work starting with their definitions of context and context-aware. 
The most widely accepted definition of context is probably the one presented by 
Dey and Abowd, which states that: “Context is any information that can be used 
to characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object 
that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an application, 
including the user and applications themselves” [Dey, Abowd 2000A]. In 
addition to defining context they provide a system for categorising different 
types of context [Dey, Abowd 2000A]. The system consists of two levels. On 
the first level are what they consider to be primary pieces of context: location, 
identity, time, and activity. These are the important pieces of context that 
characterise a situation. On the second level they place all other types of 
context, which are considered to be secondary. Secondary pieces of context are 
attributes of entities with primary context and can be indexed by primary pieces 
in information spaces. Dey and Abowd continue by providing a definition for 
context-aware which state that “a system is context-aware if it uses context to 
provide relevant information and/or services to the user, where relevancy 
depends on the user’s task” [Dey, Abowd 2000A]. They also propose a 
categorisation of the features context-aware applications have. Features are 
categorised into one of three categories: presentation, automatic execution, and 
tagging. Where the presentation category includes actions such as presentation 
of context information or services to a user, the automatic execution category 
includes actions that are triggered or adapted by the context of a user, and 
finally the tagging category includes actions that add context to information for 
later use. 
In his thesis, Providing Architectural Support for Building Context-Aware 
Applications, [Dey 2000B] Dey points out that many of the well known context-
aware applications only support a small subset of types and features. Dey 
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attributes this lack in range to the difficulty of using context information. To 
make the development of context-aware applications easier a framework is 
proposed, allowing developers to focus on the problem at hand. Seven features 
are described as being required in the framework:  
1. The framework must enable an application developer to specify the 
context required by an application. 
2. The processing of context should be independent of the retrieval. 
3. Contextual information should be able to be interpreted transparently 
by the framework. 
4. The communication between the context source and the applications 
should be transparent and support distributed sources. 
5. The context sources should be constantly available to allow 
applications to retrieve contextual information when needed. 
6. The framework should store captured contextual data to allow access 
to a context history. 
7. The resource discovery should be built into the framework. 
It is recognised that not all solutions can be accommodated. As such the 
framework provides four basic building blocks which can be used to extend the 
support: widgets, aggregators, interpreters, and services. The widgets act as 
context sources. They provide the necessary abstraction from the physical 
sensor. Aggregators allow the contextual information from multiple widgets to 
be combined to reduce the complexity of having to communicate with the 
widgets individually. Interpreters are used to provide high-level context 
information from the collected low-level information. Finally services provide 
an output, allowing changes to be made in the environment. With these building 
blocks Dey wants to encourage the development of new components for the 
framework rather than standalone ad hoc solutions. 
The implementation of the framework described in Dey’s thesis [Dey 2000B] is 
known as the Context Toolkit [Dey, Abowd 2000C]. The toolkit is implemented 
using Java and provides the required features of the framework [Dey 2000B 
(s.4.2.2)]. Communication between the components uses the HTTP protocol and 
the data is encoded using XML. They also emphasise that each component runs 
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independently allowing them to be used by many applications. To demonstrate 
the benefits provided by the toolkit Salber and others [Salber, Dey et al. 1999] 
describe three applications that have been built: an in/out board, an information 
display, and a meeting board. The in/out board displays whether or not a person 
is in the office building. To do this the board collects and uses the entry and exit 
time of office members. They also describe an information display that shows 
information relevant to a nearby person. This display uses context information 
like the identity of the person, what group they are associated with, and the 
location of the display. Finally they have added context-awareness to 
DUMMBO, another project at Georgia Institute of Technology [Brotherton, 
Abowd et al. 1999]. DUMMBO is a smart whiteboard that captures what is 
written on it during meetings as well as what is said. This information is then 
made available afterwards. By utilising the Context Toolkit they altered the 
starting behaviour of the whiteboard so that it started recording in the presence 
of two or more persons. 
The work done at Georgia Institute of Technology provides a good base for 
further research. First of all their definitions of context and context-awareness 
allow for a better understanding of what context-aware systems are. Secondly 
their work on a framework and toolkit that aid the development of context-
aware applications have been an important start to the move away from ad hoc 
implementations towards more uniform structures. However one area in which 
further research is required is that of privacy. Although a preliminary extension 
is presented [Dey 2000B (s.6.1)], allowing some control over the access of 
information, privacy protection is not central to the framework design. The 
nature of privacy issues requires this to ensure adequate protection is provided. 
Also since the development of the Context Toolkit there has been a movement 
towards infrastructures being requested that can provide even greater abstraction 
for developers [Hong, Landay 2001]. 
1.5. Cooltown 
In the Cooltown project at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories it is believed “that the 
future consists of nomadic people carrying personal communication and web 
browsing devices interacting with services that are location specific and 
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customized to the user” [Debaty, Caswell 2000]. The project seeks to support 
this behaviour by adopting the existing web infrastructure such that the real and 
virtual worlds are brought closer together. At the heart of the project there are 
three different categories of entities: people, places, and things [Debaty, Caswell 
2000]. People are the users in Cooltown, a place is an area or space, and things 
are objects. As such people can use things, and places can be filled with both 
people and things. The vision they have is that each one of these entities will 
have a web presence [Debaty, Caswell 2000], i.e. it needs to have a 
representation on the web that can be accessed using an URL. This web 
presence is then used to provide customised and enhanced services to people. 
The Cooltown museum is one of the examples they give of what an enhanced 
service may look like. Throughout the museum beacons have been deployed 
close to objects of interests such as pictures. These beacons transmit URLs that 
link the physical objects to their respective web presence, where information 
about the object is found. The visitors can then receive these URLs with their 
portable digital assistants (PDA) when they explore the museum, allowing them 
e.g. to read more about the object using the PDA’s web browser. The URLs can 
also be stored for later use. In the museum bookshop URLs are associated with 
the items for sale, to allow visitors to retrieve further information such as 
reviews. Furthermore, they offer a print service that makes it possible for 
visitors to print out the web pages associated with the URLs collected during 
their stay, as well as reproductions of paintings.  
The future as thought of in the Cooltown project is not far away. Today a large 
proportion of the population in the industrial world carry mobile phones, some 
of which support web browsing, and the use of PDAs, and increasingly, 
smartphones is steadily growing [Debaty, Goddi et al. 2003]. These mainstream 
devices can already today be utilised to gain access to enhanced services that 
give you more information about museum artefacts [Duan 2002], help you find 
your friends [Telia 2005], or guide you around a tourist attraction [Mobil 
Turism 2005]. But there is still some way to go before the real and virtual 
worlds seamlessly interact; simply providing a web presence for people, places, 
and things is not enough. 
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1.6. Music FX 
Another project that shows some practical uses of context information is 
MusicFX [McCarthy 1998]. It investigates the use of a group preference agent 
in a shared environment. The environment in question is that of a fitness centre, 
the Fitness Xchange at the Accenture Technology Park in this case. In this 
fitness centre, as in others, music is often being played. The type played can 
often be subject to dissatisfaction, and this is indeed what 25% of the Fitness 
Xchange’s written suggestions convey. This project has therefore developed a 
system that aims to improve on this by adjusting the type of music played 
according to the preferences of the group of people working out. 
To be able to make a decision about what music should be played MusicFX has 
a database containing people’s preferences with respect to musical genre. The 
preferences are expressed as a collection of ratings for the different genres. Each 
rating is on a 5 step scale, going from love +2 to hate -2 with 0 being the no 
preference. This database is populated by the members and can be updated at 
anytime. The system must also know which members are present in the 
environment. This is achieved by requiring people to logon to the system when 
they come to workout. After logging on that person is by default assumed to be 
present for 90 minutes, removing the need to explicitly logout. Together these 
pieces of data form the basis needed for MusicFX to run the group preference 
arbitration algorithm, which is the decision maker. The algorithm is run every 
time certain events occur, e.g. when a member logs on. Without going into too 
much detail the algorithm calculates the aggregate rating of the available genres 
using the preferences of the current people logged in. The top rated genres are 
then short-listed and given different weights that reflect the aggregate ratings. It 
is then from this list a genre is selected; the selection is random but takes into 
account the different weights. Having selected a genre to play MusicFX utilises 
an existing music service to play the appropriate music. This service has 
previously been controlled manually by the members of staff and consist of 91 
channels each catering for a certain genre. In addition to this there are a number 
of ways in which the system can be fine-tuned to ensure there is variation in the 
music played and for users to express their dislike of songs. 
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The MusicFX project shows one way in which context-awareness can improve 
our environments. It is especially interesting, seeing as music is commonly 
played in the background of places such as shops and restaurants and it is also 
something people can easily relate to. However the project does not consider the 
scenario of users moving between different environments nor does it adequately 
address the privacy issues that arise with the introduction of such a system. The 
set of preferences used by MusicFX are stored locally in a database, as such 
data will be duplicated if other services requiring a user’s musical preferences 
are deployed. It also gives the user less control over the use of their contextual 
information and its accuracy. Furthermore by storing preferences when not 
needed, i.e. between workout sessions, the system raises questions regarding the 
extent to which the preferences are used for other purposes than influencing the 
type of music being played. 
1.7. Fieldwork 
The use of context-awareness extends beyond controlled environments such as 
offices, homes, and gyms. It can also be applied to other situations, for example 
to assist in fieldwork. The Mobile Computing in a Fieldwork Environment 
(MCFE) project is one effort aimed at developing context-aware applications 
for the field [Ryan, Pascoe et al. 1997]. The project has developed several tools 
for handheld devices that support the recording, presentation, and administration 
of field notes [Ryan, Pascoe et al. 1997] [Pascoe, Morse et al. 1998] [Ryan, 
Pascoe et al. 1999].  
Among the tools developed is a general purpose system for rapid data entry 
[Pascoe, Morse et al. 1998]. The system is based on the stick-e note concept 
[Brown, Bovey et al. 1997], but is distinct in that the focus is on recording 
information instead of retrieving information [Pascoe, Morse et al. 1998]. To 
facilitate the fieldworker’s need for quick note taking the system utilises both 
templates and automatic capture of contextual information. The prototype 
developed has been tested in field trials in Kenya, where animal behaviour was 
studied. It was concluded from the trial that the tool developed in addition to 
replacing traditional pen and paper also benefited the users in offering better 
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usability and speed [Pascoe, Morse et al. 1998]. Thus, the work shows that 
context-aware tools are both applicable and useful in field work environments. 
Another tool developed as part to the MCFE project is a geographical 
information system allowing the mapping of field notes on handheld devices 
[Ryan, Pascoe et al. 1999]. The system utilises contextual information to make 
note taking easier, automatically augmenting notes with positioning 
information, date and time, and the recorder’s name. Previously recorded 
information as well as the user’s current position is available using a map view. 
From the map field notes can be retrieved for viewing and editing. Field trials 
with this tool have also verified the applicability of context-aware mobile 
systems to fieldwork [Ryan, Pascoe et al. 1998]. Its usefulness has also 
prompted continued development of the tool [Ryan 2005]. 
What these applications have demonstrated is that mobile computing and 
context-awareness can be successfully applied to fieldwork. Hence, it is 
important to not limit the focus of context-aware work to areas such as offices 
and homes, but also consider a wider range of environments. 
1.8. Privacy and Freedom 
The book Privacy and Freedom by Alan F. Westin [Westin 1970] provides a 
ground for understanding privacy by addressing some of the important 
questions. It is also the source of a widely used definition of privacy. 
So what is privacy? According to Westin “Privacy is the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others” [Westin 1970 (p.7)]. 
With respect to the interaction between an individual and society he states that 
“privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from general 
society through physical or psychological means” [Westin 1970 (p.7)]. The 
book also presents four basic states of privacy: solitude, intimacy, anonymity, 
and reserve. Solitude is the first and most private state. In this state the 
individual is not part of any group or under any observation. The only 
disturbance that can be experienced originates from the individual’s own senses 
and psychological fears. The second state is intimacy. In this state the individual 
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is part of a small group that is allowed to be separate from the rest of society. 
The group members can therefore form an open relationship. The third state is 
anonymity. In this state privacy is attained by being in a larger public group of 
people. The individual may be observed but since they are anonymous in the 
group they may still enjoy privacy. The fourth and final state is that of reserve. 
In this state psychological barriers are used to protect privacy. Such barriers 
may involve limiting the information an individual communicates about 
themselves. 
Is this a modern concept? No, it is argued in Privacy and Freedom that the need 
and desire for privacy is not a new phenomenon but that it can be traced as far 
back as to our animal origin. To support this, a number of parallels are 
presented between humans and animals. For example, Westin states that almost 
all animals, or intimate groups of animals, seek periods of seclusion. It is also 
said that animals, just as humans, possess mechanisms that govern the distance 
between members of a group, allowing personal space. Related to this is the 
requirement for animals to have a minimum amount of private space to ensure 
health and survival. Furthermore it is said that animals share our need for intra-
species social interaction. As such privacy is not only a human desire or as 
Westin puts it “the quest for privacy is not restricted to man alone, but arises in 
the biological and social process of all life” [Westin 1970 (p.11)]. 
What function does privacy play in society? In Privacy and Freedom the 
functions of privacy are discussed with respect to democratic societies and four 
different categories are described for which privacy is essential: personal 
autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and protected 
communication. Privacy is needed to ensure personal autonomy because the 
most serious threat to an individual's personal autonomy is, according to 
Westin, that someone may learn their ultimate secrets, be it deliberately or by 
accident. Then there is emotional release. Emotional release can be attained by, 
for example, the temporary discard of social roles, by not fully complying with 
social norms, or by being allowed to express anger. All of these forms rely on 
the individual not being held accountable for their release actions, thus requiring 
privacy. The third category described is self-evaluation. Individuals need to be 
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able to evaluate collected information about themselves and others, and they 
need to do so in privacy. One example given is that although individuals 
consider the morality of their actions continuously, it is in privacy they compare 
it to their personal ideals. Finally there is privacy for limited and protected 
communication for which Westin describes two general aspects. First, it serves 
to give the opportunities required for an individual to share sensitive 
information with those they trust. Secondly, it allows individuals to set 
psychological boundaries with respect to their interaction with others. Finally it 
is important to note that even though privacy fulfils an important function in 
society, “the individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation 
in society is an equally powerful desire” [Westin 1970 (p.7)]. 
So what determines the balance of privacy? In Privacy and Freedom the 
political system is described as a “fundamental force in shaping its balance of 
privacy” [Westin 1970 (p.23)] since the requirements differ from system to 
system. As an example, the contrast between a totalitarian state and a 
democratic society is presented. In a totalitarian state privacy, or if you will 
secrecy, is restricted to the regime. All others are subject to high surveillance 
and disclosure. On the other hand in a democratic society it is the government 
that is under the scrutiny of the public and privacy is used to protect the private 
life of the people. Furthermore historical and political traditions as well as 
cultural differences are also recognized as affecting the balance of privacy. But 
it is not only society that determines the balance of privacy. An individual’s 
personal status, their life situation, as well as their personal preferences affect 
this balance too. Finally Westin emphasises that an individual will constantly 
adjust their balance of privacy to allow them to both fulfil their role in society as 
well as their personal needs.  
Although Privacy and Freedom was published 1970 the initial chapters are still 
relevant in today’s information age. We still desire privacy [Guardian 2002] and 
the basis on which society operates is fundamentally the same. It is therefore 
assumed that privacy still fulfils much the same function today. The major 
differences are that the quantity of information flowing is larger and the speed at 
which it is communicated much faster. At the same time the amount of human 
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intervention needed to collect and distribute information has decreased, 
resulting in a greater potential for privacy invasion. 
1.9. P3P 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [World Wide Web 
Consortium 2002A] is a specification, endorsed by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C). With the specification, W3C aims to achieve two goals. 
Firstly they want to enable websites to specify their privacy policy/policies in a 
standard machine-readable format. Secondly they want users to be informed 
about what data is collected, why it is collected, and if possible what the user 
can opt-in or opt-out for. In other words, P3P is intended as a mechanism with 
which sites can convey their privacy practises and their intentions to users and 
user-agents.  
The P3P specification [World Wide Web Consortium 2002A] describes a 
format in which P3P policies, i.e. privacy policies, can be represented. The 
format is XML-based and is accompanied by a standardised vocabulary. If 
required this vocabulary can be extended. The specification also includes 
information on how to reference P3P policies on websites and the meaning of 
the accompanying vocabulary. What the specification does not cover is how to 
enforce or verify the P3P policies described. The W3C also publish a related 
specification that outlines how to represent privacy preferences with respect to 
P3P policies using sets of rules [World Wide Web Consortium 2002B]. The 
format described by this specification is also based on XML, and features an 
extendable vocabulary.  
So how will P3P be used? The specification [World Wide Web Consortium 
2002A] outlines a simple example describing the use of P3P in a Web 
environment. A user desires to visit a website on the Web and at their disposal 
is a web-browser with a built in P3P user-agent.  The user types in the address 
for the desired webpage and at this point rather than directly requesting the page 
the P3P user-agent will first attempt to retrieve the site’s P3P policy. Assuming 
a policy is retrieved, the user-agent will then evaluate the policy to see if it 
matches the user’s privacy preferences which have been provided earlier. If the 
policy matches the preferences the page will then be retrieved and displayed. If 
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the policy does not match, the user may be prompted for a decision on whether 
to retrieve the page or not. Alternatively the agent can be set up, for example, to 
block the page automatically. 
Another use is described in the paper Privacy Enhancements in the Mobile 
Internet [Nilsson, Lindskog et al 2001]. There Mikael Nilsson et al. describe 
how P3P can be used to protect Composite Capabilities/Preference Profiles, a 
standard for describing device capabilities and user preferences [World Wide 
Web Consortium 2004E]. The approach they take requires a device/user to have 
a minimal profile in addition to their normal CC/PP profile. The minimal profile 
may be empty or it may contain data that is not considered sensitive. As such it 
can be used before a level of trust has been established between user and the 
site. Hence, this minimal profile is used when the user-agent requests a site’s 
P3P policy. The P3P policy is then evaluated to see if the site’s privacy policy 
matches the user’s requirements. If it does then the more elaborate CC/PP 
profile will be used for the subsequent requests. If the site’s policy does not 
fulfil the user’s requirements they suggest the continued use of the minimal 
profile. They also suggest that the minimal profile can be used to access non-
P3P compliant sites. 
The example above demonstrates how P3P can be used. Whether P3P does 
indeed improve the privacy of users or not is debated widely. In the report 
Pretty Poor Privacy: An Assessment of P3P and Internet Privacy [EPIC, 
Junkbusters 2000] the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and 
Junkbusters raise their concerns regarding P3P. They are for example worried 
that users will be forced to give up privacy or accept a more restricted Internet. 
Another issue they highlight is that there is a problem with launching P3P 
because if few sites use P3P then few users will invest time in setting it up and 
then there is no incentive for sites to use P3P. Concerns are also held due to the 
fact that it is not possible to make sure that a site follows its stated P3P policy. 
Several other issues are also discussed and the overall view presented in the 
report is that P3P will actually not improve user’s privacy. 
In the paper Can P3P Help to Protect Privacy Worldwide? [Grimm, Rossnagel 
2000] by Rüdiger Grimm and Alexander Rossnagel a slightly more optimistic 
  
 
16 
view of P3P is presented though. They show that P3P can complement the 
German privacy laws and that it supports some of the legal requirements sites 
have to fulfil. They also point out that P3P could be extended to better support 
the existing legal framework. Another positive effect mentioned is that P3P can 
increase the awareness of users regarding privacy protection. However, several 
issues with P3P are also highlighted in this paper. For example, they criticise the 
limited choice the user has, i.e. either to accept or reject a policy. They point out 
that there is no way for the provider to know why users reject a policy. They 
also feel that the lack of technology to ensure policies are enforced is a problem, 
especially where a self-regulatory approach to privacy protection is used. 
However, it is concluded overall that the use of P3P can be beneficial. 
Independent of what view you hold, the development of the Platform for 
Privacy Preferences (P3P) specification must be credited for fuelling the debate 
regarding internet privacy. Raising the awareness among both developers and 
users about internet-privacy is just as important as providing technological 
solutions, if not more so. 
1.10. Summary 
This chapter has presented a selection of the previous work done in the fields of 
ubiquitous computing, context-awareness, and privacy.  
The initial research on ubiquitous computing done at PARC still remains an 
important influence on today’s research. Developing systems that are all around, 
yet invisible, is increasingly desirable. The ongoing technological development 
is turning this vision into reality by allowing smaller and smaller devices to be 
manufactured. Also, the everyday use of technology like mobile phones will 
gradually make the interaction with ubiquitous devices more transparent to the 
user. Research projects such as Cooltown, The Guide project, and FieldWork 
have shown that there are practical uses for ubiquitous computing technology in 
different areas. 
The progress made within ubiquitous computing has also allowed another 
research field to be born, that of context-aware computing. Dey et. al. define a 
context-aware system that uses contextual information to provide a user with 
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information or services relevant to their task. One piece of context that has been 
widely researched is location. The Active Badge system, for instance, 
demonstrated how location information can be captured indoors using infrared 
and radio based sensing technology and that the deployment of such technology 
is feasible. But context-aware applications are not limited to location. MusicFX, 
for example, uses the gym members’ preferences when determining what music 
to play in the gym. As such, context-awareness can benefit users in many 
situations. However context-aware computing also brings its own set of 
challenges. The work done on the Context Toolkit at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology emphasises the difficulty in using context information and the need 
to provide support for the development of context-aware applications. Also, 
context-aware applications operate in a wide range of environments. The 
projects described in this section cover environments such as the office, the gym 
as well as more general fieldwork environments. This undoubtedly provides 
issues itself.  
Privacy is a long standing desire that according to Westin can be traced back as 
far as our animal origin. It also asserted that privacy fulfils important functions 
in society by, for example, providing people with the opportunity to evaluate 
gathered information. It is thus not surprising that privacy is a subject of 
concern to ubiquitous technology. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project 
(P3P) is one attempt in improving the privacy of online technology users. 
Although developed for use in traditional environments, it has been shown that 
the technology can be used within mobile environments as well. How successful 
P3P is in improving privacy has been the subject of controversy, and is likely to 
continue to be so. The importance of this technology is instead seen to be the 
awareness and discussion it has raised regarding online privacy. 
Although each of these fields are research areas in their own right, the existence 
of a strong link is apparent. To provide valuable and acceptable ubiquitous 
services to end users it is believed that we need to consider all three of these 
research areas. In the next chapter a project will be introduced that attempts this, 
i.e. combines the fields of privacy, context-awareness, and ubiquitous 
computing. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PROJECT 
As the previous chapter has shown the development of ubiquitous computing 
and the related field of context-awareness have made some significant progress. 
A multitude of research projects have been undertaken which further the 
understanding of these types of system. The work done has also highlighted a 
number of existing issues with ubiquitous and context-aware computing and 
emphasised the need for further work to address these. 
This chapter presents the motivation for the research undertaken that is 
presented in this thesis within the field of Privacy in Context-Aware Ubiquitous 
Computing. It also describes in which ways this research aims to contribute to 
the field, along with the issues that need to be addressed. Finally the chapter 
also present some of the related work undertaken in the field, in the context of 
this project. 
2.1. Motivation 
Over the last decade or so, significant progress has been made in the 
manufacture of small devices. Small computing devices are no longer limited to 
research or corporate use, they are available to mainstream users at what can be 
considered reasonable cost. They have also become more powerful, and even 
though resources are still limited, what they can do has increased and continues 
to do so. Devices may still be far from invisible but even so a notable step has 
been taken towards the wide scale realisation of ubiquitous computing.  
Although this development itself has been a source for inspiration, the 
motivation for this work concerns the issues that exist in developing publicly 
acceptable context-aware ubiquitous systems for widescale deployment. In 
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particular the motivation comes from the work needed in two key areas: privacy 
and development support.   
2.1.1. Privacy 
The distribution of invisible computer devices, which are able to communicate 
and store information, throughout our physical environment poses some serious 
questions about personal privacy. What devices are nearby and what purpose do 
they serve? Do they collect information? If they do, what type of information is 
collected and will it be distributed? The origin of these concerns are in fact the 
very desirable characteristics of ubiquitous computing, the ubiquity and 
invisibility. Although privacy concerns were encountered already within the 
Ubiquitous Computing program at Xerox PARC [Weiser, Gold et al. 1999], 
these issues have not been prioritised. This has left privacy being recognised but 
to a large extent unaddressed. 
Furthermore the development of context-aware applications can be seen to 
aggravate any existing privacy concerns held with respect to ubiquitous 
computing. The nature of context information is the cause of these heightened 
concerns. A piece of context can consist of anything from location information 
to that of the current activity. Thus the information will often be personal and 
considered to be sensitive. Moreover if one takes into account that a context-
aware application may collect and use many pieces of information of various 
types over an extended period of time, then it is not difficult to see that there 
will be an impact on people’s privacy. Brown and Jones go so far as to state that 
“Context-aware applications, above all others in the pervasive field, can be 
regarded as anti-privacy” [Brown, Jones 2004]. 
But are people really concerned about their online privacy? Surveys examining 
peoples’ feelings towards privacy suggest that they are. For instance in the 
GVU’s 10th WWW survey from 1998, see Figure 1, 52.8% of the respondents 
said that they were in general very concerned about the security on the Internet, 
where security was stated to include issues like privacy, confidentiality, and 
authentication [GVU's WWW Surveying Team 1998].  
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Figure 1. Concerned about security? [GVU's WWW Surveying Team 1998] 
Similarly an ICM Poll published by The Guardian in 2002, see Figure 2, shows 
that 66% of those asked agreed to the statement: “I am worried about the 
security of my personal information travelling on the internet and email” 
[Guardian 2002 (p.3)]. 
Worried about personal information?
Disagree
21%
No 
opinion, 
14%
Agree
66%
 
Figure 2. Worried about personal information? [Guardian 2002 (p.3)]  
Finally a survey undertaken by Your voice in Europe, see Figure 3, shows that 
69% of the respondents were afraid that the personal data they provide whilst 
buying or using online services will be misused [European Commission 2002]. 
In fact it was stated to be one of the main reasons why purchases were not made 
online. 
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Figure 3. Afraid of misuse of personal data? [European Commission 2002] 
All of the above surveys focus on slightly different aspects but they all show a 
clear trend. Online privacy, security, and trust are important as well as desired. 
With surveys clearly showing that privacy is indeed desired and context-aware 
ubiquitous computing having matured, privacy research in this field has become 
a hot topic. Privacy is indeed one of the key issues that are highlighted in the 
ubiquitous computing grand challenge [Crowcroft 2003]. And as progress is 
made in creating truly ubiquitous and context-aware computing environments, 
we will increasingly find privacy to be the subject of concern. The need to 
address these concerns is further stressed by the desire to deploy context-aware 
ubiquitous systems on a wider scale for which public acceptability is ever so 
important.  
The development of privacy protection is therefore a key motivation for the 
work presented in this thesis. Most would agree that the thought of a world 
where information about us is recorded, used, or even distributed without our 
knowledge is not very pleasant and that every effort must be made to avoid the 
creation of a surveillance society. 
2.1.2. Development support 
The vast majority of people are not expected to start using context-aware 
ubiquitous technology unless it provides them with some form of benefits. Thus 
the existence of useful applications will be very important when it comes to 
persuading people to use context-aware applications. It is also recognised that 
what constitutes a useful application will vary greatly from user to user. Hence 
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there exists a need to develop a wide range of applications, providing users with 
a choice.  
But just as with the development of any other end-user application a significant 
effort is required in producing useful context-aware applications. The task is 
further complicated because of the nature of context-awareness. For instance 
four aspects described by Dey [Dey 2000B] as making the use of context 
information difficult are that:  
• Limited experience exists in using context sensing devices. 
• Abstraction is needed to make effective use of sensed context. 
• Multiple dissimilar sensors may need to be used. 
• Context information is dynamic. 
Add to this list the need to develop secure applications that are privacy-friendly, 
then further difficulties arise including: the provision of appropriate access 
controls, integrity and secrecy of communication, secure data storage, etc. 
Hence the complexity becomes even greater. 
It is therefore essential that support is provided for the development of context-
aware application. By moving the responsibility for common tasks away from 
the application, the complexity can be reduced. This will allow the applications 
to focus on the task at hand and be developed with greater ease. Projects, such 
as the Context Toolkit [Dey, Abowd 2000C], have indeed shown this to be true. 
With further work in this area it is expected that application development can be 
made even easier. Others [Hong, Landay 2001] have indeed argued that there 
are benefits in taking an infrastructure approach rather than using a toolkit. Also 
the additional difficulties that appear when secure and privacy-friendly 
applications are developed creates a need for further work in this area.  
Thus another key motivation for the work presented in this thesis is the need to 
study further how to provide better development support.  
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2.2. Focus 
The scope of possible work within the field of study is large, even within the 
key areas of motivation. Indeed both context-awareness and privacy are 
presented as unsolved key issues in the ubiquitous computing grand challenge 
[Crowcroft 2003]. Thus the focus of the work has been further narrowed.  
Firstly, the nature of the research has mostly been applied. By applied it is 
meant that the work have been focused on researching practical and operational 
solutions rather than abstract concepts. This follows the path of previous work 
in the field of ubiquitous computing where the emphasis has been on 
experimental research. Also, because the field of study is a combination of three 
independent fields, i.e. privacy, context-awareness, and ubiquitous computing, 
many benefits can be achieved by furthering the research into their integration. 
Secondly, rapid progress is made in both the manufacture of small devices and 
in the available software for such devices. This means the area is a moving 
target. To avoid the research becoming a constant quest in utilising newer 
technology the work has focused on using the same set of devices and software 
as much as possible. Naturally newer technology has been used when 
appropriate, provided no significant overhead is caused. Although it is 
appreciated that benefits can be had from always using the latest available 
technology, it is seldom required. 
Finally, the work has focused on researching the software side of ubiquitous 
computing rather than the development of specialised devices. Although the 
research into hardware is both useful and interesting it requires a large 
commitment of resources and time. Given the availability of small general 
purpose devices, e.g. PDAs, it is thought that the current focus will better utilise 
the resources to hand. Thus the work has used off-the-shelf devices throughout. 
Although this inevitably imposes limitations on what can be done, these are 
considered to be negligible. It should also be noted that the use of standard 
equipment greatly simplifies any large scale deployment of context-aware 
applications as equipment already in the hands of the users can potentially be 
used. 
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2.3. Intentions 
The work presented in this thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing development 
in the combined field of privacy, context-awareness, and ubiquitous computing. 
In particular the intention is to contribute to the following four areas: 
• The improvement of a user’s overall level of privacy. 
• The evaluation of different access control mechanisms. 
• The provision of support for easy and rapid development of privacy-
friendly applications. 
• The protection of third-party infrastructures. 
The first two areas focus on the need for privacy protection in context-aware 
ubiquitous systems, which is the primary motivation for the work. It is firmly 
believed that users should not need to compromise their privacy to be able to 
benefit from this technology. The intention is therefore to show that by 
employing careful privacy-aware design and by providing users with greater 
control over the distribution of their personal information, privacy can be 
maintained. The work also intends to show that a suitable access control 
mechanism is essential in providing the control required and includes an 
evaluation of different access control mechanism with respect to context-
awareness.  
The third area focuses on providing development support, another key 
motivation. The intention is to demonstrate that by using a privacy-enhancing 
infrastructure the handling of context information can be moved away from the 
application. It is also the intention to show that by doing this the design of 
privacy-friendly applications will be made both easier and quicker. 
Finally, the last area on which the work focuses is the provision of privacy 
protection for existing context-aware systems. The intention is to show that by 
integrating the proposed infrastructure with other context-aware systems, 
existing sensor networks and applications can be reused as well as allowing 
access from the outside to be controlled. 
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2.4. Methodology 
The methodology applied throughout this work, as with much ubiquitous 
computing research, is experimental. This fits well with the desired focus on 
applied work (See above, section 2.2).  
The employed research process has been inspired by the rational unified 
process, as described by Kruchten [Kruchten 2003], but adapted for research. It 
can be broken down into five phases: problem, requirements, proposal, 
experimentation, and evaluation. The first phase reviews the work in the field 
and defines the area of study and the problem. The second phase captures the 
requirements of the defined problem. The third phase designs a proposal that 
addresses the problem by fulfilling the requirements. The fourth phase 
implements the proposal and tests it experimentally. The fifth and last phase 
evaluates the solution proposal and the experiments performed. Figure 4 
illustrate the research process.  
Probl.
Req. 
Prop.
Exp.
Eval.
 
Figure 4. Research process 
The process has been performed iteratively. This yields a gradual research 
process with room for feedback. 
2.5. Infrastructure approach 
There are different ways in which privacy protection and development support 
can be provided. 
The most straightforward approach is to provide separate tools for the tasks. For 
example, proxies can be used to improve users’ privacy by filtering their 
requests, blocking those that would result in a violation of the users’ privacy 
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[JRC P3P Resource Centre 2005A] whilst development support can be provided 
with libraries providing APIs to desirable functionalities [Java Community 
Process 2003]. This separation is, however, not desirable. Firstly, it would be 
inefficient to manage and maintain different tools. Secondly, the tools may end 
up working against each other, due to the unavoidable conflicts that exist 
between context-aware functionality and privacy. Hence, a common instrument, 
addressing both issues, is preferred. 
The approaches taken in early related work has been to provide developers with 
the basic building blocks necessary to develop complete context-aware systems. 
Schilit, for example, presents a context-aware computing architecture [Schilit 
1995], whilst Dey describes a framework and toolkit [Dey 2000B]. Hong and 
Landay, however, argue that the use of an infrastructure approach is more 
beneficial [Hong, Landay 2001]. An infrastructure provides further abstraction 
for application developers allowing them to focus on the problem at hand. 
Examples of work that has opted for an infrastructure approach includes the 
MobiComp infrastructure [Ryan 2005], the solar system [Chen, Kotz 2002], and 
EQUIP [Greenhalgh 2002]. 
The use of an infrastructure has three key advantages according to Hong and 
Landay [Hong, Landay 2001]. Firstly, by using services in an infrastructure 
context-aware applications can be developed independently of the platform, 
assuming the interaction with the services are standardised. Secondly, an 
infrastructure provides a middleware layer that can separate the capture, 
distribution, and use of context information allowing components to be 
developed and maintained independently. Finally, an infrastructure enables 
resources to be shared between applications. 
With respect to privacy protection it is also believed that the use of an 
infrastructure approach can be beneficial. By developing the infrastructure to 
handle the privacy protection, this responsibility is lifted from the applications 
and their developers. It is deemed that this can simplify the development of 
applications. Furthermore, by incorporating the privacy protection into the 
infrastructure, better possibilities ought to exist to provide a uniform protection 
mechanism. 
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2.6. Related Work 
Given the width of the combined field in which this work has been undertaken, 
this section will only present a selection of the related work. The focus will be 
on aspects considered particularly important when developing a privacy-
enhancing infrastructure.  
2.6.1. Context and Context-awareness 
Different definitions of context and context-awareness have been used in related 
work, each emphasising aspects found to be important. 
The early work in the field by Schilit and others describes context to capture 
changes to things of interest, specifically they mention three aspects they 
consider important: “where you are, who you are with, and what resources are 
nearby” [Schilit, Adams et al. 1994]. Hence, change characterises contextual 
information. Schilit et. al. also continue to present a number of examples of 
what they consider to be contextual information, including location information, 
lighting conditions, noise level, connectivity, communication costs and 
bandwidth, and information about the social situation.  
The importance of changes is further emphasised by Schilit’s and Theimer’s 
definition of context-aware computing. They define context-aware computing as 
“the ability of a mobile user’s applications to discover and react to changes in 
the environment they are situated in” [Schilit, Theimer 1994 p.3]. Thus, the 
definition stresses the importance for context-aware systems to be able to 
capture and utilise contextual information. 
A later definition of context presented by Dey and Abowd stresses the need for 
information to describe a situation relevant to a user-application interaction (See 
above, section 1.4). Hence, Dey and Abowd focus on the relevance of 
information rather than on whether the information simply changes or not. They 
also present four primary context types: location, identity, time, and activity 
[Dey, Abowd 2000A]. Contexts that do not fit into those types are considered to 
be secondary and are indexed by the primary types in information space. 
Dey and Abowd also provide a definition for context-aware computing (See 
above, section 1.4). The definition is similar to that presented by Schilit and 
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Theimer in that it stresses the use of context information. However, what makes 
Dey’s and Abowd’s definition distinct is that they continue to emphasise the 
importance of relevance instead of changes.   
These definitions illustrate there that there are differences in how context and 
context-awareness is defined, changes vs. relevance. However at the same time 
the definitions can also be seen to overlap under certain conditions, for example, 
when changes are relevant. 
2.6.2. Application domain 
A fundamental idea of ubiquitous computing is that computational devices 
should be ever-present in our environment. It is therefore not surprising that the 
domain covered by related work is large.  
The early work in the area was carried out in office environments [Weiser, Gold 
et al.1999] [Want, Hopper 1992B]. Since then there have been work carried out 
that focus on peoples’ homes [Kidd, Orr et al. 1999] [Intille, Larson et al. 2005] 
and places of leisure [McCarthy 1998] [Kindberg, Barton et al. 2002]. Some 
have also gone outdoors to cover such domains as tourist sites [Cheverst, Davies 
et al. 2000] [Mobil Turism 2005] and archaeological work [Ryan, Pascoe et al. 
1997]. Furthermore, a large proportion of systems are mobile and work without 
any fixed infrastructure [Ryan 2005] [Osbakk, Rydgren 2005]. 
In each of the environments different types of applications and services have 
been deployed. For example, the active badge project provides a call forwarding 
service at the office [Want, Hopper 1992B], MusicFX provides a personalised 
music service at the gym [McCarthy 1998], and the GUIDE project provides 
information to visitors information of interest [Cheverst, Davies et al. 2000]. 
These are just some examples of different services that can be and are provided 
by ubiquitous computing systems. 
It is therefore not possible to isolate ubiquitous computing to any single 
environment. Furthermore, there is no single application or service that 
characterises ubiquitous computing and can be used as a standard template. 
  
 
29 
2.6.3. Devices used 
A wide range of devices are being used in ubiquitous computing systems 
including both commercially available consumer devices and specially designed 
experimental platforms. Of interest to this work are four types of devices: 
TabletPCs, PDAs, Smartphones, and embedded devices. 
The TabletPCs are the most powerful of the four types of devices. They are 
perhaps best described as slimmed down portable personal computers. Some 
features distinguishing the TabletPCs from ordinary laptops are lower weight, 
smaller size, and the addition of a pen-based mechanism for data entry. Both the 
form factor and the mechanisms for interaction of the TabletPCs are remarkably 
similar to the Pads described by Weiser [Weiser 1993]. The capabilities of a 
TabletPC are comparable to that of a low-end laptop. Thus, they generally 
provide abundant processing power, memory, and disk storage for ubiquitous 
computing applications. An example of related work using early TabletPCs is 
the GUIDE project [Cheverst, Davies et al. 2000]. 
The PDAs are perhaps the most commonly used device type, out of the four. 
They provide a general purpose computing platform in a handheld package. 
Similar to the TabletPCs, PDAs generally provide a pen-based mechanism for 
data entry. In contrast to TabletPCs, a PDA’s processing power and memory is 
much more limited. Furthermore most PDAs do not feature disk storage but 
have to make do with limited amounts of flash memory. However whilst the 
PDAs are not on a par with the TabletPCs in terms of performance, their small 
size and low weight make them much more mobile. In terms of the shape and 
size these devices are similar to the tabs described by Weiser [Weiser 1993]. 
Their high cost, though, so far prohibit them from being scattered around a 
user’s environment as envisaged. Related work using PDAs includes FieldNote 
[Ryan, Pascoe et al. 1999], Cooltown [Kindberg, Barton et al. 2002].  
The Smartphone is a device type that has gradually become more interesting 
with respect to ubiquitous computing as the possibility to run third-party 
applications has improved. A smartphone is essentially a mobile phone to which 
PDA functionality has been added. They are however often more limited than 
PDAs in terms of performance and capabilities. For example processing power 
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is seldom prioritiesed in a smartphone and it is not uncommon that they lack 
pen-based input. Smartphones however have the advantage of featuring a 
mobile-network connection. This generally provides wireless connectivity with 
a better coverage. It also allows consumers to make voice calls and run 
applications on a single device. Smartphones, just like PDAs, can be seen as an 
expensive tab. Related work using smartphones include MobiTip [Rudström, 
Svensson et al. 2004], Mobil Guide [Mobil Turism 2005], Bluereminder 
[Osbakk, Rydgren 2005]. 
The last type, embedded devices, is frequently used when building sensor 
networks and ubiquitous computing artefacts. An embedded device is a 
computational platform that is committed to a specific task and closely tied to a 
surrounding system. Generally, and particularly in ubiquitous computing, 
embedded devices have a small form factor. The actual specifications vary 
greatly from device to device but common characteristics include the lack of a 
user interface of their own and severe constraints on resources, even more so 
than with smartphones or PDAs. Some examples of embedded devices used in 
related work are SmartIts [Gellersen, Schmidt et al. 2002], TINIs [Russo, 
Sukojo 2004], and Mica motes [Hill, Culler 2002]. 
The capabilities of all of these four types of devices continuously improve. 
However, it is still possible to get an idea of the differences that exist by 
inspecting a sample of the available devices. The table in Figure 5 shows the 
capabilities of one device from each of the four types. 
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Figure 5. Overview of device capabilities 
2.6.4. Privacy protection 
With the development of electronic commerce, online privacy has become an 
acute issue. To guide service providers five principles central to fair information 
practises have been composed: notice, choice, access, integrity, and 
enforcement [Landesberg, Levin et al. 1998]. Firstly, subjects should be made 
aware when their information is collected how it will be used. Secondly, they 
should be given the choice of whether to participate or not. Thirdly, subjects 
should be able to access and correct information held about them. Fourthly, 
captured data should be accurate and kept securely. Finally, it is necessary for 
the principles to be enforced. These principles capture the basic requirements 
for privacy protection. 
In ubiquitous computing privacy issues are even more prominent, especially 
when combined with context-awareness. Research into the adoption of privacy 
protection for this field, however, has been and still is limited. Nevertheless, 
some projects have been undertaken on this topic. They investigate techniques 
that may allow ubiquitous computing systems to conform with the principles of 
fair information practises as well as other methods for the protection of privacy.  
From the principles of fair information practices six design principles for 
preserving privacy in ubiquitous computing system have been derived 
[Langheinrich 2001]. These include notice, choice and consent, anonymity and 
Device CPU Memory/ Storage Connectivity
Size (mm)/ 
Weight (Kg) 
A) Tecra M4 Centrino M740 1.73 Ghz 
512 Mb / 
60 Gb 
IR, Wifi, 
Bluetooth, 
Ethernet 
328x290x38‡ 
/ 2.8 
B) Ipaq 4150 ARM PXA255 400 Mhz 
64 Mb† / 
(Exp. card) 
IR, Wifi, 
Bluetooth 
114x70x14‡ / 
0.132 
C) Sony Eric. 
P910i ARM 9 
64Mb† / 
(Exp. card) 
GSM 
(GPRS) 
115x57x26 / 
0.155 
D) DSTINI 
m400  DS80C400 1Mb / 1Mb Ethernet 67x48x5‡ / ? 
† Shared memory and storage ‡ Approximate measures 
A) [Toshiba 2005] B) [Hewlett-Packard Company 2003] 
C) [Sony Ericsson 2004] D) [Dallas Semiconductor, Maxim 2005A] 
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pseudonymity, proximity and locality, adequate security, access and recourse. 
Based on these design principles the privacy awareness system [Langheinrich 
2002] has been developed. The central idea in the project is that privacy 
beacons are used to announce where and when information may be collected by 
a service. These announcements are picked up by a privacy assistant carried by 
the users and forwarded to a remote but personal privacy proxy. The privacy 
proxy analyses the situation by inspecting the service’s privacy policy and 
compares it with the user’s preferences. A choice can then be made whether to 
utilise the service or not. The privacy proxy also keeps track of services used 
and the information collected. This allows the proxy to send updates to services 
when relevant information changes. Furthermore the privacy awareness system 
is also stated to provide secure communication and access controls. Hence, the 
system covers all the fair information practice principles except enforcement. 
The enforcement of privacy policies is a problem that due to its difficulty 
perhaps never will be completely addressed. However, the use of social 
mechanisms, such as reputation and trustworthiness, allow the situation to be 
improved upon. Goecks and Mynatt describe a personalized reputation system 
for the protection of privacy in ubiquitous computing environments [Goecks, 
Mynatt 2002]. The idea is that every user has a reputation built from the trust 
placed in them by other users. The trust network is weighted such that the 
opinion of trusted users weighs more than those that are not trusted or unknown. 
Once calculated the reputation can then be used as a means of ascertaining a 
user’s trustworthiness and thus whether it is desirable to share information with 
them or not. Since the feedback left by a user also affects the larger network, 
malicious acts can be penalised in this type of system by reducing the trust 
placed in the rogue user. 
An alternative approach to that of adopting the principles of fair information 
practices has been taken in the solar system [Minami, Kotz 2002], an 
infrastructure supporting the capture, processing, and distribution of contextual 
information [Chen, Kotz 2002]. In this system the focus is on controlling the 
release of contextual information using access controls rather than on its use 
once released. In solar, contextual changes are represented as events and 
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applications subscribe to event streams to retrieve information. To control 
access, each event in solar is tagged with an access control list (ACL). The ACL 
specify who can access the event as a list of named principals or roles and is 
created together with the event. As the events flow through the system, their 
associated ACLs are modified appropriately to reflect any transformation the 
information undergoes. The access can then be enforced by restricting the 
delivery of events to applications that execute on behalf of a principal listed, 
either directly or through role memberships, in the event’s ACL. Thus, 
assuming that the ACL is true to a subject’s privacy preferences then their 
privacy is protected. 
2.6.5. Security aspects 
Providing a subject with the ability to control their flow of personal information 
is of little use unless the infrastructure and its communication is secure since 
without adequate security, sensitive information may fall into the wrong hands 
anyway. Security is therefore a necessary condition when addressing privacy, 
though it should be noted that it is not sufficient alone. 
The book Security for Ubiquitous Computing [Stajano 2002] provides a 
comprehensive discussion of the security issues that exist in ubiquitous 
computing.  In the book Stajano examines five aspects deemed important for 
security. Firstly there is confidentiality. A secure system needs to keep 
information secret to all but the intended recipient(s). Stajano highlights the 
increased vulnerability of wireless networks. Given the absence of wires, the 
opportunity to listen in on communication exists for anyone within signal range. 
Secondly there is integrity. Information must be protected against unauthorised 
modifications for a system to be secure. Stajano makes the point that integrity 
applies not only to information being transported, but also to information held 
by hosts. Thirdly there is availability. In a secure system rogue users must not 
be able adversely affect the availability of the system and deny legitimate 
requests from being processed. Fourthly there is authentication. It must be 
possible to verify the identity of users.  Stajano emphasises the importance of 
authentication for security and states that confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability can be violated without it. Finally there is anonymity. Stajano draws 
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attention to the fact that it is not always the content of messages that yields the 
most useful information but its existence. 
These five security aspects need to be taken into account when developing any 
ubiquitous computing system and especially if the system is to protect the 
privacy of its users. 
2.7. Summary 
In this chapter the basis for this thesis on privacy in context-aware ubiquitous 
computing has been introduced. 
The motivation behind this work concerns the issues that exist in developing 
publicly acceptable context-aware ubiquitous computing systems. In particular 
the work has been motivated by the need for improvements in privacy 
protection and development support.  
Given the wide scope of possible research within the field of study, the focus of 
the project has been constrained to applied experimental research on the 
software side of ubiquitous computing. Furthermore, to avoid a constantly 
moving target the platform and the technologies used have been kept constant 
whenever possible. 
The aim of the research is to contribute to the ongoing development in the 
combined field of privacy, context-awareness, and ubiquitous computing. In 
particular the intention is to contribute to the improvement of users overall 
privacy, the evaluation of different access control mechanisms, the provision of 
development support, and the protection of third-party infrastructures.  
The research process used has been inspired by the rational unified process and 
consists of the five phases: problem, requirements, proposal, experimentation, 
and evaluation. Together the phases provide the necessary structure to perform 
the research. In this work the research process has been performed iteratively. 
In this work an infrastructure approach for providing privacy protection and 
development support has chosen to be investigated. The choice is motivated by 
the benefits Hong and Landay argue to exist including platform independence, 
separation of components, resource sharing. Another motivation is that it is 
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believed to be beneficial to place the responsibility for privacy protection on an 
infrastructure rather than individual applications. 
Also described in this chapter is related work in a number of areas including 
context-awareness, application domain, devices used, privacy protection, and 
security. What is evident from the work described is ubiquitous computing is a 
truly diverse field, without any established standards. It is therefore especially 
important to not assume implicit knowledge.  
This leads us to the next chapter, which will present the definitions of context 
and privacy employed in this work. The chapter will also describe the 
conceptual models of context and privacy derived from the definitions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
Neither context nor privacy are concepts that are without ambiguity. This is 
clearly undesirable. To develop a privacy-enhancing infrastructure for context-
awareness a firm understanding and formal definitions of both these concepts is 
essential.  
This chapter will present the conceptual models that form the base of this work. 
Two models have been put together, one for context and one for privacy. The 
context model emphasises the existence of relationships between entities. This 
creates networks of contextual information. The privacy model defines privacy 
in terms of control over a subject’s flow of information. It also states that the 
ideal level of privacy in ubiquitous systems is equal to that enjoyed offline. 
3.1. Context Model 
Although most research done in the context-aware field takes a similar view of 
what constitutes context, the exact definition used varies from project to project. 
In the selection of work presented in the background chapter everything from 
location to musical preferences has been referred to as context. Whilst the 
variations in the exact definition of context seldom cause any practical problems 
it is still important to be clear about what specific definition is in use.  
This section is therefore dedicated to presenting the context model employed in 
this work. It will start by presenting the definition of context used in this work. 
After this the derived model of context will be described. Finally the section 
will show how this model can be represented both graphically and textually. 
  
 
37 
3.1.1. Definition 
The definition of context employed in this work is broader than either of the 
definitions described previously (See above, section 2.6.1). 
“Context is information related to an entity, where the information may be an 
entity itself” [Osbakk, Ryan 2003] 
The definition stresses the existence of a relation between entities and data 
values. Compared to the definitions previously described, it is closer to the 
linguistic definition of context which defines context as “associated 
surroundings” [Larousse 1994]. It is therefore hoped that the definition will 
better fit the concept of context that is held by the general public.  
By requiring the existence of a relation the definition also rationalises why one 
piece of information can be considered to be context under some circumstances 
but not under other. For example take the string “ISBN 0-7522-2470-0”. This 
string represented on its own would not be classified as context information. But 
if I state that the string provides a reference to the book “The Dilbert Principle” 
by Scott Adams, the very same string will now be considered to be a piece of 
context as its relationship to an entity has been defined. This context relation is 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
The Dilbert Principle ISBN: 0-7522-2470-0reference
 
Figure 6. An entity to context relation 
It is also important to note that the definition does not place any limitation on 
what an entity must be nor on the type of information that constitutes context. 
Thus given the existence of a relation, anything can be considered to have 
and/or be context. This includes physical entities such as people, places and 
things [Kindberg, Barton et al. 2002] as well as virtual entities such as events 
and concepts. For example, assume that a meeting is held where Alice and Bob 
are present. Perhaps they are exchanging secret keys. This meeting will thus be 
a piece of context with a relation to both Alice and Bob, e.g. current activity. 
But the meeting itself can also be regarded as an entity on its own. It is a virtual, 
and in this case a temporal, entity. Thus the meeting can also have context 
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information associated with it. Obvious examples of such context information 
would be the attendees, time, purpose, location etc. Figure 7 illustrates a set of 
entity to context relations. 
Bob
Meeting
Key exchange
Alice 15:00
attend time
attend purpose
 
Figure 7. A set of entity to context relations 
Finally the width of the definition ensures that narrower application specific 
definitions can coexist within a system. For instance the definition by Dey and 
Abowd [Dey, Abowd 2000A] needs the usage of a piece of information to be 
clear whereas knowing the type of information is crucial with the classification 
employed by Schilit et al [Schilit, Adams et al. 1994]. Thus situations exist 
where a piece of context will be considered context in one system but not the 
other. By using the definition presented here and then a narrower application 
specific definition only when necessary, the information may coexist within an 
infrastructure (the existence of a relation is intrinsically assumed given that 
unreferenced information is seldom valuable and thus rarely used). This feature 
will later be shown to be important for the integration of the developed 
infrastructure with others. 
3.1.2. Network of relationships 
The context model used in this work is directly derived from the employed 
definition of context. Consequently it takes the shape of a network, where the 
network is created from the relations between entities and pieces of context (or 
other entities). The previous figures have shown very limited context networks, 
starting with simplest containing only one entity and one piece of context.  
The world we live in however is much more complex, hence we will get an 
almost infinitely complex network of relationships when using this model. The 
network will represent the context of any entity within it. For example assume 
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that Alice has read the book “The Dilbert Principle” by Scott Adams [Adams 
1997] and so has her friend Bob. Thus a relationship exists between them and 
the book as well as between themselves. Figure 8 is a graphical representation 
of the context model derived from the information given so far. 
Key exchange
Meeting
Bob
15:00 Alice
time attend
purpose attend
The Dilbert 
Principle
ISBN: ...
Scott Adams
author
friend
reference
read
read
 
Figure 8. A simple context network 
What becomes clear from the above example is that the relationships work both 
ways and those entities that initially may seem unrelated such as Bob and Scott 
Adams form part of each other’s context.  
The context of any one entity in the model is found by resolving the associated 
network of relationships and may include recursive relationships. In a real world 
situation this will create a graph of arbitrary size, where the size will depend on 
the number and formation of the relationships. For practical reasons it will thus 
be expected that the length of the relationship chain will be fixed to a 
manageable value during modelling. Although this can reduce the model to a 
manageable size it introduces the problem of selecting the scope. The decision 
on what scope to use will largely be subjective, where important factors include 
the intended use, requirements, and the available resources. Thus the decision 
needs to be made on a per model basis where a trial and error approach may be 
employed. In an application scenario on the other hand the graph size would be 
drastically reduced as privacy protection mechanisms should, and is assumed, to 
limit the length of the chain. Thus it may not be necessary to further reduce the 
context model. 
3.1.3. Representation 
So far the context model has only been represented graphically. Although useful 
when rendering an overview of the context network, it is not adequate when the 
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model is going to be processed. The model ideally needs to be represented in a 
format that allows it to be read and interpreted by both humans and machines. 
So how do we do this? The approach taken in this work is to represent the 
context-network using the Resource Description Framework (RDF) [World 
Wide Web Consortium 2004A]. An approach also taken by others [Korpipää, 
Mäntyjärvi et al. 2003] [Korpipää, Mäntyjärvi 2003]. 
RDF is a framework developed to allow information about web resources to be 
represented [World Wide Web Consortium 2004B]. It is based on the idea that 
resources are associated with properties and data values which can be described 
using simple statements. Such statements consist of a subject, predicate, and 
object. The subject identifies the resources about which the statement is made 
and consists of a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). The predicate refer to the 
particular property being described. Finally, the object is the value of the 
property, which can be a literal or a resource itself. These statements can then 
be represented using an RDF graph where the predicates form arcs between 
subject and object nodes, as illustrated in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. RDF Graph representing a simple context model 
Although RDF is focused on representing web related metadata it is not limited 
to this use. RDF can represent information from other areas too. The only 
requirement is that the resources are identified using URIs. The translation 
between the employed context model and the RDF representation is straight 
forward: entities translate on to resources, relations to properties, and context to 
data values. As can be seen, there is a good match between the context and RDF 
models.  The context model has indeed been influenced by RDF. However, 
there are subtle differences. The RDF model always makes a distinction 
between data values and resources. The graph representation makes this 
distinction clear, showing resources using ovals and data values with rectangles. 
Although accurate given the current data set, it should be remembered that the 
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length of the relationship chain may be limited. Thus the data values may in 
reality be entities themselves, which is why no distinction was made in the 
previous graphical representation of the context model. Note the namespaces 
used here are abbreviated to improve the legibility. 
As previously stated the reason for using RDF is the need to represent the 
context model non-graphically. The most intuitive way of doing this using RDF 
is as a collection of subject – predicate – object triples. This allows a condensed 
listing of the current information in the model to be provided, as illustrated in 
Figure 10.  
Subject: Predicate: Object: 
ent://Bob rel://attend ent://Meeting 
ent://Alice rel://attend ent://Meeting 
ent://Meeting rel://purpose “Key exchange” 
ent://Meeting rel://time “15:00” 
Figure 10. RDF triple representation of a simple context model 
Alternatively the context model can be represented using RDF serialised as 
XML (RDF/XML) [World Wide Web Consortium 2004C], see Figure 11. Even 
though the structure of RDF/XML is more verbose than RDF triples, this is the 
preferred format. A key benefit of RDF/XML is that the format is well defined. 
By using services such as the W3C RDF Validation Service [World Wide Web 
Consortium 2005A] the validity of such a document can thus be established. 
RDF/XML is also the commonly used representation of RDF. Furthermore both 
RDF graphs and RDF triples can easily be obtained from it, e.g. using the 
former service. 
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Figure 11. XML Serialised RDF representation of a simple context model 
Finally it should be mentioned that although RDF does not directly provide any 
methods for describing the relationships between the represented resources 
beyond their existence, the related RDF vocabulary description language 
[World Wide Web Consortium 2004D] does this. This language allows the 
creation of RDF Schemas that define the vocabulary used in RDF documents. 
By using these schemas the validity of RDF documents and hence the 
represented model can be established.  
3.2. Privacy Model 
The need for privacy in context-aware and ubiquitous computing environments 
has been stated to be a key motivation for this work. The need for privacy is not 
exclusive to these environments, nor to today’s society. The work by Westin 
[Westin 1970] that has been presented in the background chapter argues that 
this desire can be traced back as far as our animal origin. However the 
introduction of this new technology enables the invasion of privacy on a much 
larger scale and using fewer resources than before. Although the issues 
concerning privacy were encountered already with the early work in ubiquitous 
computing the work in this area has been limited. Thus there is no well 
established model of privacy, leaving most ideas subject to discussion. 
This section will therefore introduce the conceptual model of privacy used as a 
basis for the work presented in this thesis. The aim is to clarify the position 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<rdf:RDF   
    xmlns:rdf=http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#  
    xmlns:schema="rel://"> 
    <rdf:Description rdf:about="ent://Bob"> 
        <schema:attend rdf:resource="ent://Meeting"/> 
    </rdf:Description> 
    <rdf:Description rdf:about="ent://Alice"> 
        <schema:attend rdf:resource="ent://Meeting"/> 
    </rdf:Description> 
    <rdf:Description rdf:about="ent://Meeting"> 
        <schema:purpose>Key exchange</schema:purpose> 
        <schema:time>15:00</schema:time> 
    </rdf:Description> 
</rdf:RDF>
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taken with respect to privacy. It will also later allow requirements to be 
captured. The chapter will start by presenting the adopted definition of privacy. 
It will then continue to discuss what is thought of as being the ideal level of 
privacy followed by the subject’s scope of control. Furthermore, the section will 
present the process of disclosure in the model as well as how the concept is 
visualised. Finally, an overview will be given of how this privacy model relates 
to the employed model of context.  
3.2.1. Definition 
The linguistic definition found in a dictionary [Larousse 1994] refers to privacy 
as “seclusion”, “freedom from intrusion by the public”, “avoidance of notice”, 
etc. This gives the impression that it is necessary to protect a subject from all 
forms of external interaction to achieve privacy. As such, the ability to 
participate in the society would be limited. Such behaviour may in turn be 
interpreted as abnormal and be taken as an indication of something being 
wrong. Indeed the dictionary [Larousse 1994] also refers to privacy as “secrecy” 
and “concealment”, which is easily associated with negative behaviour.  
The work presented in this thesis, however, views privacy from the perspective 
of information flow. This is natural given the nature of the area in which privacy 
is considered. One of the key differences between traditional and context-aware 
applications is in fact that the latter takes advantage of the information available 
about its surroundings. Thus throughout this work the following definition of 
privacy has been adopted: 
 “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others” [Westin 1970 p.7] 
The definition emphasises the subject’s right to control the flow of information 
about them. Privacy does not therefore equal isolation nor does it imply that 
there is such a desire. The issue is instead one of control. A subject may choose 
to make the flow of information about them fully public or they may indeed 
choose to isolate themselves. What is important is that the subjects themselves 
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can control the extent of their information flow. As such it is with the subjects 
that the ownership of information rests.  
Thus, the availability of privacy does not limit the participation in society by 
default, though a subject’s choice may. The majority however are expected to 
strike a balance between the two extremes of complete openness and complete 
isolation. There are many factors that may influence this balance of privacy, 
among those mentioned in Privacy and Freedom by Westin [Westin 1970] are 
for example the political system in use, historical and cultural traditions, life 
situation, personal preferences, etc. From this list it can be seen that some of the 
factors can be affected by the subjects and not others. This work will therefore 
make a distinction between the range of privacy society allows and the 
particular trade-off a subject makes. The former will be referred to as the level 
of privacy and describes how much control a subject has in determining their 
balance of privacy. The latter will be referred to as the effective balance of 
privacy as it represents the subject’s choice of privacy within the range 
specified by society. It is therefore the effective balance of privacy that can 
cause a subject’s claim for privacy to be interpreted negatively by others.  
3.2.2. Ideal level of privacy 
What level of privacy is then required? The position taken in this work is that 
the introduction of new technology should not adversely affect people’s privacy. 
It does not matter if the effect on privacy is limited. Over time individual and 
even seemingly small sacrifices will add up to eventually give rise to an 
undesirable level of intrusion. We should also not automatically assume that the 
benefits provided by context-aware environments will justify any reduction in 
privacy. The current level of privacy is therefore thought to be the ideal and 
should therefore remain static with the introduction of new technology.  
The reference point, against which the level of privacy is fixed, has been chosen 
to be that of an offline environment. This choice has been made because of two 
reasons. Firstly, the nature of an individual’s interactions with the physical 
world is considered to be mainly offline, i.e. they do not occur over a computer 
network. Most interactions take place directly between an individual and non-
networked objects or other people. Offline is therefore thought to be the natural 
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state against which privacy needs to be compared. Secondly, the level of 
privacy people enjoy while being offline is found acceptable by most. This is 
not surprising since the established balance of privacy in our society is in part 
determined by tradition and culture and thus has gradually evolved over many 
years. Also, in recent years there have not been any significant changes to the 
western world’s politically system, a key determinant of the balance. This has 
also contributed by allowing people to grow accustomed to the privacy that is 
available. Thus this work makes the assumption that: 
The level of privacy in context-aware ubiquitous environments should ideally be 
equal to the privacy enjoyed whilst being offline. 
But what level of privacy does an offline environment then provide? Consider 
the scenario previously described where Bob and Alice meet to exchange 
cryptographic keys. In this situation the information exchange is voluntary and 
under their control. Either one could decide not to share their information if they 
wish to do so. However they have less control over the fact that the meeting is 
taking place. If a third-party sees Alice and Bob entering the meeting room the 
occurrence of a meeting can be deduced. Alice and Bob do therefore not enjoy 
complete privacy, they do not have full control over their information flow. The 
offline world is therefore considered to constantly leak private information. 
Furthermore, there are no absolute guarantees of how the information 
exchanged during the meeting will be used. Even though there is a relation of 
trust between Alice and Bob that may stipulate that they will not reveal 
confidential meeting information, either of them can at a later stage break this 
trust. Therefore, once information has been revealed in the offline world, no 
control is held over it by the person disclosing it. This is also the case with 
leaked information, as once acquired the third-party may continue to spread the 
information. The privacy enjoyed in an offline environment is therefore not 
perfect. Indeed the actual level of control a subject has in an offline 
environment is fairly limited and can be summarised as being restricted to 
controlling their own disclosures, their presence, actions in public spaces, and 
receptiveness. These areas will be further discussed later.  
  
 
46 
What is important to note is that even in simple situations, free from invasive 
technology, information can leak and thus potentially be misused. Thus the 
intrusion caused by information leakage in an offline environment is part of 
people’s everyday life and there is, in practise, little that can be done to avoid 
this. The level of privacy that is needed in an ubiquitous system does therefore 
not necessarily need to be perfect, rather the requirement in the adopted model 
is for an adequate level of privacy to be provided. The privacy enjoyed and 
accepted in our everyday offline environments is after all imperfect. Indeed 
Westin argues that “the individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since 
participation in society is an equally powerful desire” [Westin 1970 p.7]. This 
does not mean though that privacy cannot be enjoyed whilst participating in 
society but that it is difficult for an individual to fully control the flow of 
information about them in such situations. Thus a certain degree of privacy 
invasion will be deemed as acceptable. 
3.2.3. Scope of control 
At the start of this chapter privacy was defined as a subject’s right to control the 
flow of information about them, making the scope of control the primary factor 
that determines privacy. This section will now further describe the extent of the 
control a subject has over their flow of information. 
Two fundamental assumptions have been made about the scope of control, both 
briefly introduced in the previous section: 
• Information constantly leaks from a subject’s presence and actions in 
public spaces  
• Control over information can only be exerted up to the point of 
disclosure. 
The first assumption specifies that there is a constant leakage of private 
information. Even if a subject does not choose to disclose any information, their 
presences and actions in public spaces may allow others to deduce certain 
pieces of information. The second assumption specifies that the control over the 
flow of information can only be exerted up to the point of disclosure. Once 
information has left a subject’s personal space, be it by a deliberate disclosure 
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or an uncontrolled leakage, the subject cannot control how it will be used. This 
relaxation simplifies the privacy model to one that is practically achievable in 
an imperfect world.  
Because of the limitations incurred by these assumptions the level of control a 
subject has over their information flow is practically limited to the four areas: 
• Controlling their own disclosures 
• Controlling their presence or recognition in public spaces 
• Controlling their actions, and link therewith, in public spaces 
• Controlling their receptiveness 
Firstly, controlling their own disclosures is, in terms of this work, the foremost 
way in which a subject can enforce their privacy. By directly controlling what 
information is disclosed and to whom any disclosures are made, the subject can 
guard their private information. Such control is broken down into two 
approaches:  
1. A subject may choose to keep the existence of certain pieces of 
information secret. 
2. A subject can also just reject requests for private pieces of information. 
In (1), the subject may avoid having to deal with requests for the information 
kept secret. For example if Bob does not acknowledge having taken part (and 
having knowledge of what was said) in the meeting with Alice, a third-party is 
not expected to ask him what happened during the meeting. This however is 
dependent on two conditions (A) that the existence of the information is indeed 
a secret and (B) that the subject does not unveil the secret when queried 
arbitrarily. If either of these conditions are false then this approach does not 
work. Such breakdown can occur if for example someone sees Bob entering the 
meeting, or if someone knows Bob frequently attends such meetings with Alice. 
Also in the cases where the subject denies knowledge of information and the 
third-party knows for a fact that this is untrue, consequences may follow either 
due to the dishonesty or the withholding of information.  
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In (2), following the example given so far Bob would then make no effort to 
hide his attendance at the meeting; instead he would tell a third-party the 
meeting was private. This approach is not limited by the two conditions of the 
previous paragraph as there is no denial to possessing the information. This 
however implies that the requester always knows that the subject is withholding 
information, and the respective consequences may follow.  
Secondly, a subject can also control their presence or recognition in public 
spaces to minimise the leakage of private information. In this way a subject can 
proactively manage their privacy, even in situations where there is no direct 
control over the information flow. This area can also be broken down into two 
approaches:  
1. A subject can avoid being present in public spaces where the 
information leakage is deemed to be potentially damaging. 
2. A subject can instead of controlling their presence, hide it. 
In (1), for example assume Bob is interested in taking up employment with a 
rival to his current employer and that they hold a public event. By not attending 
this event Bob can ensure his intention does not leak, thus protecting his 
privacy. This approach of avoiding information leakage, although assured, is not 
always desirable as it negatively affects a subject’s freedom.  
In (2), by remaining anonymous the information leakage will not be meaningful, 
thus protecting the subject’s privacy. Indeed in many situations a subject will be 
anonymous as they will only be seen as being part of a larger crowd. Thus if the 
attendance to the event is high enough then Bob may successfully take part 
while still remaining anonymous to the other attendees. Although this approach 
allows greater freedom for the subject, success is dependant on the condition 
that the subject needs to remain anonymous with respect to the particular public 
space. This in turn requires the subject to be inconspicuous and limits their 
possibility to interact. If this condition is not met and their identity is discovered 
or deduced, either while present or later, the information leaked will become 
meaningful. Thus consequences may follow. 
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Thirdly, by controlling the actions taken, and their link therewith, a subject can 
control the leakage of information in public spaces even when not hiding their 
presence. This will allow a subject to interact with other people yet have some 
control over the information leaked and thus their privacy. Similar to before, 
this area is divided into two approaches:  
1. A subject can actively control the action they take in a public space to 
ensure the information that leaks will not be too invasive. 
2. A subject can also conceal the link between them and their actions, e.g. 
by using a pseudonym. 
In (1), for example, if Bob attends a rival company’s event then by controlling 
his action there, e.g. not openly meeting their recruitment personnel, his 
intention to changes sides may remain private. Once again this will of course 
limit the freedom of the subject.  
In (2), this limits the meaning of the information to the particular pseudonym 
and, if desired, public space. If Bob is approached by another attendee he can 
use a pseudonym if he needs to identify himself. This will allow him to be 
known during the interaction (and between separate occurrences of interaction) 
yet isolating the leakage of information. This approach therefore allows greater 
freedom for the subject to interact. However the success of this approach 
depends on the subject remaining unlinked to their pseudonym and thus their 
action. If this condition is not held the information leak can be linked with the 
subject and consequences may follow. 
Fourthly, by controlling their receptiveness to information a subject can 
introduce uncertainty in the information flow. This will ensure plausible 
deniability if the subject later is confronted with the information due to a 
leakage. It can also reduce the risk of incorrectly disclosing the information 
themselves in the future. Two approaches have been identified in this area: 
1. A subject can treat unsolicited information as noise. 
2. A subject can actively select which information to acknowledge. 
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In (1), by treating unsolicited information as background noise it can be 
ignored. For example, when Bob is at the rival company’s event he can focus 
entirely on the information he is interested in, ignoring what happens around 
him. If he is observed and an attempt is made to communicate with him it will 
go unnoticed. This hopefully causes the observer to become uncertain of 
whether the observation was correct or not. Bob can then insist that a mistake 
must have been made if later confronted with the information. This approach 
requires the subject to be in full control of their receptiveness to information, 
which may not always be possible. However, when successful, the subject has 
no knowledge of the unsolicited information. 
In (2), should Bob fail to successfully ignore the attempt to communicate he can 
opt not to acknowledge it. Again, this will enable him to insist a mistake must 
have been made. This approach requires the subject to suppress the natural 
reflex to respond when an attempt is made to communicate with them. It should 
be noted that persistently ignoring other’s attempts to communication can be 
interpreted as anti-social behaviour and may incur consequences from those 
being ignored. 
These four areas represent the actual control a subject holds. Because of the 
limitations imposed by the assumptions made, a subject does not have full 
control over the information communicated about them. This constrains the 
level of privacy that is achievable within the model and may indeed limit the 
possibilities a subject has of achieving the effective balance of privacy they 
desire. But even so it should be possible to achieve what has been defined as the 
ideal level of privacy simply because these assumptions are deduced from the 
offline environment in which we live. Furthermore, it will now be shown that all 
of the four basic states of privacy (Solitude, Intimacy, Anonymity, and Reserve) 
described by Westin [Westin 1970] can be attained with the available scope of 
control. Figure 12 outlines the mapping. 
  
 
51 
 
Figure 12. Mapping to Westin’s four basic states of privacy. 
The first state, solitude, is characterised by the subject not being part of any 
group or under any observation. Thus a subject can attain this state by limiting 
their presence to spaces that are known to be secluded and safe. The second 
state, intimacy, is characterised by the subject being part of a small group 
separated from the rest of society. This state can therefore also be attained by 
the subject by controlling their presence, but this time to a space controlled by 
the group. The third state, anonymity, is characterised by the subject remaining 
unidentified and unknown. This state can thus be attained by the subject either 
by hiding their identity or by presenting an un-linkable identity, i.e. a 
pseudonym. The fourth state, reserve, is characterised by the use of 
“physiological barriers” [Westin 1970 p.32] to retain privacy, where such 
barriers may involve the limitation of communication about themselves. This 
state is therefore attained by the subject controlling their own disclosures and by 
controlling their receptiveness. Hence all of the four states are indeed attainable. 
3.2.4. Process of disclosure 
Because of the imposed limitation of not being able to control personal 
information once released, the process of disclosing information plays an 
important role. It is only within this process that the subject can actively control 
their effective balance of privacy, using the three areas of control previously 
discussed. In this conceptual privacy model the process of disclosure is 
therefore thought to be like a business transaction where the disclosure of 
information follows some form of agreement that governs how the information 
will be used. 
 Solitude Intimacy Anonymity Reserve 
Own disclosures    √ 
Presence or recognition √ √ √  
Actions or links    √  
Receptiveness    √ 
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3.2.4.1. Participants 
There are two types of participants that can take part in a transaction. First, there 
is the subject, the primary participant, whose personal information the 
transaction is about. Their aim it to ensure that the release of information only 
occurs on terms that do not violate their privacy preferences. Then there are the 
potential recipients of information, the secondary participants. In many cases it 
will be they who initialise the process of disclosure with a request. Their aim is 
of course to persuade the subject to release information for the purpose they 
require at as favourable terms as possible. For a transaction to be able to occur 
there must be at least one primary and one secondary participant. By definition 
only one primary participant can take part since one subject alone should 
control their release of information. However in certain situations there may be 
multiple secondary participants. 
3.2.4.2. Agreement 
An agreement is made between the primary and secondary participants. This 
agreement is central to the process of disclosure as it states the terms on which 
information is released, thus communicating the subject’s privacy preferences. 
This allows a subject to specify what use of their information they consent to 
when released. It also enables the subject to state any limitations or conditions 
associated with the disclosure. For example an agreement may state that the 
disclosed activity information may be used to assist in effectively managing 
incoming calls but that the information may not be further used or forwarded. 
The form and details of such an agreement will naturally vary greatly from 
situation to situation. In certain situations where very sensitive information is to 
be released the agreement can be explicitly stated in high detail, e.g. within a 
legally binding contract. In other day to day situations the agreement can be 
very relaxed and informal, in which case it may be implicitly determined by 
such factors as cultural and social norms, existing relationships, etc. Thus, with 
an agreement there is some capability of affecting the use of released 
information. One may even say it provides some degree of control. There are 
however no guarantees that the recipients of information will honour their 
agreement. 
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3.2.4.3. Trust 
An important factor in determining whether or not to release information will 
therefore be the recipient’s trustworthiness. Once a subject has established an 
agreement with the potential recipients, they need to evaluate if the recipients 
can be trusted to honour the agreement. It is only if the potential recipients are 
found to be trustworthy enough that information is released. This evaluation of 
trustworthiness adds an incentive for recipients to honour their agreement 
because if they fail to do so, their trustworthiness will undoubtedly be reduced 
and with that their future chances of receiving information. There is therefore a 
linkage between current and previous actions within the conceptual model. This 
obviously affects those who want to remain anonymous or that frequently 
change pseudonyms by introducing a trade-off between being anonymous and 
being trusted. Trust management is therefore not only essential for primary 
participants but also for secondary. All participants must be careful in deciding 
on who they trust as well as how they build up and retain their own 
trustworthiness.  
Research into trust management and trust formation is, however, outside the 
scope of this work. For the purposes of this conceptual context model it is 
assumed these actions are carried out by the participants. 
3.2.4.4. Ownership and disclosure 
It should also be noted that even when a recipient is deemed trustworthy and 
information is released the ownership of information stays with the subject. The 
reason for this is that, unless anonymous, the personal information will still be 
linked to the subject after it has changed hands. Thus, by definition, the subject 
is the owner and should be in control over its flow.  Disclosing information is 
therefore considered to be the equivalent of licensing its use rather than a 
traditional transfer of ownership. As such the process of disclosure is a business 
transaction in which the use of personal information is licensed to others. 
Finally even though ownership is not transferred with a disclosure, information 
is for most other purposes in this conceptual model regarded just as any other 
good owned by the subject. Hence personal information, and its license for use, 
can be given away, traded, and even sold. Although this is not an area in which 
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this work will focus it is important that such behaviour is accommodated in the 
underlying model.  
3.2.5. Legislation and social norms 
In the last section it was stated that there are no guarantees of whether a 
recipient will follow their agreement or not. The only incentive presented for 
recipients to follow the agreements they make was that this will retain and 
possibly improve their future trustworthiness. There are however further 
incentives for a recipient to hold their end of the bargain such as legislation, 
social norms, and reputation. 
In this model disclosure only follows after the terms of its releases have been 
agreed. This use of an agreement opens up the possibilities to further strengthen 
the privacy protection. An agreement can, as previously described, be explicit 
and stated in high detail within a legally binding contract. Such a document 
could also include the possible fines that will be incurred if the agreement is 
broken. In this way strong incentives can be ensured. The use of a dedicated 
contract is however not feasible in most situations. Not only is it time 
consuming and complicated to make an accurate agreement, but the process of 
being compensated once broken will most likely be long and expensive. In 
certain situations when dealing with very sensitive information, it may be an 
alternative.  
Existing legislation that regulates the use of personal information, e.g. like the 
data protection act [Stationery Office 1998] in the UK, may also provide some 
protection. However, the applicability and application of such laws to 
ubiquitous computing environments must be further investigated before they 
can be relied upon. Furthermore, even if current data protection laws are 
applicable the problem of pursuing compensation remains. It is deemed, though, 
that legislation can act as a strong deterrent.  
The social norms in society provide another incentive to respect people’s 
privacy. They give guidance to what is found acceptable, and what is not, in our 
society. For instance it is generally acceptable to deduce information from 
occasional personal observations in public spaces. However it is not acceptable 
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to systematically observe a subject. This could be considered to be a form of 
surveillance or stalking. Similarly there exists a degree of tolerance for gossip, 
though depending on the circumstance it could be considered to be slander. 
Given that the breach of such social norms can make the offender an outcast in 
society, the potential is there to provide a reasonable deterrent.  
Finally, the possibility of receiving a bad reputation can also act as a deterrent. 
This is a technique employed by sites such as eBay [eBay 2005]. The idea is 
that your actions, good or bad, are aggregated to form a reputation. This 
reputation can then act as a mechanism for establishing the trustworthiness of an 
entity. Hence it is desirable to retain a good reputation, which requires a subject 
to keep to their agreements. The application of reputation based privacy 
protection to ubiquitous computing environments is currently being researched 
[Goecks, Mynatt 2002]. 
3.2.6. Visualising the model 
To visualise the model the idea that each subject has their own personal space is 
used. This personal space is where subjects keep information about themselves, 
which makes the ownership of this information clear. As the subject alone 
controls their disclosures and receptiveness, access to their personal space is 
limited to themselves. Thus, the release of information can only occur at the 
discretion of the subject.  
The idea of personal space does not conflict with the notion of uncontrolled 
leakages, although it may appear to do so. A leakage is information that is 
deduced from the presence or actions of a subject. Hence, no information leaves 
the personal spaces.  
As previously stated, only information regarding the subject is held within their 
personal space. By definition, the privacy of a subject only depends on them 
controlling the flow of their own personal information. Thus, information about 
others is therefore treated separately. In this privacy model, the use of others’ 
personal information is governed by the agreement upon which it was released.  
  
 
56 
Information flow
 
Figure 13. A visual representation of the personal spaces 
Figure 13 shows two subjects, each with their own personal space and 
information. Although a subject is represented as an individual the model is not 
limited to this. Not only does the adopted definition state that also groups and 
institutions should be able to control their flow of information but this 
categorisation has been further relaxed to include anything about which 
information can be communicated. Also it should be noted that even though the 
personal space is represented as an area surrounding the subject, such space may 
be distributed provided the subject is in control. Finally the arrows represent the 
information flows that occur with the release of information. In this diagram 
both subjects have released information to each other. 
3.2.7. Application to Context Model 
So how is this model of privacy applied to the previously presented context 
model? To start with, the entities in the context model are the subjects. It is 
about them that information is held and communicated. Thus each entity has 
their own personal space in which their contextual information is held. As 
asserted previously the information must be about the subject, thus in this work 
ownership can only be claimed over information with respect to the particular 
relation that exists between an entity and a piece of context. This is important as 
it ensures that there is no conflict over the ownership of information in 
situations where a piece of context is shared between multiple entities as each 
entity will have their own relation to the information. The consequence of this 
mapping between the context and privacy models is that the control over 
context information should be with each entity. In cases where the entity is not 
an individual, an administrator can act on the entity’s behalf. 
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3.3. Using the models 
The models presented describe the position taken in this work with respect to 
context and privacy. This section aims to further clarify the use of the models 
with the help of a scenario. In particular the focus is on discussing various 
design issues and their consequences. 
3.3.1. Scenario 
Think of a typical office environment. There is a reception, offices, meeting 
rooms, coffee area, printer rooms, etc. Employees are situated in the various 
rooms around the building. Resources available are also in the form of 
computers, printers, telephones, photocopiers, stationary, etc.  
Assume this environment has been equipped with a sensor network capable of 
accurately locating tags, worn by employees, within the building. 
3.3.2. Entities and subjects 
The context model does not place any limitation on what an entity must be (See 
above, section 3.1.1). Instead it encourages the use of narrower application 
specific definitions, as appropriate, in conjunction with the model. A key task 
when applying the model is therefore to further specify what an entity is. 
Whilst anything in the above scenario could theoretically be defined to be an 
entity, it is in practise best to use things of interest as entities. In this case the 
employees are the key candidates. It is about them that location information is 
captured using the sensor network and tags. However, the rooms in the building 
can also be argued to be entities. The information captured by the sensor 
network applies to them as well. To understand the difference between these 
two alternatives assume that Bob, a worker, is present in the coffee area and 
then consider the following two statements: 1) Bob is currently located in the 
coffee area. 2) The coffee area is currently used by Bob. Both statements are 
equally valid but the information is structured differently. In the former 
statement the employees are selected as entities and in the latter statement the 
rooms are selected as entities. Whilst the structure has no impact on the 
information captured by the context model, it significantly affects the privacy 
model. 
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The entities in the context model are the subjects in the privacy model; it is 
about them contextual information is held and communicated (See above, 
section 3.2.7). The definition of what an entity is therefore also specifies 
ownership of information, which in turn has consequences for privacy control. 
For example, if in the above scenario the employees are chosen to be the entities 
then direct control over the disclosure of positioning information will be with 
the individuals. If, on the other hand, the rooms are chosen to be the entities 
then the control over the information will be with the administrator acting on 
behalf of the rooms. Consequently, from the employees’ point of view, the 
information captured by the system will be an involuntary leakage. 
Considering that it is the individuals that have a desire for privacy, it makes the 
most sense in the above scenario to define the employees to be the entities, and 
thus the subjects, in the model. However, there are situations in which it can be 
convenient, from an implementation perspective, to also define rooms as 
entities. For example, if the usage of a meeting room is to be monitored then 
defining it as an entity allows the system to retrieve who is located within it 
without having to query all the individual employees. How privacy control is 
handled when context information is shared is discussed later (See below, 
section 3.3.4). 
3.3.3. Context elements 
The definition of context is also an area in which the context model is general 
by design (See above, section 3.1.1). Again, the model does not place any 
limitation on what type of information constitutes context. For a data value to be 
recognised as contextual information the model only requires it to have a 
relation to an entity. Application specific definitions are then used in 
conjunction with the model, as necessary, to further specify what context is. 
Assuming that the employees in the above scenario are chosen to be entities 
then any piece of information with a relation to the employees can be 
considered context. This produces an arbitrarily large context network. Hence, 
to make the context model manageable further restrictions must be introduced. 
For example, in this case it is possible to limit contextual information to be 
positioning data. Whilst this arguably makes the system location-aware rather 
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than context-aware, it is the only contextual information that has been specified 
to be of interest in the scenario. In practise, more types of information are 
generally of interest and a broader restriction must therefore be applied. For 
example, the definition presented by Dey and Abowd [Dey, Abowd 2000A] can 
be used. 
A consequence of employing a narrower application specific definition of 
context is a reduction in the number of context elements supported. Whilst this 
is necessary to implement the model, it limits the types of applications that can 
be supported. For example, suppose the definition of context is limited to 
positioning information then the development of applications that require 
knowledge of the user’s task is hindered. However, from a privacy perspective 
this specialisation can be argued to be beneficial. A reduction in the number of 
context elements that are supported implies that less information is held and 
communicated about the subjects. 
3.3.4. Shared context 
The context model allows situations to exist where a piece of context is shared 
between multiple entities. This occurs when there is more than one relation to a 
context item. As expected, this has consequences for privacy control. 
Consider a situation where a meeting is taking place. Assume the sensor 
network, installed in the building, is able to capture accurately who is present at 
the meeting. On this occasion this includes several employees. Furthermore, for 
the purpose of the example, suppose there are only two pieces of context 
available: current location and meeting participants. In this situation, who owns 
the context information and who should be able to control the flow of 
information? 
The privacy model states that the subjects have the right to control the flow of 
information about them (See above, section 3.2.1). It also specifies that it is with 
them that the ownership of information rests. When applied together with the 
context model it is further stated that ownership, and therefore also control, can 
only be claimed over information with respect to the particular relation that 
exists between an entity and a piece of context (See above, section 3.2.7). 
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Hence, in the situation outlined, each employee present at the meeting owns and 
has the right to control the disclosure of their current location. Furthermore, 
each employee also has the right to claim ownership and control over the 
context element meeting participants. However, since all employees have a 
relation to this element the ownership and control will not be exclusive, i.e. each 
employee can choose to disclose this information at their own discretion. 
In situations where context information is shared, privacy control is 
significantly reduced. Since conflicts of interests can occur, a subject should 
treat shared context information as the result of an involuntary leakage over 
which they no longer have any control. Privacy control must therefore be 
exercised prior to any leakage of information and is limited to controlling their 
presence or recognition and to controlling their actions (See above, section 
3.2.3). For example, in the situation above an employee can decide not to attend 
the meeting or to forget their tag, making it appear as if they are somewhere 
else, to minimise the leakage of information. 
3.3.5. Implementation 
Together the context model and privacy model lay the foundation for the 
development of privacy-friendly context-aware systems. The models identify 
the conceptual issues that exist and provide guidance on how conflicts should be 
resolved. It is then the responsibility of the implementation to ensure that the 
models are upheld. 
The role of the infrastructure is to provide a system independent implementation 
of the models. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it enables a single 
implementation of the models to be used by any number of systems. This 
reduces the risk of the models being interpreted differently by separate systems. 
It also avoids work being duplicated. Secondly, it allows sensor networks and 
applications to be developed independently from each other and without 
knowledge of the underlying principles. Instead it is enough to follow the 
interfaces and protocols defined by the infrastructure. This simplifies the task of 
the developer. 
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As shown, because the models are general by design, a situation can be 
modelled differently depending on the decisions a system designer chooses to 
make. Whilst this can significantly affect the models, the consequences for the 
implementation are limited. Firstly, the selection of entities only determines 
who exercises control over the infrastructure components. For example, it does 
not matter if, in the outlined scenario, the employees or the rooms are chosen to 
be entities. The functionality required in the infrastructure, and thus the 
implementation, will be the same. However, differences can be expected in how 
the infrastructure is deployed and in the privacy preferences. Secondly, the 
adoption of a narrower application specific definition of context only affects the 
information handled in the infrastructure. To adhere to the context model the 
implementation must allow anything to be considered as context, provided a 
relation exists with the entity. For example, the implementation cannot be 
limited to handle only positioning information, as used in the above scenario, 
but must handle information in general. Hence, further specifying what context 
is does not affect the implementation of the infrastructure. On the contrary the 
application of a narrower definition during use can alleviate the issues that 
otherwise can occur if the implementation or the device(s) the infrastructure is 
deployed on cannot handle the demands of the context model. 
3.4. Summary 
In this chapter the definitions employed of privacy and context have been 
presented along with their associated conceptual models. 
The definition of context presented state that “context is information related to 
an entity, where the information may be an entity itself” [Osbakk, Ryan 2003]. 
The emphasis is on the existence of a relation between entities and context. A 
piece of information can therefore be considered to be context in certain 
situations but not others. Furthermore, the definition does not restrict what can 
be considered to be an entity or a piece of context. Both these features have 
been shown to be important. 
Based on the definition of context a conceptual model has been developed that 
represents context as a network of relationships between entities and context 
items. As demonstrated, it is not always easy to identify what is part of an 
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entity’s context. The use of this model however, allows contextual relationships 
to be made clearer. It has also been described how the modelling of real world 
scenarios can be done, even though this may at first seem unreasonable due to 
the large quantity of relationships. This involves limiting the length of the 
relationship. Although there are issues concerning the optimisation of such 
limits, when used in application scenarios privacy will in practise provide a 
natural limit. Furthermore it has been shown how RDF can be used to represent 
the context model in a non-graphical format readable by both man and machine. 
RDF with its subject, predicate, object statements closely matches the idea of 
relationships used in the context model. 
In this work privacy is viewed from the perspective of information flow. 
Westin’s definition of privacy has therefore been adopted. It states that “Privacy 
is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others” [Westin 1970 (p.7)]. This definition emphasises a subject’s right to 
control the flow of information. Hence, privacy requires control not seclusion.  
A conceptual model of privacy has therefore been presented that focuses on 
controlling the flow of information. In this model the position taken is that the 
introduction of context-aware ubiquitous systems must not adversely affect a 
subject’s privacy, rather than aiming for perfect privacy. Hence, the ideal level 
of privacy is set to be that enjoyed offline. Two important assumptions are also 
made about the scope of control. Firstly, information constantly leaks from a 
subject’s presence and action in public spaces. Secondly, control over 
information can only be exerted up to the point of disclosure. Thus in the 
employed model of privacy a subject’s control is in practise limited to 
controlling their own disclosures, controlling their presence and recognition in 
public spaces, controlling their actions and links therewith in public spaces, and 
controlling their receptiveness. Another issue described is the process of 
disclosure. It is thought of as a business transaction where the use of 
information is licensed under an explicit or implicit agreement. The 
trustworthiness of a user and their intention to fulfil the agreement is thus an 
important factor in determining whether to release information or not. Social 
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norms, reputation, and perhaps legislation, have been presented as potential 
deterrents to the breach of agreements governing the release of information.  
To clarify the use of models, a scenario has been outlined and used to discuss 
various design issues and their consequences. This has shown how the selection 
of entities in the context model is linked to the subjects in the privacy model and 
how this affects privacy control. Narrower application-specific definitions of 
context can be used in conjunction with the context model to control what 
information is included in the model. An example of a situation where context is 
shared has been presented and ownership and privacy control in it explained. 
Finally, the role of the infrastructure has been described and the consequences 
of the design decisions on the implementation discussed. 
In the next chapter a privacy enhancing infrastructure is presented based upon 
the conceptual models of context and privacy as well as the background and 
project directives presented in previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
In chapter 2 it was stated that the approach taken in this work would be 
experimental. With the conceptual models in place, the applied work can be 
presented. As previously described this involves the development of a privacy-
enhancing infrastructure. The aim of the infrastructure is to improve both the 
level of privacy enjoyed by users and the support available for application 
development. 
This chapter describes the developed infrastructure. It presents the requirements 
of the infrastructure along with the strategy and the scope of the design. 
Furthermore the infrastructure architecture is described together with some 
alternatives for the privacy protection. Finally the format used for context 
communication in the infrastructure is presented. 
4.1. Requirements 
In the previous chapters the problem, namely that of privacy in context-aware 
environments, has been described and the areas in question defined. This has 
corresponded to the problem phase in the research process. The next step is the 
requirements phase. It is within this phase that the requirements of a privacy-
friendly context-aware infrastructure are captured.   
Even though the area is fairly specific, being the intersection of privacy, 
context-awareness, and ubiquitous computing, this phase is still of the highest 
importance. The boundaries provided by the joint nature of the areas are 
themselves not enough to counteract the centripetal forces pulling the work 
away from its focus. It would otherwise be all too easy to go astray. Central to 
this process will of course be the context and privacy models presented as well 
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as the problem description. Indeed several requirements will be drawn from the 
models. 
4.1.1. Capture process 
Generally the requirement capture process (see Figure 14) entails finding, 
specifying, and validating all of the requirements of a project in detail. 
However, being a research project, the aim of the requirement capture has been 
slightly different. Instead of emphasising the need for a complete requirement-
set, the process has focused on identifying the key issues the work should 
address. As such the requirement-set has been the stepping stones from which 
the problem space has been explored rather than being an absolute list of tasks 
that must be fulfilled. This has ensured the freedom necessary to research the 
area as well as keeping the research on track. 
Background Models Aim
Review and 
Selection
Effective Requirement Set  
Figure 14. Requirement capture process 
The process used to capture the requirements, i.e. the key issues, can be divided 
into two stages. 
The first stage of the process has involved extracting potential requirements 
from various sources including the background, the models employed, and the 
work’s focus. The ‘background’ source refers to the previous work done in 
related areas. This has been the starting point of the requirement capture 
process.  By studying the results from related work a set of requirements has 
been built up. This includes both the features that related work has incorporated 
as well as those felt to be missing. The ‘models’ source refers to the adopted 
conceptual context and privacy models. This source has been especially 
important as the work needs to reflect the requirements stipulated by the 
underlying models. Thus by analysing the models and what they specify it has 
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been possible to extract and add further requirements to the set. Finally the 
‘aim’ source refers to the work’s focus and contribution. As such it groups 
together miscellaneous requirements that the work’s focus as well as the 
intended area of contribution brings out. These requirements have been 
extracted from what has been set out as the aim of the work.  
The second stage of the process has consisted of reviewing the set of 
requirements collected from the sources in the first stage and selecting which 
ones should be part of the effective requirement-set. The effective requirement-
set is what later will be used in the proposal, experimentation, and evaluation 
phases. The review and selection of requirements has been performed iteratively 
during the requirements capture. 
4.1.2. Captured requirements 
This section will present the captured requirements set. To improve the 
overview the set will be broken down into three categories: privacy, functional, 
and miscellaneous. Under each category the relevant requirements will be 
described. It will also be indicated from which source the requirements have 
been captured. The sources possible are: [B]ackground, [M]odels, and [A]im 
(See above, section 4.1.1). In the cases where the requirements originate from 
multiple sources, all will be listed.  
4.1.2.1. Privacy 
The privacy category includes both those requirements that directly and 
indirectly affect a subject’s privacy. Five different requirements have been 
captured, see Figure 15. 
Requirement title: Source
Retain offline level of privacy A, M 
Customisable effective balance of privacy M 
Handle known and unknown recipients B, M 
Decentralised structure B, M 
Security A, B 
 
Figure 15. Privacy-requirements 
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Retain offline level of privacy 
It is required that a ubiquitous computing environment provides a subject with 
the same level of privacy as they currently enjoy in the offline world. Hence the 
infrastructure must not be more intrusive than the everyday environment in 
which we work and live. 
This requirement initially originates from the aim source. It is the key 
motivation for this work to improve the overall level of privacy protection in 
context-aware ubiquitous systems (See above, section 2.1). The privacy model 
then formalises this aim and establishes the ideal level of privacy to be equal to 
that enjoyed offline (See above, section 3.2.2). 
Customisable effective balance of privacy 
It is required that the effective balance of privacy is customisable in the 
infrastructure. To reflect the scope of control the customisable privacy 
protection required can be broken down into three parts: access control, 
anonymity, and pseudonymity. Firstly an access control mechanism is required 
to enable a subject to have control over their own disclosures and to enable a 
subject to control their receptiveness. The mechanism must allow a subject to 
express their preferences with respect to their own disclosures and what 
information is solicited from whom. Furthermore the access control mechanism 
must enforce these preferences appropriately. Secondly a mechanism for 
achieving anonymity is required to allow a subject to control when they can be 
recognised and not in public spaces. Thirdly it is also required that a mechanism 
is in place that allows a subject to identify themselves using a pseudonym. This 
requirement goes further than simply being anonymous. It requires that a user is 
identifiable but not linkable to their chosen identity. 
This requirement originates from the models source. First of all, the adopted 
definition of privacy makes the subject’s control over the flow of information 
about them the focus. Secondly, the derived model of privacy then specifies 
what is considered the ideal level and the types of mechanisms that are required 
to achieve it. 
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Known and unknown recipients 
It is required that the infrastructure supports both previously known and 
unknown participants. Hence a mechanism is needed with which a subject can 
express their privacy preferences independent of the identity of a recipient. 
Furthermore it must be possible for an agreement to be formed with previously 
unknown recipients. 
This requirement originates from the background and models source. Firstly, the 
nature of ubiquitous computing is such that it is not feasible for a subject to 
know all participants in advance, there are too many of them. Secondly, the 
privacy model does not differentiate between previously known and unknown 
participants; a subject’s privacy should therefore be enforced in both cases. 
Decentralised structure 
It is required that the infrastructure is decentralised and distributed. Subjects 
must not be required to have their personal information stored or processed by 
any centralised authority not under their control. Instead the subjects must 
themselves be allowed to decide where information is stored and processed. 
Furthermore the infrastructure must not rely on any single point for its 
operation, but should be able to function in isolation if required. 
This requirement originates from the background and models source. Firstly the 
vision of ubiquitous computing speaks of the deployment of large numbers of 
devices in our environment [Weiser 2002]. This makes a centralised 
infrastructure impractical in terms of scalability. Secondly, the employed 
privacy model speaks of a level of control that is not achievable if a centralised 
infrastructure is forced upon the subjects (See above, section 3.2.3). 
Security 
It is required that adequate security is provided in the infrastructure. The 
infrastructure must therefore provide mechanisms to support authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and anonymity. An adequate level of 
security is considered to have been achieved when a significant effort and 
considerable resources are required to breach the system. Hence, the system 
should be protected against attacks from the majority of users.  
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This requirement originates from the aim source. It is the aim to provide a 
privacy enhancing infrastructure. For this to be achieved security must be 
provided. The aspect important for security has then been drawn for background 
sources and Stajano’s book on ubiquitous computing security [Stajano 2002]. 
4.1.2.2. Functional 
The functional category includes the features found necessary to provide the 
basic functionality needed to support ubiquitous context-aware applications. 
Five basic requirements have been captured, see Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Functional-requirements 
Storage of context 
It is required that the infrastructure is able to store a subject’s context. This 
minimises the duplication of data by applications. Context information should 
also be accessible at times other than when captured. Hence, the storage must 
support persistency. The storage must also be separate from the application and 
under the control of the subject. Furthermore, the type of data storage that can 
be used must not be restricted. This is essential to make best use of the, often 
limited, resources in ubiquitous computing environments. 
This requirement has been captured from the background and models source. 
Many of the context-aware applications previously developed rely on contextual 
information being available rather than constantly sensed. The applications also 
utilise a wide variety of devices with different capabilities, many with 
constraints on the available resources. Furthermore, the privacy model specifies 
that a subject’s context is held in their personal space.  
Communication of context 
It is required that contextual information can be communicated within the 
infrastructure. The communication must not be restricted to any particular 
medium or protocol. Instead the infrastructure should allow the necessary 
Requirement title: Source
Storage of context B, M 
Communication of context A, B 
Synchronisation of data B 
Multiple concurrent agents B 
Triggered actions B 
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support to be added when necessary. Hence, a standardised way of providing 
communication support must therefore also exist. Furthermore the infrastructure 
must support unreliable forms of communication. Finally with respect to the 
applications the actual communication must be transparent. 
This requirement has been captured from the aim and background sources. A 
basic aim of the infrastructure is to communicate contextual information in a 
non-intrusive manner. Related work has also shown it to be desirable to separate 
applications from sensors [Dey 2000B]. Furthermore, ubiquitous computing is a 
large domain with a wide variety of heterogeneous devices being used.  Thus it 
is not feasible to assume that a single form of communication can be used nor 
that connectivity is ever-present. 
Synchronisation 
It is required that the synchronisation of context information is supported in the 
infrastructure. A subject must be able to synchronise the contextual information 
held about them by one distributed component with another. 
This requirement has been captured from the background source. The devices 
used in ubiquitous systems seldom feature a constant and reliable connection. 
This makes it difficult to guarantee that information can be updated in real time. 
Hence synchronisation at times of connectivity is essential, a feature common in 
mobile devices supporting Personal Information Management.  
Multiple concurrent agents 
It is required that support is provided for multiple concurrent agents in the 
infrastructure. Each subject must be able to utilise several context consumers 
and context producers simultaneously. Furthermore both local and remote 
agents must be supported. Finally the infrastructure must allow the set of agents 
to change at runtime.  
This requirement has been captured from the background source. The related 
work demonstrates that contextual information has many uses, uses that cannot 
be excluded from coinciding. Previous applications developed also show that 
both locally and remotely sensed data is used in ubiquitous computing. 
Furthermore the users of ubiquitous systems are seldom stationary, but move 
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about. This causes users to often change environments and with them also 
agents. 
Triggered actions 
It is required that the infrastructure handles two types of triggered actions. 
Firstly the infrastructure must be able to handle context triggered events. Hence 
contextual changes must be detectable and the infrastructure must be possible to 
set up to act upon them. Secondly, the infrastructure must also be able to handle 
request triggered context collection. Hence the infrastructure must be able to 
collect information from context producers in a just-in-time manner. 
This requirement has been captured from the background source. Being able to 
detect and react to changes in the environment is a central aspect of context-
aware computing. Furthermore given the often limited resources of ubiquitous 
computing devices, the ability to reduce the frequency of context collection is 
beneficial. 
4.1.2.3. Miscellaneous 
Finally the miscellaneous category includes requirements for extended 
functionality. Three desirable requirements have been selected, see Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Miscellaneous-requirements 
Development support 
It is required that support is provided for easy and rapid application 
development. Privacy-friendly applications must not be more difficult to 
develop than those ignoring privacy issues. Hence, application developers must 
not be required to manage the privacy protection. Their responsibility should 
only be to publish the application’s privacy practices, allowing the subjects to 
decide whether to release information or not. 
This requirement has been captured from the aim source. It is an ambition of 
this work to improve the development support for privacy-friendly applications. 
Requirement title: Source 
Development support A
Standalone and integrated operation A
Interoperability with third-party systems A
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Indeed the hypothesis intended to be tested is whether the use of an 
infrastructure can help. 
Standalone and integrated operation 
It is required that the infrastructure can be operated both in a standalone and an 
integrated mode. Hence, infrastructure components must be able to be executed 
and run as separate processes. Furthermore, they must also be able to be 
embedded in other applications. 
This requirement has been captured from the aim source. It is an ambition to 
provide as flexible development support as possible. Developers should be able 
to choose the mode of operation that is most appropriate given the requirements 
of the situation.   
Interoperability with third-party systems 
It is required that the infrastructure can interoperate with third-party systems. 
Contextual information must be able to be delivered and retrieved from systems 
developed by third-parties.  
This requirement has been captured from the aim source. It is a goal that 
existing context-aware systems should be able to be utilised. The use of already 
deployed sensor networks is particularly beneficial. By interoperating with the 
different systems encountered by a user on a day-to-day basis, it is also hoped 
that these systems can be bridged. 
4.2. Strategy 
The goal of the infrastructure is of course to fulfil the requirements (See above, 
section 4.1). There are however different ways in which this goal can be 
pursued and depending on which route is taken the outcome will differ.  
In many situations there will also be a trade-off between the different 
requirements causing the fulfilment of one requirement to affect the possibility 
to meet another satisfactorily. For example in this work a trade-off exists 
between the requirements that concern privacy and those that specify 
functionality. The reason for this is that privacy requires, by definition (See 
above, section 3.2.1), that the subject has control over the flow of their personal 
information while context-awareness on the other hand relies on information 
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being available to collect and process. Thus a subject’s claims for privacy may 
hinder functionality.  
A strategy is therefore needed that describes how to resolve such conflicts when 
they occur. In this work the strategy has been to place the emphasis on privacy 
and flexibility. What this implies is discussed in the following sections. 
4.2.1. Prioritise privacy 
From the start the improvement of privacy has been both the driving force and 
the goal of this work (See above, section 2.1). Thus the position taken during 
the design and implementation of the infrastructure is that privacy is the most 
important objective.  
It is especially important to be clear on this prioritisation as the effectiveness of 
the privacy protection depends on the infrastructure as a whole rather than 
individual parts. For example, if the infrastructure strictly controls the flow of 
information to individuals but takes a more relaxed approach to automated 
services then it is likely that suspect individuals will tunnel their requests 
through dummy services. Thus the real level of protection offered to a subject is 
considered to be that of the lowest denominator. This means that privacy always 
needs to be prioritised so as to not void the protection. Hence, any functionality 
must be weighed against its potential impact on privacy and if necessary be 
adjusted or counteracted before it can be incorporated into the infrastructure. 
Take for example the functional requirements “Communication of context” and 
“Multiple concurrent agents” presented in the previous section (See above, 
section 4.1). Together these require that remote agents should be able to retrieve 
a subject’s contextual information. Unmodified, this would be a direct violation 
of a subject’s privacy. The privacy requirements must therefore take precedence 
here, allowing suitable protection to be put in place even if this may restrict the 
desired functionality.  
Furthermore, the prioritisation of privacy must be applied from the beginning of 
the design process. It is at this early stage the real opportunities exist in ensuring 
that a privacy-friendly product is attained. Once the functionality has been 
decided and the design started, adding privacy would involve either redesigning 
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the product or wrapping it with the privacy protection. The former is of course 
time consuming and therefore also costly. The latter would generally interfere 
with the already designed functionality and may still even then not provide the 
desired overall protection. This was recognised already in the early work at 
PARC [Weiser 2002]. Privacy then needs to continue to be taken into account 
throughout the design process. 
The strategy taken in this work has therefore been to prioritise privacy over any 
other functionality from start to end of the project. This implies that in situations 
where requirements diverge or conflicts occur, privacy always takes precedence.  
By doing this the desire has been to maintain an adequate level of privacy 
throughout the infrastructure design, and also later in the implementation. It has 
also ensured that a minimum amount of time has been spent on redesigning 
parts of the infrastructure to fulfil the privacy requirements.  
4.2.2. Modular design 
It is also the objective of this work to improve the support available when 
developing context-aware applications. This is hoped to be achieved by moving 
much of the responsibility from the developer onto the infrastructure. Whilst 
this is obviously beneficial when it comes to simplifying the tasks a developer 
needs to perform, it does however limit their freedom. 
From the requirements presented in the preceding section (See above, section 
4.1) it is clear that a single solution will not be able to encompass every 
scenario. The heterogeneity of the target devices, and their capabilities, means 
that many different solutions need to be supported. For example it is required 
that no limitations are placed on either the data store or the forms of 
communication that can be used (See above, section 4.1.2.2). To be able to fulfil 
these and other conditions, the infrastructure must be flexible.  
In contrast with the approach taken in previous work such as the Context 
Toolkit [Dey, Abowd 2000C], where the toolkit itself was extendable [Dey 
2000B s.6.], the strategy taken in this work to provide the required flexibility 
has been to make the infrastructure modular wherever possible. By using 
modules the behaviour of one part of the infrastructure can be optimised or 
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customised without requiring changes to be made to other parts. This is 
important in order to retain the unity of the infrastructure. Furthermore, by 
controlling which parts of the infrastructure are implemented as modules and 
what functionality they encompass, the overall behaviour can be guaranteed. 
From a privacy perspective this is important as even small changes to the 
handling of information may result in serious loss of privacy. The modular 
approach also preserves a high level of abstraction which is believed to be 
beneficial when ease of development is desired. By making ready modules 
available for common configurations a majority of developers and users should 
be able to put together a suitable setup from existing parts. In this way they 
simply need to know what module or functionality is required, not how it is 
implemented. For example, there may be one data storage module available that 
uses a file for storage and another that uses a database. 
4.3. Scope 
Designing an infrastructure for context-awareness even for the requirements 
presented in the previous section (See above, section 4.1) is an ambitious task. 
With the focus on ubiquitous computing environments come limitations. 
Resources such as processing power, memory, data storage, and battery power 
are scarce compared with those available in traditional computing 
environments. This is the case even when working with relatively powerful 
devices. Thus, there are restrictions on what can be achieved as well as a need to 
be extra careful with resources. The wide range of devices used in ubiquitous 
computing environments, and the lack of common ground between them, also 
has its implications. Each type of device comes with its own set of features and 
limitations. This is of course problematic when developing a uniform 
infrastructure. The more diversity that exists, the harder it is to achieve an all-
inclusive solution.  
While the impact of these aspects can be seen throughout the work, two areas of 
the design are affected more directly: the context model and the hardware 
platform. 
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4.3.1. Restricting the context model 
Earlier in this thesis (See above, section 3.1.1) context was defined as 
information related to an entity, where the information may be an entity itself. 
The emphasis is on the existence of relationships, rather than specific 
characteristics. Thus no limitations are placed within this definition on what can 
and cannot be context. Instead the condition for when something is to be 
considered context is specified. While this generality is desirable it does 
complicate things. 
Because of the emphasis on relationships the contextual model has a network 
structure (See above, section 3.1.2). When applied to the real world the network 
will be almost infinitely complex since relationships exist between everything 
around us. As shown previously even between seemingly unrelated entities a 
relationship-chain can be established (See above, section 3.1.2). Thus the 
context graph will from any given point be several levels deep and may also 
contain relationship loops. This makes the model difficult and perhaps even 
impossible to create, let alone process, without further limitations. It is therefore 
necessary to reduce the complexity of the context model, to a level that is 
feasible to process.  
The first step towards a more manageable model is to reduce the depth of the 
context graph. Each entity in the model, i.e. that is associated with context, must 
per definition be related to at least one entity. In reality they are however, likely 
to be related to many more. For example, a person may have three friends, and 
each of the friends may in turn have three friends of their own, and so on. Thus 
restricting the depth of the model will have a significant effect on the graph size, 
illustrated in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Growing context model  
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The degree to which the depth should be limited is in this work determined by 
the privacy model. The employed model of privacy (See above, section 3.2) 
states that each subject has their own personal space in which information about 
them is held. The context model is therefore in effect split into several sub-
models, where each one represents the context of a particular entity. 
Furthermore, since the personal space only contains information about the 
subjects themselves, the depth of each sub-model is restricted to one level. Thus 
the size of the graph that needs to be handled for each entity is reduced. 
However it is not enough to limit the depth of the context model. Even one 
entity’s sub-model, with its depth limited, is likely to be too large to be handled 
effectively on a mobile device. For example, think of the number of direct 
relationships that exist between a person and their family, their friends, the 
places they go to, and the objects they interact with. Just the relationships that 
are ‘active’ on a daily basis can form a link with several hundreds or even 
thousands of entities. Even though the possibility to automatically establish 
what relationships exist provides a natural limitation, this limitation cannot be 
relied upon.  As technology advances relationships will become easier to detect 
and any such limitations will gradually disappear.  
The second step towards a more manageable model will therefore be to reduce 
the number of relationships. It is assumed that there will always be a subset of 
relationships that are found to be more interesting than others. The approach 
taken has therefore been to limit the context model to only contain relationships 
of interest which will reduce the size of the model. To what degree, will of 
course depend on how many relationships are found to be interesting. So what is 
interesting? This is determined individually by each entity (or its administrator) 
and will vary. As such an entity will be able to scale their context graph to fit 
the resources available by changing the size of the subset with relationships they 
find interesting. 
By both limiting the depth of the context model and reducing the number of 
relationships it contains it is possible to attain a context model that is possible to 
process even on the limited devices that are used in ubiquitous computing 
environments. 
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4.3.2. Targeting a specific device type 
Related work has shown there to be a wide variety of devices being used by 
ubiquitous computing systems (See above, section 2.6.3). This diversity is 
certainly beneficial when attempting to incorporate the devices into our 
environment as situations differ. However, it also means that there is no 
common platform on which systems can be built. This makes it difficult to 
develop a uniform infrastructure that can run on all the devices being used. 
Thus, it is necessary to target a specific subset.  
4.3.2.1. Criteria 
To decide upon what type of devices to focus on, a number of different aspects 
have been considered. Together they form a set of criteria that have been used to 
select the device type to target. 
Capabilities - The device type needs to be able to fulfil the demands of the 
infrastructure. This includes providing enough processing power, memory, and 
storage to handle the flow of information. It also takes into account the available 
means of communication and interaction.  
Versatility - The platform must also be flexible enough to work in many 
environments, to adapt to different situations, and to allow customisation with 
respect to user preferences. Thus it is important that the devices provide choices 
both in terms of the capabilities they offer and how they are configured.  
Availability - The type of devices must be widely available. This means using 
common off-the-shelf devices whenever possible, a point which the work has 
focused on from the start (See above, section 2.2).  
Cost - The type of devices selected must also be reasonably priced. It is 
important that the cost is such that it is indeed possible to mass deploy an 
infrastructure.  
Ubiquitousness - Finally the chosen type of devices must be or have the 
potential of becoming pervasive. In line with the vision of ubiquitous computing 
[Weiser 2002] the devices should be both ever-present and seemingly invisible.  
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4.3.2.2. Personal digital assistants 
For this infrastructure the choice fell on off-the-shelf PDA-type devices. The 
motivation behind this choice is as follows.  
Firstly, in comparison with the other resource constrained devices, PDAs are 
quite powerful. It can even be argued that the limiting factor now is battery life 
rather than processing power and memory. Furthermore, PDAs come with many 
different features in a single package, e.g. colour display, sound input/output, 
text input/output, and various connectivity options including wireless.  
Secondly, PDAs are versatile. Since they are mobile and have a small form 
factor, it is possible for them to be used both on the move and as part of a fixed 
infrastructure. They also offer further options for customisation through 
different models, accessories, and software configurations.  
Thirdly, the availability of PDA-type devices is good. PDAs can be bought from 
most consumer electronic shops. There is also a large assortment of models 
available from several different manufacturers.  
Fourthly, the cost of a PDA, whilst considerable, is still regarded to be 
reasonable given the features these multipurpose devices have.  
Finally, PDAs exhibit the characteristics of a ubiquitous device. They are 
mobile devices that a user often brings with them. Furthermore, even though the 
device itself is visible, the interaction with PDAs is gradually becoming so 
natural as to appear invisible. They can be thought of as mobile personal servers 
in a ubiquitous computing environment. 
Altogether these aspects show personal digital assistants to meet the criteria set 
up.  
4.4. Architecture 
The architecture of the infrastructure is closely tied to the employed conceptual 
models (See above, Chapter 3). It has also been designed with the presented 
strategy (See above, section 4.1) and scope (See above, section 4.3) in mind. 
Overall the infrastructure is perhaps best described as being decentralised with 
islands of control. Each island is a centre of information that operates 
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independently within the infrastructure. These centres are referred to as context 
managers and they are the main components in the infrastructure.  
In addition to the context managers there are also agents, data stores, and 
context manager catalogue services. All of these components interact within the 
infrastructure and will now be described together with the context manager. 
4.4.1. Context managers 
The context managers are the central components in the infrastructure. They are 
in charge of handling the contextual information. 
4.4.1.1. Relation to entities 
Each entity in the infrastructure is associated with at least one context manager. 
This is necessary to ensure a single level relationship chain as required by the 
depth restriction placed on the context model (See above, section 4.3.1). Note, it 
is possible for an entity to distribute their contextual information over several 
context managers if desired. A context manager on the other hand can only be 
associated with at most one entity. To better understand why this is the case we 
need to return to the conceptual model of privacy (See above, section 3.2) and 
look at how the context manager fits in.  
 
Figure 19. Entity and its personal space 
In the model the idea of a personal space is used to represent the place where a 
subject holds information about themselves, illustrated in Figure 19. Access to 
this personal space was stated to be restricted to the subject alone. However an 
entity has a special relationship with its associated context manager(s). A 
context manager is not considered to be an external entity but an extension of 
the subject themselves. More precisely, the context manager sits on the 
boundary between the personal space and the surrounding public domain, as 
illustrated in Figure 20. This allows the context manager to act as an 
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information gateway. Since the context manager forms a part of a subject’s 
personal space it cannot be associated with more than one entity. 
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Figure 20. Entity and its personal space and context manager 
4.4.1.2. Responsibilities 
The context managers have been designed to provide much of the required 
functionality (See above, section 4.1) in the infrastructure. First of all a context 
manager is responsible for storing an entity’s contextual information. This is the 
most fundamental duty and one that is necessary for the operation of the 
infrastructure. The context manager is also responsible for making the stored 
context information available. It is through an entity’s context manager(s) that 
all their information flows. Related to this is of course another duty, namely that 
of privacy protection. Given that the flow of information passes through a 
context manager, it is there the privacy protection must be applied. The context 
manager must also provide the capability to synchronise data. Synchronisation 
is needed to make the use of multiple context managers feasible. The data that 
needs to be synchronised includes contextual information, privacy preferences, 
and settings. Finally it is the context manager’s duty to ensure its address 
information is kept up-to-date. 
4.4.1.3. Multiple context managers 
It was stated above that an entity in the infrastructure can be associated with 
multiple context managers. The motivation for this is as follows. Firstly, as the 
infrastructure targets a ubiquitous computing environment the accessibility of 
the context managers is expected to vary. This could be because of limited or 
intermittent connectivity, power management, or simply device usage. Through 
the use of multiple context managers it is possible to improve accessibility, 
particularly if one instance is run on a server. Secondly, the infrastructure 
targets resource-constrained devices. This limits the rate at which requests can 
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be performed. By distributing the context information over multiple context 
managers the load can be shared and performance improved. Finally, associated 
with the use of small mobile devices is an increased risk of accidental damage 
or loss. It is therefore especially important that data is backed up regularly. The 
use of multiple context managers to duplicate data provides a convenient 
alternative.  
4.4.2. Agents and other actors 
Agents are the actors that allow the infrastructure to interact with the 
surrounding environment. It is they that communicate with the context manager 
to store and retrieve contextual information. Figure 21 illustrates the 
information flow between a context manager and an agent. 
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Figure 21. Information-flow 
The infrastructure contains two types of agents, context producers and context 
consumers. The context producers collect contextual information about an entity 
and send it to their context manager. From the perspective of the context 
manager such agents appear as the source of the information. In most situations 
though, context producers will be middleware that enable information to be 
extracted from sensors or sensor networks. The context consumers on the other 
hand retrieve and use the information stored by context managers. Hence it is 
they that provide users with context-aware services. Context-aware applications 
will therefore be context consumers.  
In addition to agents there are two other actors in the infrastructure that provide 
supporting services namely data stores and catalogue services. The former, data 
stores, provide context managers with the data storage they need. Hence 
although a context manager is responsible for the storage of contextual 
information it will only manage this process. How the information is then stored 
physically depends on the data storage used. With this separation the context 
manager becomes independent from any underlying storage mechanism 
allowing it to change as required (See above, section 4.1.2.2). The latter, 
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catalogue services, provide a service that allows context managers to publish 
how they can be contacted and also enables agents to retrieve such information. 
Thus a catalogue service makes it possible for a constant address to map to the 
dynamically changing contact details of a context manager. This functionality is 
necessary in the infrastructure to support unreliable communication over an 
arbitrary number of protocols and mediums (See above, section 4.1.2.2).  
4.4.3. Component interactions 
The interaction between the different infrastructure components plays a vital 
role in the infrastructure. There are altogether five different types of base 
components: context managers, context producers, context consumers, data 
stores, and catalogue services (CMCS). Each of these interacts with at least one 
other component in the infrastructure. Figure 22 gives an overview of the 
interactions that occur within the infrastructure. Note that the catalogue services 
interact with any component that needs to look up addresses or update address 
entries. 
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Figure 22. Infrastructure components 
Since the majority of the interaction within the infrastructure will occur between 
a context manager and an actor the interaction will be presented from a context 
manager’s perspective. From the responsibilities presented in the previous 
section (See above, section 4.4.1) six use cases have been identified: store 
context, retrieve context, synchronise data, process request, handle catalogue 
service, and handle data storage. All use cases except process request, which is 
internal, map onto a different infrastructure component, as shown in Figure 23. 
Note the separate use case for handling the data storage. This serves the purpose 
  
 
84 
of emphasising the design choice of modelling the data storage as a external 
actor. 
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Figure 23. Use Cases 
Store context - This use case enables the context managers to receive 
contextual information from various context producers in the infrastructure. The 
interaction between the context manager and the context producers occurs 
through one of two mechanisms, push or pull. The push-mechanism allows a 
context producer to push information to the context manager for storage. Hence 
the context producer initiates the interaction and transfer of information. The 
pull-mechanism on the other hand allows the context-manager to explicitly 
request information from a context producer. With this mechanism it is 
therefore the context-manager that initiates the information transfer. Regardless 
of whether the information is pushed or pulled, the context manager evaluates 
the information when received and if appropriate stores it. 
Retrieve context - This use case allows contextual information to be delivered 
to context consumers. There are two mechanisms by which the context manager 
can achieve this, request and publish. The request based mechanism requires 
context-consumers to initiate the process by placing a request for the piece (or 
pieces) of information they require. Upon receiving such a request the context 
manager then evaluates the request and returns an appropriate response. In 
contrast, the publish-based mechanism is initiated by the context manager and is 
not restricted to delivering information only when requested but could do so at, 
for example, set intervals or when triggered by changes in context. 
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Synchronise data - This use case provides the means for context managers to 
synchronise their data with each other. The interaction between the context 
managers is request based and can be initiated by either context manager. The 
process involves three interactions. It starts with the initiator requesting a 
snapshot of the available data items, including identifiers and timestamps. This 
request is then dispatched to and processed by the opposite party. The opposite 
party then evaluates the request and adds identifiers and timestamps as 
appropriate before replying. Upon receiving the response the initiator evaluates 
it against the data items contained locally. Then depending on which type of 
synchronisation is being performed, local / remote / local & remote, data is 
either downloaded, uploaded, or downloaded and then uploaded. 
Handle data storage - This use case concerns the interaction with the data 
storage. This interaction, whilst important, depends on the type of data storage 
employed. The interaction can therefore not be completely specified. From the 
perspective of the context manager however, the interaction must be seamless. 
Thus, even thought the interaction between the data storage and its handler may 
change, the interface towards the internal structure of the context manager will 
remain fixed.  
Handle catalogue service - This use case allows context managers to interact 
with the catalogue service to update the address record. The interaction is 
request-based and is initialised by the context managers. Each time the 
address(es) to the context manager change(s), an update request is sent to the 
catalogue services subscribed to. The update request contains the current contact 
information allowing the catalogue service(s) to update the record held. 
As can be seen from the interaction between the base components, the 
infrastructure is focused on performing particular tasks, for example the context 
producer only interacts with context managers to store information. This makes 
the interaction and the flow of information clearer. Thus while it is possible for 
an actor to take on multiple roles, it is not recommended. 
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4.5. Privacy protection 
It is the main aim of this work to improve the available privacy protection and 
several requirements have therefore been presented (See above, section 4.1.2.1) 
on this topic. There are various mechanisms that can be used to fulfil these 
requirements. This section discusses some of the alternatives considered for use 
within the infrastructure to perform authentication, control access, and achieve 
anonymity/pseudonymity. The section also examines the concept of notice and 
how it is handled within the infrastructure. 
4.5.1. Authentication 
Authentication is an important part of the privacy protection, after all a key 
determinant in deciding whether to release information is often the identity of 
the recipient. In the authentication process it is irrelevant what this identity 
represents, but simply that the authenticity of the claim is determined. 
Stajano outlines three methods for authentication [Stajano 2002]. Firstly, 
passwords can be used. This is the simplest of the three mechanisms. It only 
requires a common secret to be known by the involved parties. Hence, it can be 
used with very resource constrained devices. The disadvantages though, of a 
password-based authentication mechanism are that it is susceptible to replay 
attacks and can be difficult to manage. Secondly, a chain of linked one-time 
passwords can be used. This mechanism uses a verifiable sequence of single use 
passwords for authentication. In this way replay attack can be avoided. This 
gives rise to another disadvantage though, namely that both parties need to be 
synchronised. Here synchronised means that they need to be at the same index 
in the password list. Also every time the end of the list is reached a new 
sequence needs to be generated. Finally, a challenge-response based mechanism 
can be used. This type of mechanism establishes the identity of a user by posing 
a challenge and verifying the given response. This allows replay attacks to be 
avoided without any need to retain synchronisation between the parties. 
However, given that public key cryptography often is used with this type of 
mechanism it is more demanding in terms of the resources required. It is also 
susceptibility to man in the middle attacks. Man in the middle attacks can be 
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counteracted by verifying the origin of public keys using a trusted third party, 
assuming such a party exists and is available. 
Which mechanism can and should then be used with respect to this 
infrastructure? The use of one time passwords can be excluded. The need to 
retain a synchronised state is not compatible with either the distributed 
architecture proposed or the requirement to support unreliable connectivity. 
Hence, the choice stands between using a password based mechanism or a 
challenge-response based mechanism. Both of these can technically be used in 
the infrastructure. The choice therefore depends on what should be prioritised: a 
challenge-response based mechanism is more secure, whilst a password based 
mechanism allows a wider selection of platforms to be supported. 
4.5.2. Access Control 
Access control is at the centre of the employed model of privacy (See above, 
section 3.2). It is via the access control mechanism that a subject is given the 
power to control their own disclosures and their receptiveness. Three different 
mechanisms have been investigated in this work. Due to the scope of the work 
all three focus on static preferences with respect to identity, which have been 
shown to be stronger [Lederer, Mankoff et al. 2003]. 
4.5.2.1. Classification and Clearance Scheme 
In the early experiments [Osbakk, Ryan 2002] the use of a classification and 
clearance scheme to structure privacy preferences was evaluated. The 
mechanism, which will be referred to as CCS, captures privacy preferences in 
levels of sensitivity and trustworthiness. The underlying thought is that as one 
places greater trust in someone, more sensitive information can be revealed to 
them. This assumption forms the basis for this simplistic access control 
mechanism. Figure 24 illustrates the relationship between sensitivity and 
trustworthiness. 
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Figure 24. CCS trustworthiness and sensitivity 
In CCS each context element is assigned a classification level, indicating its 
sensitivity. The more sensitive the information is the higher the level assigned. 
For experimental purposes a range between 0 (public) and 5 (private) was used 
in the evaluation, though there is no technical limitation hindering the use of a 
larger range. Context consumers are assigned a clearance level, indicating their 
trustworthiness. This clearance level then determines what information they can 
access. Only if the context consumer has a clearance that is higher or equal to 
the classification of a requested piece of information will it be released. The 
ability to store information is controlled by a context producer flag. Thus, only 
an agent that has been given producer ‘status’ can store information. 
With only two types of variables being used, classification and clearance levels, 
the advantage of this mechanism is its simplicity. Take for instance the process 
of evaluating whether or not to release a piece of information. This becomes a 
straightforward comparison between the recipient’s clearance level and the 
classification of the information. Furthermore, since neither the classifications 
nor the clearance levels change dynamically, this comparison can be made 
highly efficient through the use of cached lookup tables. Another aspect that 
needs to be considered is the procedure needed to set up the access control 
mechanism. With CCS this merely involves going through the list of context 
elements, classifying them according to their sensitivity as appropriate, then 
assigning clearance levels to context consumers with respect to how trustworthy 
they are. Since each context element and consumer is only associated with a 
single level the workload rises linearly with the increase in numbers.  
The disadvantage of the approach is that it does not scale to deal with large 
numbers of context elements or consumers. The problem is that the CCS 
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mechanism relies on the assumption that the more trustworthy someone is the 
more sensitive information they should be able to retrieve. Hence, a more 
trushtworthy context consumer is always able to access a superset of the context 
elements that a less trustworthy context consumer can access. When the number 
of context elements and consumers increases, the probability that a subject’s 
preferences will fit this assumption decreases. Any exceptions that occur will 
cause either too high or too low access to be granted. Consequently the expected 
accuracy with which privacy preferences can be expressed decreases. Consider 
the following scenario. Assume there are two context consumers, Alice and 
Bob, and two context elements, activity.note and location.place. Furthermore, 
assume that the subject feels that Alice is the more trustworthy context 
consumer and that activity.note is the more sensitive context element. Finally, 
assume that the subject wants Alice and Bob to be able to access activity.note 
and location.place respectively. Note that the subject does not want to disclose 
location.place to Alice despite her trustworthiness. The reason for such an 
exception could be that the knowledge Alice has about the subject allows her to 
infer more from the information. In this scenario a mismatch exists between the 
subject’s privacy preferences and the capabilities of the CCS mechanism. Since 
neither of the context consumers’ access can be expressed as a superset of the 
other’s access the subject’s preferences cannot be represented accurately. In 
such situations the subject must decide whether to release more or less 
information. For example, the subject can either accept that location.place is 
released to Alice or lower Alice’s clearance level below the classification of 
location.place, consequently also denying Alice access to activity.note. Neither 
of these alternatives is of course desirable, but accepting the need to 
compromise allows the CCS mechanism to scale better. However, even 
selecting such compromises becomes increasingly difficult as the numbers of 
context elements and context consumers increases. 
Whilst the CCS mechanism is straightforward to process and exhibits a linear 
configuration workload, the failure to accurately capture a subject’s privacy 
preferences in certain situations, as demonstrated by the scenario above, cannot 
be ignored. The requirements specify that a subject should be able to control 
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their own disclosure of information (See above, section 4.1.2.1). While it is 
possible to improve upon the accuracy of the CCS mechanism by introducing 
individual classification lists, this would both complicate the processing and 
significantly increase the configuration workload. Thus for increased accuracy 
another mechanism is required. 
4.5.2.2. Role Based Access Control 
In response to the limitations found with CCS further experiments have been 
performed with Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [Sandhu, Coyne et al. 
1996]. The idea behind RBAC is to use roles to group permissions together. 
This makes administration easier and provides scalability, by allowing 
permissions to be reused. Another important aspect is that the possible accuracy 
of the RBAC mechanism is not affected as the number of context consumers 
and context elements increases. 
The role based mechanism evaluated in this work is based on the RBAC0 model 
[Sandhu, Coyne et al. 1996]. As such there are three variables: agents, roles, and 
permissions. Agents are the entities that desire access to information, i.e. context 
consumers and context producers. Roles denote the functions held by users, 
associating them with certain rights and responsibilities. Finally permissions 
capture the consent to data access and are always positive. Together these 
variables allow a subject to describe their privacy preferences. This process 
involves defining permissions, assigning permissions to roles, and finally 
assigning roles to agents. Figure 25 illustrates the relationship between the 
variables. 
PermissionsRolesAgents * * * *
 
Figure 25. RBAC variables 
However, while based on the RBAC0 reference model, this mechanism has an 
important difference in that roles are automatically activated as required. This 
simplifies the use of the access control mechanism as agents do not need to 
decide what roles to invoke when requesting information. The result is that 
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agents, i.e. context consumers and context producers, will always be granted the 
best possible access given their current set of roles. For example, if Alice has 
been assigned two roles, friend and colleague, then her access, at any time, will 
be the permissions held by both roles. Assuming the roles friend and colleague 
grants access to user.home-info and user.business-info respectively then Alice 
can access both context elements. 
The permissions have been implemented as lists of access controls. Each access 
control grants access to one context element. Any combination of read, write, 
and history access can be specified, including none of them. In the case of 
history access, a limit can be set on how far back access is granted. For further 
customisation the possibility of agents being assigned a personal permission has 
also been introduced. The personal permission overrides any permission granted 
by more general roles, allowing the access to be fine tuned. This capability 
helps to minimise the administrative burden of handling exceptions. 
Compared to CCS the RBAC has an important advantage, scalability. Firstly, 
and most importantly, the accuracy of the RBAC mechanism is not affected as 
the number of context elements and consumers increases. The subject can 
represent their privacy preferences just as accurately with respect to a single 
agent and context element as to many. The reason for this is that preferences are 
expressed as exact permissions describing access in detail. While the grouping 
of these permissions onto roles may appear to reduce the exactness, they do not 
as the mapping of permissions onto roles is free. Furthermore, the introduction 
of a personal permission allows agent specific preferences to be expressed. Thus 
it is possible, if required, to control access at an individual level. Secondly the 
use of roles offers benefits in terms of administration. Whilst there can be many 
agents requiring access to contextual information, it is not uncommon for the 
number of different roles these agents take, with respect to the subject, to be 
limited. By expressing privacy preferences using roles, then reusing these for 
many agents, the workload of setting up the access control mechanism can be 
reduced. For example a person may have several friends, all of which should 
enjoy similar access. The use of a friends role allows the common permissions 
to be setup once and then reused for each friend, leaving only exceptions to be 
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expressed individually. Finally, the RBAC mechanism facilitates a loose 
coupling between agents and permissions. This allows an agent’s access to 
progress, through role changes, without altering permissions. For example as a 
subject gets to know someone better they can improve their access by changing 
the assigned role from acquaintance to friend. Indeed Sandhu et al. [Sandhu, 
Coyne et al. 1996] point to evidence showing that changes to role membership 
is more frequent than changes to role permissions. 
There are however also drawbacks to using the RBAC mechanism. Even though 
the reuse of roles helps to keep the administrative burden down, the RBAC 
mechanism requires a significant initial effort to be setup. Before any agents can 
be granted access, the appropriate roles and their associated permission need to 
be setup. This is a slow process, particular if the privacy preferences are 
complex, as permissions express privacy preferences in detail. Furthermore 
what roles a subject should define is not always clear, nor is the mapping of 
permissions onto roles. For example should a separate role for acquaintances 
and friends be used, or is it enough to have a single role with exceptions? The 
decisions made will directly affect the effort required to setup the mechanism, 
but also that of maintaining them later. Any strategies must therefore be 
carefully evaluated. Another disadvantage is that the access control mechanism 
is ‘non-fluent’, i.e. access is granted using distinct permissions, or groups 
thereof. This makes it difficult to evaluate whether a particular setup provides 
better access than another, unless one is the superset of the other. Thus, the 
process of improving an agents access is not as simple as increasing their 
clearance level. Instead an individual assessment needs to be made about which 
roles or permissions need to be added or changed. 
Overall though, the RBAC mechanism is an improvement upon CCS. By 
providing a subject with facilities to control the access to their information in 
detail, the accuracy issue displayed by CCS has been addressed. The use of 
roles also reduces the effect of the increase in the administrative burden the 
more detailed control brings. However, there is still a significant effort needed 
to set up the mechanism initially. Furthermore, the non-fluency of the RBAC 
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mechanism hinders the subject from making small but general increases in 
access. 
4.5.2.3. The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)  
Both the CCS and RBAC mechanisms express privacy preferences with respect 
to previously known agents. There are however many situations, particularly in 
ubiquitous computing, where the identity of agents cannot be known in advance. 
To handle these situations a supplementary mechanism based on the Platform 
for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [World Wide Web Consortium 2002A] has been 
evaluated. The mechanism exploits the fact that an agreement is made between 
a subject and an agent during the process of disclosure (See above, section 
3.2.4), allowing access decisions to be made on the basis of agreed information 
usage. 
The P3P based mechanism uses two types of data: P3P policies and rulesets. 
The former, the P3P policy, represents the agreement made between a subject 
and a recipient regarding the use of information. It is the contract that describes 
what the recipient may do once the information has been received. For example, 
the contract may state that the purpose of the data collection is to allow them to 
tailor the subject’s visit. When using the P3P-based mechanism the contract is 
formulated by the requester alone, declaring their intentions. The latter, rulesets, 
represent a subject’s privacy preferences. Each ruleset contains a list of rules 
and an access control mapping. The rules specify conditions that must or must 
not be true. For example a ruleset can contain two rules. One rule could state 
that data may be collected to allow visits to be tailored. Another may state that 
the collected data must not be stored after the end of the session. The access 
control mapping provides the link with the underlying access control 
mechanism being supplemented with P3P. Being privacy preferences, the 
rulesets are consequently defined by the subject. 
To allow assertions to be made about contextual information, the P3P 
vocabulary has been extended. The extension adds several context specific data 
elements, see Figure 26. For example an element called location.place has been 
added to the vocabulary, allowing preferences and intentions to be describe with 
respect to location information. Though, whenever possible, existing P3P data 
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types have been reused. For instance, instead of defining a new data type for 
addresses, the postal data type is reused. For the mechanism to work both P3P 
policies and rulesets need to employ a compatible context vocabulary. Details of 
the vocabulary used can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 26. Examples of context vocabulary 
With the P3P based mechanism a two-step process is used to resolve access, see 
Figure 27. In the first step the P3P policy is evaluated against any predefined 
rulesets. This involves checking whether the policy obeys the rules made by the 
subject. Each ruleset is evaluated independently and only a binary outcome is 
possible. Either the policy obeys all the rules in the set, in which case there is a 
match, or at least one rule is broken, resulting in a mismatch. Once the policy 
has been evaluated against all the rulesets and at least one match has occurred, 
the second step is carried out. The second step resolves the link between the 
matching rulesets and the underlying access control mechanism. Depending on 
which access control mechanism is being supplemented the details of this step 
varies. When used with CCS the rule sets maps onto clearance levels. Thus a 
successful match between a P3P policy and a ruleset grants the requestor the 
associated level of clearance. On the other hand when used with RBAC the 
rulesets map onto roles. Hence a successful match therefore assigns the 
requestor with the associated role or roles. Once the appropriate mappings have 
been made the underlying mechanism can resolve the access as if the requestor 
was known. 
Data elements:
location.place
location.postal
location.coordinates
activity.note
activity.type
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Figure 27. Resolving access with P3P 
The advantage of the supplementary P3P mechanism is that privacy preferences 
need not be linked with a particular agent. They can also be expressed with 
respect to information usage. This enables access decisions to be based not only 
on identity but also on the intended usage of information. Thus it is possible to 
handle requests from previously unknown agents with improved accuracy. 
Instead of simply limiting unknown agents to public information it is possible to 
further evaluate their request. By comparing the agents intended usage of the 
information against the subject’s privacy preferences additional privileges may 
be granted. The P3P based mechanism also formalises the process of disclosure 
(See above, section 3.2.4) by providing a common way of representing the 
agreement made between a subject and an agent. 
Associated with the mechanism are also limitations and disadvantages. For the 
mechanism to allow unknown agents to be supported it has been assumed that 
the contract governing the usage of information, i.e. the P3P policy, is written 
by the agents alone. Consequently this limits the subject’s ability to influence 
the usage of the information expressed in a P3P policy. The mechanism is left 
with only two options with respect to each ruleset. Either the usage of 
information is accepted or it is rejected. Another limitation of P3P in general, is 
that the specification does not provide any means of enforcing nor verifying an 
agent’s compliance with their published policy. An important point raised by 
others as well [Grimm, Rossnagel 2000] [EPIC, Junkbusters 2000]. 
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Furthermore, the specification states that “P3P declarations are positive, 
meaning that sites state what they do, rather than what they do not do” [World 
Wide Web Consortium 2002A s.1.1.3]. Thus potentially useful information is 
omitted. Finally P3P is not an easy technology to use. Policies as well as 
rulesets are difficult to define. A study has shown errors to be prominent 
[Cranor, Byers et al. 2003]. 
Despite its weaknesses P3P is a useful technology. It provides the means of 
representing the agreement made between a subject and an agent in a common 
format. Thus with P3P the intended usage of information can be described. This 
mechanism exploits this to allow access decisions to be made in situations 
where the agent is previously unknown. However, the inability to enforce and 
verify policies call for extra care when defining rulesets and mapping them onto 
access controls. 
4.5.3. Anonymity and pseudonymity 
Both anonymity and pseudonymity are states in which a subject can disclose 
information without revealing their true identity. This is an important quality 
that allows people to perform their daily tasks without constantly worrying 
about privacy. 
Before we can provide anonymity and pseudonymity in ubiquitous computing 
environments it is necessary to define to what degree the identity of the subject 
needs to be protected. In the conceptual model of privacy an example is given in 
which a crowd allows a subject to be anonymous (See above, section 3.2.3). 
When claiming anonymity here it is assumed that the people in the crowd do not 
know the subject and that they do not actively attempt to identify the subject 
using, for example, event attendance details. Hence, anonymity does not require 
the identity of a subject to be perfectly hidden. It is enough if it is adequately 
obfuscated. This suggests that in a digital world, where a subject is connected to 
a larger network with a dynamic address, it could be enough to obfuscate the 
static address with which they are contacted. The same reasoning can be applied 
to pseudonymity, except that the subject needs to be able to retain a fabricated 
identity over time.  
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One method of achieving a basic level of anonymity/pseudonymity in the 
infrastructure would be by using dynamic addresses. For a subject this would 
involve the use of the context manager catalogue service (See above, section 
4.4.2). The CMCS provides a context manager, i.e. subject, with a static address 
that maps to their dynamic context details. By using another or a second 
unknown static address the subject would in effect obfuscate their identity. For a 
requestor no other mechanism is required. This mechanism of course relies on a 
subject’s context manager having a dynamic address. It also assumes that the 
subject does not reveal any other uniquely identifying information and that 
requestors use anonymous credentials. Furthermore, it also assumes an attacker 
does not go to any great length in trying to find out the true identity of the 
subject. For example, if the device reveals their host name this could be used to 
identify the subject. 
Another method to achieve a more advanced level of anonymity/pseudonymity 
involves the breaking of the traceable path between a subject and requestor. For 
this to be achieved, techniques such as anonymity networks need to be 
employed. In the infrastructure the anonymising mechanism can be thought of 
as an external proxy component through which messages can be sent and 
received but not traced. How the component obfuscates the messages path is 
outside the scope of this work. From the point of view of the participants in the 
infrastructure the proxy will work as follows. When requests are to be sent 
anonymously, the requester contacts the proxy with the message and the address 
of the recipient. The component will then take responsibility for the delivery of 
the message and also for the return of the reply. As such there will be no 
traceable path between the requestor and the subject making the requestor 
anonymous. When requests are to be received anonymously, i.e. using a 
pseudonym, the proxy instead acts as a virtual recipient. The requestor sends the 
message to the proxy, in the belief that it is the subject. The proxy then forwards 
the request to the subject and also later returns the reply to the requestor. Hence, 
the message path becomes untraceable and the subject can remain known only 
by their pseudonym. It should be noted that even though this more advanced 
method provides a better level of protection it still relies on the 
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subject/requestor not revealing any uniquely identifying information themselves 
in the communication. 
4.5.4. Notice 
Notice is one of the core principles of privacy protection according to the fair 
information practise codes [Landesberg, Levin et al. 1998]. It stipulates that 
users should be made aware of when information is collected and how it will be 
used. Hence, notice enables informed decisions to be made of whether to utilise 
a service, allowing data to be collected, or not. 
In this work notice is handled implicitly prior to disclosure. As described in the 
privacy model, the release of information is governed by an agreement that 
specifies the terms of the disclosure including any associated limitations or 
conditions (3.2.4.2). Therefore, if access has been granted it is assumed an 
agreement is in place and that the user has been properly notified by the other 
party. 
The motivation for excluding explicit notification at the point of release can be 
found within the foundation of ubiquitous computing. The aim from the start 
has been to move computing into the background [Weiser, Gold et al.1999]. The 
use of notification, which draws attention to the system, is therefore believed to 
contradict a fundamental aspect of the work. Furthermore, the vision of 
ubiquitous computing also speaks of a world where large numbers of 
interconnected computing devices are embedded seamlessly and invisibly in our 
everyday environment. In such an environment it is not deemed feasible to 
expect users to respond well to explicit notifications as these are likely to be 
presented too often. Indeed even related work, that follows the fair information 
practise codes more closely, minimises explicit notification at the point of 
release through the use of personal privacy proxies acting on behalf of the users 
in accordance with their privacy preferences [Langheinrich 2002]. 
The consequences of the chosen approach are twofold. Firstly, it requires 
notification to occur prior to the point of release. This allows the users to 
perform their everyday tasks undisturbed, with the system in the background. 
However, it also implies that privacy preferences must be expressed when less 
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information is available about the situation(s) in which it will be disclosed. 
Whilst this can result in less accurate privacy control, it is deemed that the 
adoption of a restrictive access policy can to some extent be used to compensate 
for this. Secondly, there is no feedback when information is accessed. Again 
this ensures that users are not disturbed, which is good. The drawback is that it 
makes it difficult for users to monitor the disclosures that occur. This in turn 
negatively affects the ability to verify that agreements made are followed. But 
then again, even if the occurrence of disclosures could be monitored this would 
on the whole have little impact as the use of the information could still not be 
controlled. 
4.6. Context communication format 
An essential part of any context-aware infrastructure is the communication of 
contextual information. Simply letting sensors collect information is of little 
use. The gathered information needs to be passed on to services and/or 
applications to provide a user with an enhanced service. Whilst it is perhaps 
tempting in some situations to incorporate the sensing directly into the 
application, previous work has shown that it is preferable to keep the collection 
and use of information separate [Dey 2000B]. Thus independent of the situation, 
contextual information will always need to be communicated. 
The communication of contextual information has traditionally been designed 
and implemented in an ad-hoc manner for each context-aware system 
developed. Hence there is no de facto standard to use. Consequently this has 
made collaborations between different systems unnecessarily complex, 
hindering the development of truly ubiquitous context-aware applications. This 
situation is of course not desirable. 
To address the issue of communication both within the infrastructure and 
externally a uniform communication format has been developed together with a 
context vocabulary. 
4.6.1. Objectives 
The context communication format needs to meet three conditions: simplicity, 
universality, and versatility. 
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Simplicity - The format should be simple enough to allow it to be used with 
resource constrained devices. This is important since the majority of the agents 
deployed in an infrastructure are expected to run on resource constrained 
devices, after all it is they that yield the smallest form factor and the lowest cost. 
For example, both the sensors and pervasive interaction devices used generally 
have limited processing power, memory, and battery-life. Furthermore to fully 
meet the requirement of a decentralised infrastructure (See above, section 
4.1.2.1) any agent must be able to operate independently within the 
infrastructure. Hence, at the minimum this implies that context consumers and 
producers can decode and encode contextual information in the communication 
format respectively. Finally it is also beneficial, if at all possible, for the format 
to be simple enough to allow the data to be humanly readable. This will aid 
developers to debug and test implemented agents. 
Universality - The format should be universal, i.e. device and platform 
independent. This is necessary to support the diversity found in ubiquitous 
computing systems. The capabilities needed by a sensor for instance, are much 
different to those of an end user application. Furthermore, factors such as 
context, user preferences, costs, etc. also influence the choice of device and 
platform. Indeed previous and related work show that a large number of 
different devices have and are being used (See above, section 2.6.3). Thus it is 
essential that the context communication format does not impose limitations 
restricting its use to a particular device or platform. 
Versatility - The format should be versatile. Context has been defined in terms 
of the relationship that exists between an entity and a piece of information (See 
above, section 3.1.1). Thus no restriction has been placed on what can be 
classified as context information, allowing it to vary with situations. It is 
therefore not possible to determine in advance exactly what information the 
format needs to support. A piece of context may for example be a name 
represented as a string, a location represented by coordinates, or even an image 
showing a user’s current view. The context communication format must 
therefore be flexible enough to allow any data to be included. 
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4.6.2. Composite Capability / Preference Profiles 
An existing format that largely meets the conditions is the Composite 
Capability/Preference Profiles (CC/PP). CC/PP is a standard that has been 
designed to allow device capabilities and users preferences to be communicated 
to remote services, allowing services to be tailored with respect to users and 
their devices. The CC/PP specification [World Wide Web Consortium 2004E] 
mainly focuses on conveying static device capabilities such as screen size, 
supported html version, etc. However, the format is not limited to this. It can 
accommodate a more general use through the definition of vocabulary 
extensions. Whilst CC/PP may not be suitable for modelling context [Indulska, 
Robinson et al. 2003], experiments have found it is sufficiently flexible to be 
used successfully in the communication of contextual information [Osbakk, 
Ryan 2002]. 
The RDF/XML format used to represent CC/PP profiles allows both the 
simplicity and universality objectives to be fulfilled. RDF is a structured XML 
format that can be encoded using plain text. Thus, in theory profiles can be 
inspected and manipulated by any device and platform capable of handling plain 
text. Naturally the device and platform support will be slightly more limited, in 
practise, since the profiles need to be interpreted as well. However, several 
minimal XML parsers exist [Wilson 2001A] [Wilson 2001B] [Aadland, Angel 
et al. 2002], one with a footprint as small as 6 kb [Scheemaecker 2003]. Also 
small higher-level RDF parsers exist [Megginson 2001]. Hence, CC/PP profiles 
are simple enough to be processed on resource constrained consumer devices, 
e.g. PDAs and mobile phones, as well as on embedded systems, e.g. on TINIs. 
CC/PP profiles are also universal as their representation makes them both 
device and platform independent.  
The versatility objective however, is not fully met by the CC/PP format. Whilst 
the possibility to use vocabulary extension provides some degree of versatility, 
it is not enough by itself. Two important limitations remain. First of all a 
profile’s hierarchy is only two-levels deep. Secondly the specification only 
defines basic data types. It is however possible to work around these issues, as 
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will be demonstrated in the following section (See above, section 4.6.3). Thus, 
for now it will be assumed that CC/PP fulfils the versatility objective. 
Given that the CC/PP format can fulfil the objectives of a general context 
communication format, it was decided that this format was to be used. Thus, 
instead of defining a format specific to context communication, a vocabulary 
extension to CC/PP was developed. Profiles conveying contextual information 
will be referred to as ‘context-profiles’. 
4.6.3. Addressing CC/PP limitations 
It has been stated that the CC/PP format’s versatility is limited with respect to 
its hierarchical depth and the data types defined. This section will further 
describe these limitations and why they constitute an issue when CC/PP profiles 
are used for context communication. The section will also demonstrate how the 
limitations can be resolved. Please note that the techniques described should 
only be applied to information using the context vocabulary, defined later. 
Doing so will ensure that the resulting profile is backward compatible with 
ordinary CC/PP profiles. 
4.6.3.1. Depth 
A CC/PP profile’s hierarchy is only two-levels deep. This is caused by the data 
structure of a profile. The CC/PP format uses two types of elements to structure 
data: components and attributes. Components are used to categorise groups of 
data, e.g. HardwarePlatform, whereas attributes identify and hold the data, e.g. 
ScreenSize. Thus the attained result is a simple two-level tree structure, 
illustrated in Figure 28.  
 
Figure 28. Two-level data structure 
This two-level structure, although sufficient to communicate static device 
capabilities and simple user preferences, is not adequate to support the 
communication of general context information since essential metadata cannot 
be communicated. For example, it may be desirable to add a timestamp, 
HardwarePlatform 
 ScreenSize = 320x280 
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lifetime, or measure of accuracy to the data. Furthermore, complex pieces of 
context information may also require the data format to be described along with 
the data.  
Different approaches can be taken to overcome this limitation and enable 
metadata to be present in a CC/PP profile. For instance, the functionality of 
RDF, which supports an arbitrary depth, can be utilised. Another alternative is 
to define custom complex CC/PP attributes. However, to preserve the structure 
of CC/PP, and hence its simplicity and universality, a third approach has been 
taken. The approach involves the use of a flattened three-level tree structure. To 
explain the chosen structure, the changes made when moving from a two-level 
structure to a flattened three-level structure will now be described.  
Starting with the simple two-level CC/PP profile shown in Figure 28. To this 
structure a third level is added, dedicated to holding data and metadata. This 
results in the second level being used only as a data identifier. To allow basic 
data to be represented a common data holder must be defined. This data holder 
must be globally known and reserved for this use only. In this work ‘value’ has 
been reserved. The result is a three-level structure, illustrated in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29. Three-level data structure 
Now to achieve a flattened three-level structure, the category information and 
the data identifier are joined and represented by a component. The category 
information and data identifier are separated by punctuation, effectively creating 
a single string. Multiple separations, i.e. punctuations, can be used to create an 
arbitrary depth. Attributes are then used to represent the data holders. Thus a 
three-level structure can be represented using only two-levels. The result is 
referred to as flattened three-level structure and is illustrated in Figure 30. 
HardwarePlatform 
 ScreenSize 
  value = 320x280 
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Figure 30. Flattened three-level data structure 
With this flattened three-level structure context information and metadata can 
be added to a CC/PP profile.  
4.6.3.2. Types of data 
The CC/PP format defines a number of basic data types for the representation of 
attribute data [World Wide Web Consortium 2004E s.4.1]. Supported are the 
following simple data types: string, integer number, and rational number. In 
addition to these, two complex data types are supported: set of values and 
sequence of values.  
Whilst the supported data types may be sufficient for the communication of 
static device capabilities and user preferences, it is not adequate for the 
communication of context information. Contextual information can take many 
forms including binary. Even in the simple case of adding textual context 
information care has to be taken to ensure none of the characters reserved for 
the xml/rdf structure are used. For example a P3P policy cannot be directly 
added to CC/PP policy as value since it uses xml. Another example is the 
current view of the user in the form of an image. 
To address this issue a standardised way of encoding unsupported data needs to 
be specified. In accordance with the recommendation in the CC/PP 
specification, the use of complex data models has been avoided [World Wide 
Web Consortium 2004E s.2.1.2]. Instead it has been decided to utilise the 
mechanisms developed for the specification of Internet message bodies – RFC 
1341 [Borenstein, Freed 1992]. Any unsupported data is encoded according to 
the “Base64 Content-Transfer-Encoding” [Borenstein, Freed 1992 s.5.2]. To 
indicate that that data has been encoded the “Content-Transfer-Encoding Header 
Field” [Borenstein, Freed 1992 s.5] is added as metadata. Furthermore, to aid 
the recipient in interpreting encoded data, it is recommended that the MIME 
type of encoded data also is added as metadata in a “Content-Type Header 
HardwarePlatform.ScreenSize 
 value = 320x280 
 unit = Pixels 
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Field” [Borenstein, Freed 1992 s.4]. Figure 31 illustrates the addition of 
unsupported data. 
 
Figure 31. Adding unsupported data types using base64 encoding. 
Using this technique it is possible to add otherwise unsupported data types to a 
profile. 
4.6.4. Context vocabulary 
The developed vocabulary has been inspired by the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P) [World Wide Web Consortium 2002A] and whenever 
possible its names and structures have been used. There are several reasons for 
doing this. Firstly, the notation used by the P3P is both standardised and well 
known. Secondly, it covers some of the basic context information that is 
desirable to include in the vocabulary. Finally, a P3P based privacy protection 
mechanism has been developed in conjunction with the context communication 
format and by using the same names and structures in the context vocabulary 
the administration of this mechanism is simplified.  
The vocabulary consists of three parts: categories, data identifiers, and data 
holders.  
Beginning with the categories, their aim is to allow related data to be organised 
into groups. This makes the data easier to find and allows frequent data 
identifiers to be used more than once in the vocabulary. There are four broad 
categories: ‘user’, ‘business’, ‘activity’, and ‘location’. The categories have 
been identified from the characteristics often considered by context-aware 
applications, the “who’s, where’s, when’s, and what’s” of entities [Dey 2000B 
p.4]. The ‘user’ and ‘business’ categories correspond to the ‘who’s’. They group 
data related to an individual or an organisation (or non-human entity) 
respectively. The ‘activity’ category corresponds to the ‘what’s’ and includes 
user.currentview 
 value = <base64 encoded data> 
 content-transfer-encoding = base64 
 content-type = image/jpeg 
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information about an entity’s current activity. Finally the ‘location’ category 
corresponds to the ‘where’s’. It groups information representing an entity’s 
physical and possibly virtual location. Please note that there is no category for 
temporal information, i.e. the ‘when’s’. This information is considered to be 
metadata and will be dealt with later. 
Under each of the categories a number of data identifiers have been defined. 
The user category contains information structures like ‘name’, ‘bdate’, and 
‘home-info’. These hold the individual’s name, date of birth, and home contact 
details respectively. Similarly the business category contains structures like 
‘name’ and ‘contact-info’ to hold the name of the entity and their contact 
details. In the activity category, a ‘type’ and a ‘note’ identifier can be found. 
They hold the type of the activity and a short description respectively. Two 
structures ‘start’ and ‘end’ also exist, allowing the time frame of an activity to 
be described. Finally under the location category a ‘coordinates’ and a ‘place’ 
identifier can be found. They hold position information in the form of a 
longitude-latitude pair and a place name respectively. Furthermore a ‘contact’ 
structure also exists under the locations category. This structure holds any 
location specific contact information. 
Together the categories and the data identifiers form the components that 
identify particular pieces of context in a context profile. Please note that the 
structures have deeper hierarchies. For example ‘user.name’ is a higher level 
representation of ‘user.name.family’ etc. Figure 32 lists the resulting 
components in the vocabulary. Further details can be found in Appendix A. 
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Category Data Identifier ⇒ Component 
user name† user.name† 
user bdate† user.bdate† 
user home-info† user.home-info† 
business name† business.name† 
business contact-info† business.contact-info† 
activity type activity.type 
activity note activity.note 
activity start† activity.start† 
activity end† activity.end† 
location coordinates location.coordinates 
location place location.place 
location contact† location.contact† 
 † Structure 
Figure 32. Context vocabulary components. 
Finally the vocabulary defines several data holders, see Figure 33. These form 
the attributes in the context profile.  The most fundamental data holder defined 
in the vocabulary is ‘value’. Its purpose is to hold the actual context information 
in the flattened three-level structure (See above, section 4.6.3.1). The remaining 
data holders defined in the vocabulary only contain metadata. They are:  
‘content-transfer-encoding’, ‘content-type’, ‘timestamp’, ‘accuracy’, 
‘confidence’, ‘lifetime’. The ‘content-transfer-encoding’ and the ‘content-type’ 
hold metadata that describe the format and content of the data contained in the 
‘value’ attribute. They are used when adding data that cannot be supported by 
the built in data types (See above, section 4.6.3.2). The ‘timestamp’ attribute 
allows the data to be accompanied with a date and time, generally showing 
when the information was captured. Thus, the ‘timestamp’ takes into account 
the ‘when’s’. The ‘accuracy’ and ‘confidence’ attributes allow estimates of the 
quality to be included. Finally the ‘lifetime’ attribute can be used to represent 
the expected validity period of the data. Further details can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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Data holder ⇒ Attribute 
value 
content-type 
content-transfer-encoding 
timestamp 
accuracy 
confidence 
lifetime 
Figure 33. Context vocabulary attributes 
With the described components and attributes the context vocabulary enables 
basic contextual information to be communicated. Naturally the support is 
limited to only a small subset of all possible contexts that it may be desirable to 
communicate. It has never been the aim to provide a complete vocabulary. 
Instead the vocabulary has been developed for the needs of this infrastructure. It 
is then expected that further compatible vocabulary extensions will be defined 
as required. 
4.7. Summary 
In this chapter the design of a privacy enhancing infrastructure has been 
described.  
The requirements capture has involved extracting potential requirements from 
the aim, the background, and the employed models then reviewing these to form 
an effective requirements set. The set consists of three categories of 
requirements privacy, functional, and miscellaneous. The privacy category is 
the most important with requirements such as: retain offline level of privacy, 
customisable balance of privacy, ability to handle both known and unknown 
agents, decentralised structure, and security being covered. 
Also presented is the strategy taken during the development as well as the scope 
of the infrastructure. The strategy has involved prioritising privacy throughout 
the work rather than functionality. It has also been an objective to produce a 
modular design that allows customisation. The scope of the infrastructure has 
been adjusted to fit area of ubiquitous computing. To reduce the required 
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resources the depth of the context model has been restricted. Also to simplify 
the development a specific type of device, namely, personal digital assistants 
has been targeted. 
To meet the requirements, a decentralised component based architecture has 
been designed for the infrastructure. The main component in the architecture is 
the context manager. Each entity in the infrastructure is associated with at least 
one context manager that handles their contextual information. Interacting with 
the context managers are agents, context consumers and context producers, that 
retrieve or store contextual information, respectively. There is also a data 
storage component and a catalogue service component in the architecture, 
providing storage of date and address resolution, respectively. 
For privacy protection the focus is on access control. Thus, three different 
access control mechanisms have been presented. A classification and clearance 
scheme that uses levels to express information sensitivity and the 
trustworthiness of context consumers. A role based access control mechanism 
that uses roles and permission to specify access. And a mechanism based on the 
platform for privacy preferences that enables preferences to be expressed with 
respect to privacy polices. Discussed is also anonymity/pseudonymity and 
briefly authentication. 
A context communication format has also been presented. In developing the 
format the properties of simplicity, universality, and versatility has been 
emphasised. Subsequently, the Composite Capability Preference Profiles, an 
existing data format, has been extended for more general use. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The previous chapter has described the architecture of a privacy-enhancing 
infrastructure. It has also described some alternatives for privacy protection and 
a context communication format. Together these partially fulfil the 
requirements.  Before the infrastructure can be evaluated however, it needs to be 
implemented. The implementation also provides the remaining features 
necessary to meet the requirements. 
This chapter presents the implementation of the infrastructure developed. 
Particular attention has been given to explaining implementation specific 
details, relevant to the fulfilment of requirements. The chapter also presents a 
number of agents developed to test and demonstrate the infrastructure. 
5.1. Overview 
Following the previously presented architecture (See above, section 4.4), the 
implementation consists of several components. Each component will be 
described in detail in this chapter and an overview is provided by Figure 34. 
Context-Aware 
Desk Display
Context
Manager
Web Presence
iButton Context
Capture
Proxy
HTTP-Socket
Data Storage
CMCS
Admin.
Console
 
Figure 34. Overview of implemented infrastructure components. 
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5.2. Platform 
All the components in the infrastructure have been implemented in Java. This 
makes the infrastructure platform independent. Since the infrastructure is 
targeted at resource constrained device types, personal digital assistants (See 
above, section 4.3.2), it has been developed for the Micro Edition of the Java 2 
Platform (J2ME) [Sun Microsystems 2002]. More precisely the infrastructure 
has been developed for the Connected Device Configuration [Java Community 
Process 2002A], Foundation Profile [Java Community Process 2002B], and the 
Personal Profile [Java Community Process 2002C]. Together these components 
form a complete Java runtime environment that is suitable for use on resource 
constrained devices. It will henceforth be referred to as J2ME CDC/PP. 
A distinct advantage of the J2ME CDC/PP platform is its compatibility with 
both Java 2 Platform, Standard Edition (J2SE) and Personal Java Application 
Environment (PJAE) [Sun Microsystems 1998]. This enables the infrastructure 
to be deployed on a wide range of devices. The compatibility with J2SE 
platform allows the application to run on more powerful traditional computing 
devices, e.g. desktops and servers, whilst PJAE provides backward 
compatibility with older pre-J2ME environments, e.g. PDAs and Smartphones. 
5.3. Context Manager 
As previously stated the Context Managers are the central components in the 
infrastructure (See above, section 4.4.1). It is with them the other infrastructure 
components interact to store and receive contextual information. This 
interaction is performed using a request/response protocol, where the context 
manager takes the server role. Hence the context managers are to run as 
background processes in the infrastructure, constantly ready to receive requests 
from agents. The requests form the inward flow of information to the context 
manager. Each request is processed by the context manager upon being 
received. Once processed the context manager returns an appropriate response. 
The responses form the outward flow of information. Figure 35 illustrates the 
inward/outward flow of information. 
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Context 
ManagerRequest Response
 
Figure 35. Inward and outward flow of information 
The context manager’s handling of incoming requests can be broken down into 
four stages, as illustrated in Figure 36, each addressing a different aspect. The 
first stage is inward communication. During this stage the context manager 
receives the incoming request and, if required, decrypts the request. The second 
stage is privacy protection. It is during this stage the subject’s privacy 
preferences are enforced. This includes verifying the requestor’s supplied 
credentials, evaluating their access, and filtering the request to remove any 
unauthorised actions. The third stage is request fulfilment. During this stage the 
request is executed. This involves going through a pre-processing procedure, 
performing the authorised actions, and carrying out a post-processing procedure. 
The fourth and last stage is outward communication. At this stage the response 
is encrypted, if required, and the response is returned to the requestor. 
 
Figure 36. The CM’s request handling stages and their subsidiary steps. 
The implementation of these four stages will now be described. 
Stage 1: Communication – inward 
• Receive request 
• Decrypt request 
Stage 2: Privacy protection 
• Authenticate 
• Evaluate access 
• Filter request 
Stage 3: Request fulfilment 
• Pre-processing 
• Perform actions 
• Post-processing 
Stage 4: Communication – outward 
• Encrypt response 
• Return response
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5.3.1. Communication 
Several of the captured requirements concern the communication in the 
infrastructure either directly or indirectly (See above, section 4.1). It is therefore 
not surprising that communication plays an important part in the handling of 
requests. In fact given the architecture, communication is essential even for the 
most basic operations such as allowing agents to interact with the context 
managers to store and retrieve information (See above, section 4.4.3).  
To meet the captured communication requirements a customisable 
communication scheme has been constructed. The scheme focuses on three 
different aspects of communication namely the method of communication, the 
transport mechanism, and confidentiality. This is illustrated in Figure 37. 
Transport 
mechanism
Method of 
communication Confidentiality
Communication
 
Figure 37. The three aspects of communication. 
5.3.1.1. Method of communication 
A method of communication has been implemented that suites the 
request/response style interaction employed by the context manager.  
The method splits interaction dialogues into sequences of messages, where each 
message is either a request or a response. A message consists of two parts: a 
header and a body. The header is primarily used to communicate information 
that applies to the message as a whole. This includes information such as the 
status of the request/response, authentication details, etc. It can also be used to 
issue special commands, to retrieve a public key for example. The body on the 
other hand contains the action to be performed. An action can for example be to 
store or retrieve a piece of contextual information. Within a single request 
multiple actions can be performed.  
In the infrastructure the messages are represented using an extension to the 
context communication format described earlier (See above, section 4.5.4). The 
extension allows implementation specific information to be encoded. 
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Specifically it provides support for the header-body structure and extends the 
vocabulary to handle various actions. It should be noted that any messages 
represented are still valid ‘context profiles’ and compatible with the CC/PP 
specification [World Wide Web Consortium 2004E]. The extension merely 
provides the semantics necessary to create and interpret infrastructure specific 
messages accurately. 
Context profile extension 
Support for the header-body structure is added to the ‘context profiles’ by 
introducing a component, reserved for header information. The header 
component, just as any other component, then uses attributes to hold data. The 
rest of the context profile forms the body. This approach ensures that the 
context-profile is backward compatible, as only additions to the vocabulary are 
made. However it does limit the type of information that can be embedded in 
the header. For example, it is not possible for a piece of information stored in 
the header to have associated metadata. This restriction is acceptable though, as 
the header must only contain metadata with respect to the whole message or 
special commands.  
The header component is mandatory when communicating with a context 
manager. Furthermore, every request must at least contain a ‘username’ 
attribute in the header, where an anonymous use is supported with the data 
value ‘anonymous’. In addition to the ‘username’ attribute, there are several 
optional attributes including ‘password’, ‘encrypteddata’, ‘publickey’, ‘status’, 
etc. Figure 38 provides additional information about the frequently used header 
attributes. For a more comprehensive listing consult Appendix B. 
 
Figure 38. Frequently used header attributes 
Header attribute Description
username The requester’s identity.
password  Password authenticating the claimed identity.   
encrypted The name of the employed cipher. 
encryptedData Holds encrypted data.
command Any command to be performed, e.g. synchronise. 
status The request’s status.
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Additional attributes are also defined for use within the message body. The 
message body is the optional part of the message that carries contextual 
information. The information is embedded directly in the ‘context profiles’ as 
previously described using components and attributes (See above, section 
4.6.4). The additional attributes defined are specific for the context manager 
implementation and are applied individually on each component in the context 
profile. Several attributes are included in the extension including ‘action’ and 
‘status’. The ‘action’ attribute, for example, is mandatory if the context manager 
is to process the component. It can hold the values ‘read’, ‘write’, and ‘history’. 
They correspond to the retrieval of current contextual information, the storing of 
contextual information, and the retrieval of past contextual information. Figure 
39 provides additional information about the frequently used body attributes. 
For a more comprehensive listing consult Appendix B. 
 
Figure 39. Frequently used body attributes 
5.3.1.2. Transport mechanism 
The context manager has been implemented to use plug-ins to transport 
messages. This allows the low-level details of the transport mechanism to be 
transparent to the context manager. Hence, the context manager is only 
responsible for the handling of transport plug-ins. The details of the transport 
mechanism are then implemented in the plug-ins.  
There are two types of plug-ins being used, server plug-ins and client plug-ins. 
The server plug-ins provide the ability to receive requests and return responses. 
The client plug-ins on the other hand allow requests to be made and responses 
to be received. Together a plug-in pair provides the necessary mechanism to 
support a two-way transportation of messages, see Figure 40.  
Request
ResponseClient plug-in Server plug-in
 
Figure 40. Client and server plug-ins. 
Body attribute Description
action The action to be performed.
status The status of the individual action. 
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Each client and server pair is implemented to handle a particular mode of 
transport. Furthermore the client-server pairs are exchangeable and multiple 
pairs can co-exist. This ensures that the mode of transport is fully customised, as 
required (See above, section 4.1.2.2).  
Transport plug-ins 
Whilst the details of the transport mechanism differ from plug-in to plug-in, 
their interface towards the infrastructure components must follow strict 
guidelines. 
First of all, the plug-ins must follow a specified naming scheme and be located 
in a known package. The naming scheme divides the name of the class into two 
parts a plug-in name and a suffix. The plug-in name can be any combination of 
lowercase letters but must be the same for both plug-ins in a pair. The suffix on 
the other hand varies with the type of plug-in, where the client plug-in must use 
the suffix ‘TCP’ and the server plug-in ‘TSP’. Note that the suffix must always 
be in capital letters. The package the plug-in classes must be located in is 
‘net.osbakk.pi.cm.plugins’. It is important that the naming scheme is followed 
and that the classes are placed in the right package as the context manager will 
use this information when dynamically loading plug-in classes. 
Secondly, each plug-in must implement an interface that corresponds to its type. 
Starting with the client plug-in, the less complex of the pair, it must implement 
the ‘TCPInterface’, outlined in Figure 41. The TCPInterface mandates that 
methods to initialise the plug-in and to post requests are implemented. Then 
there is the server plug-in. It must implement the ‘TSPInterface’, outlined in 
Figure 42. The TSPInterface requires seven methods to be implemented 
including methods to initialise the plug-in, to control and retrieve its state, to 
retrieve any associated addresses, to post responses, and to attach 
communication event listeners. The communication event listeners provide the 
link between the plug-in and context manager and must be used to pass on 
incoming messages as events. Full details of both interfaces can be found in 
Appendix C.2 and C.3 respectively. The details of the communication event 
listener and the events that must be sent by the transport server plug-in are 
available in Appendix C.4 and C.5 respectively. 
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Figure 41. Transport client plug-in specification. 
 
Figure 42. Transport server plug-in specification. 
Socket Plug-in implementation 
A transport plug-in pair has been implemented that uses TCP/IP sockets as the 
means of transport. The socket plug-in pair transports the messages as a single 
stream of characters only preceded by the length of the message being sent. The 
length of the message consists of an integer ending with a hash character. The 
implementation works as follows and its lifecycle is illustrated in Figure 43.  
Beginning with the server side. When the context manager is started it checks 
the configuration to see which plug-ins to load. Assuming the context manager 
has been configured to use the socket server plug-in, the plug-in is loaded. Once 
loaded the plug-in is initialised. During the initialisation the plug-in parses the 
properties file and extracts the address of the server. If not manually configured, 
this information is detected automatically. When this is done the context 
manager activates the plug-in by calling the connect method, prompting it to 
start listening for connection on the default port. If for some reason the port is 
unavailable, another port will be chosen automatically and the addresses 
Name: <plug-in name>TSP† 
Package: net.osbakk.pi.cm.plugins 
Impl. interfaces: TSPInterface 
Methods: 
init isConnected addComEventListener 
connect getAddresses  
disconnect reply  
Notes: N/A 
†<plug-in name> follows regular expression [a-z]+ 
Name: <plug-in name>TCP† 
Package: net.osbakk.pi.cm.plugins 
Impl. interfaces: TCPInterface 
Methods: 
init post  
Notes: N/A 
†<plug-in name> follows regular expression [a-z]+ 
  
 
118 
updated appropriately. Once listening to the port the plug-in sits in the 
connected state, ready to receive requests from agents and responses from the 
context manager. Upon receiving a request it will wrap the message, together 
with a connection identifier, in an event and pass it on to the context manager 
using the communication event listener. The request will then be processed by 
the context manager before a response is returned. Upon receiving a reply event 
from the context manager the server plug-in will unwrap the event and extract 
the message and the connection identifier. The message containing the response 
will then be returned to the requestor using the appropriate connection. Once 
done the server plug-in returns to the connected state. The plug-in is capable of 
processing multiple request/responses at once. Finally when the context 
manager is shutting down it will deactivate the server plug-in. This causes the 
plug-in to stop listening for new connections and terminate with the context 
manager.  
On the client side, the process starts when the first message is going to be sent 
to a particular context manager using the socket protocol. The agent first loads 
the client plug-in. The plug-in is then initialised with the context manager’s 
address. Once initialised the plug-in sits in a disconnected state ready to post 
requests. Then when a message is to be posted a connection is opened to the 
specified address and a request sent. The client plug-in will then be placed in a 
connected state, waiting for a response. When the client plug-in receives the 
response, it closes the connection and returns the received message to the agent. 
If no timely response is received the plug-in will time-out. This will also close 
the connection, but instead of returning a response an exception will be thrown. 
Once the connection is closed the plug-in will return to the disconnected state. 
The plug-in then remains in the disconnected state until another request is 
posted or the agent terminates it. 
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Initialised
/ parse properties
/ start listening on port
Connected
[action = event] / handle event
[action = disconnect] / stop listening on port
Disconnected
/ terminate
Server
Initialised
/ parse properties
Disconnected
[action = terminate] / terminate
[action = event] / connect,post message
/ return response or time-out
Connected
Client
 
Figure 43. Socket server and client plug-in lifecycles. 
5.3.1.3. Confidentiality 
To ensure the confidentiality of the communication another plug-in based 
mechanism has been implemented. The mechanism uses cryptographic plug-ins 
to secure the interaction dialogue. Each cryptographic plug-in developed is 
responsible for both the encryption and decryption of messages using their own 
particular function(s). Furthermore, the plug-in must be able to generate suitable 
keys. Consequently each plug-in provides a complete cryptographic solution 
including encryption, decryption, and key generation. 
The implemented mechanism does not impose any direct limitation on what 
type of cryptographic functions to be used, though it has been designed with 
public key cryptography in mind. This allows differences both in requirements 
as well as legislation to be supported. Moreover just as the transport plug-ins are 
exchangeable so are the cryptographic plug-ins. Hence a selection of 
cryptographic functionality can be provided using different plug-ins. The 
mechanism also allows the different cryptographic plug-ins to co-exist, ensuring 
wide runtime support. 
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Cryptographic plug-ins 
All cryptographic plug-ins must have a common interface towards the context 
manager. This interface is defined by the following criteria. 
First of all, the cryptographic plug-ins must follow a particular naming scheme. 
The scheme is similar to the one used by transport plug-ins. Hence the name of 
the class consists of a plug-in name and a suffix. The plug-in name can be any 
combination of lower case letters, whilst the suffix must be ‘EDP’ in capital 
letters. The plug-in must also be located in the plug-in package 
‘net.osbakk.pi.cm.plugins’. Once again these rules are important as this 
information is used when dynamically loading plug-in classes. 
Secondly, all cryptographic plug-ins must implement the ‘EDPInterface’, 
outlined in Figure 44. The interface requires four methods to be implemented 
including methods to initialise the plug-in, to generate keys, to encrypt data, and 
to decrypt data. With these methods the context manager can interact with the 
plug-in to encrypt and decrypt information. To provide a uniform support for 
various key types, the interface requires individual keys to be formatted as byte 
arrays. For key pairs a wrapper class is used. Full details of the ‘EDPInterface’ 
and the key pair class can be found in Appendix C.6 and C.7 respectively. 
 
Figure 44. Cryptographic plug-in specification. 
RSA AES Plug-in 
A cryptographic plug-in has been developed that employs both an asymmetric 
cipher, RSA [Rivest, Shamir et al. 1977], and a symmetric cipher, AES [NIST 
2001]. The RSAAES plug-in, as it will be referred to, aims to strike a balance 
between security, manageable key distribution, and performance. To implement 
Name: <plug-in name>EDP† 
Package: net.osbakk.pi.cm.plugins 
Impl. interfaces: EDPInterface 
Methods: 
init encrypt decrypt 
generateKeys   
Notes: N/A 
†<plug-in name> follows regular expression [a-z]+ 
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the plug-in the Bouncy Castle crypto package [Bouncy Castle 2003] has been 
used. 
The implementation works as follows. Upon either receiving or sending the first 
RSAAES encrypted message the context manager will create an instance of the 
plug-in. This instance will then also be used for subsequent request/responses. 
Once created the RSAAES plug-in is initialised. The initialisation sets up the 
BouncyCastle cryptographic provider and a pseudo-random number generator. 
When done the plug-in is ready to generate keys, encrypt data, and decrypt data 
using the BouncyCastle API [Bouncy Castle 2003]. The key generation process 
is straightforward. It simply creates a new pseudo-random RSA key pair and 
encodes the generated public and private keys as byte arrays. In a typical 
scenario this process is only performed once. Only if the private key is 
compromised, does a new RSA key pair need to be generated.  
The encryption process is somewhat more complex and can be divided into four 
steps. The first step generates a new pseudo-random secret key for use with the 
AES cipher. The second step encrypts the generated secret key using the RSA 
cipher and the message recipient’s public key. Once this is done the encrypted 
secret key is added to the output stream together with its length encoded using 
two bytes. The third step generates a 16 byte pseudo-random initialisation 
vector for use with the AES cipher. This initialisation vector is also added to the 
output stream. Finally, the fourth step encrypts the sensitive data and adds it to 
the output stream. The encryption is performed using the AES cipher, the 
generated secret key, and the initialisation vector. The resulting output stream is 
illustrated in Figure 45. 
Length
(2 byte)
Encrypted Secret Key
(X byte)
IV 
(16 byte)
Encrypted Data
(Y byte)  
Figure 45. Data format of RSA-AES plug-in. 
The decryption process is similar but retrieves information from the input 
stream rather than using the pseudo-random number generator. The process 
consists of three steps. The first retrieves and decrypts the secret key embedded 
in the input stream. The decryption is performed using the RSA cipher and the 
recipient’s private key. The second step retrieves the initialisation vector from 
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the input stream. No processing is required. Finally, the third and last step 
decrypts the actual data. For this the AES cipher, together with the decrypted 
secret key and the embedded initialisation vector, is used. 
5.3.2. Privacy protection 
The second stage, privacy protection, handles the protection of a subject’s 
privacy. During the design of the infrastructure a number of different 
mechanisms and approaches has been evaluated (See above, section 4.5). This 
section will describe which of these mechanisms has been chosen to be 
implemented by the developed infrastructure and explain the choice.  
The context manager implements two aspects of privacy protection previously 
described, namely authentication and access control. This is illustrated in Figure 
46. Although the authentication mechanism described here will take the issue of 
anonymity into consideration, this last aspect will utilise an external mechanism 
described later (See above, section 5.5.2.2).  
Authentication Access Control
Privacy 
Protection
 
Figure 46. Privacy protection aspects. 
5.3.2.1. Authentication 
Of the two alternative authentication mechanisms previously short listed (See 
above, section 4.5.1) the password-based mechanism was chosen to be 
implemented.  
This choice is motivated by the simplicity of the mechanism and the wide 
device support it yields. By using the less resource demanding password based 
mechanism the performance of the infrastructure is also expected to be better. 
Furthermore, in a research environment the probability of a subject being 
exposed to replay attacks is considered to be low. Hence, the increased risk 
associated with the use of the weaker mechanism is judged to be offset by its 
benefits. It should also be noted that it would be possible at a later stage to 
compliment the infrastructure with support for a challenge-response mechanism. 
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Since the infrastructure has been implemented to be stateless, the authentication 
is performed on a per message basis. This means that every message sent to a 
subject’s context manager must contain an identity. The message must also 
contain a password that verifies authenticity of the claim unless the requestor 
asks to be anonymous. As already described the username and password are 
added to the header of a message using the attributes ‘username’ and ‘password’ 
respectively (See above, section 5.3.1.1). Supplying the username ‘anonymous’ 
marks the request as coming from an anonymous agent. 
Upon receiving a non-anonymous request the context manager will authenticate 
the requestor by comparing the supplied password with that stored by the 
context manager for the identity in question. The identity could of course be a 
pseudonym. If there is a match then the requestor’s claim has been positively 
verified and the request can be further processed. If on the other hand the 
password does not match, the requestor is assumed to be a rogue user and the 
request will not be further processed. Anonymous requests, if allowed by the 
subject, will always be positively verified. They will incur a slight delay in their 
processing though, to discourage unnecessary use. 
5.3.2.2. Access control 
To control access to a subject’s context both the role based mechanism (See 
above, section 4.5.2.2) and the P3P based mechanism (See above, section 
4.5.2.3) were chosen to be used. This combination allows privacy preferences to 
be expressed with respect to be unknown and known users. 
The motivation for choosing the role based mechanism over the classification 
and clearance scheme is its scalability. As previously demonstrated the 
probability that the CCS mechanism can accurately represent a subject’s 
preferences diminishes as the number of agents and context items increase (See 
above, section 4.5.2.1). Even in deployment of limited size the number of agents 
and context items are deemed to be large enough to cause considerable 
inaccuracies. Hence, the higher initial effort required to set up associated with 
the RBAC is judged to be preferential. 
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In the context manager the RBAC mechanism has been implemented as a two 
step process, illustrated in Figure 47. The first step evaluates an agent’s access. 
This involves calculating its overall permission by aggregating permission 
granted by all the subject’s roles, including those associated with any matching 
P3P rulesets, and then superimposing their personal permission. As previously 
asserted roles are always aggregated such that the best possible access is granted 
(See above, section 4.5.2.2). The resulting permission represents the effective 
access granted to the agent for that particular request. To make the access 
control mechanism efficient an agent’s overall permission is cached. Naturally, 
in the event that a subject’s privacy preferences change this cache is cleared. 
The second step filters incoming requests. During this step any unauthorised 
entries are discarded. This isolates the privacy protection stage from the request 
fulfilment stage, as any request passed on should be fulfilled, if possible. If at a 
later stage it becomes desirable to alter or exchange the access control 
mechanism, this separation will be beneficial. 
Access Control
Stage 1:
Evaluate access
Stage 2:
Filtering
Authorised
Requests
Requests
 
Figure 47. Access control steps 
5.3.3. Request fulfilment 
The third stage of the context manager’s request handling concerns the 
fulfilment of requests. Within this stage there are three distinct parts: data 
storage, synchronisation, and extensions. This is illustrated in Figure 48. 
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SynchronisationData storage Extensions
Request 
fulfilment
 
Figure 48. Request fulfilment aspects. 
At the very basic level the request fulfilment stage enables contextual 
information to be stored and retrieved. This involves executing the read, write, 
and history actions embedded in the requests (See above, section 5.3.1.1) and 
interacting with the data storage. The request fulfilment stage also provides the 
necessary mechanism to support the synchronisation of information, as required 
(See above, section 4.1.2.2). Furthermore, through the implementation of 
extensions additional advanced functionality can be incorporated as well. For 
example, the use of extensions allows tasks such as context aggregation and 
evaluation to be performed. It also provides the mechanism by which the 
required support for context triggered events and request triggered context 
collection (See above, section 4.1.2.2) can be implemented. 
5.3.3.1. Data storage 
To store and retrieve information a context manager must use data storage. The 
data storage is a separate infrastructure component (See above, section 4.4.3) 
with which the context manager interacts. To ensure that no restrictions are 
placed on what type of data store that can be used (See above, section 4.1.2.2) a 
driver based approach has been taken when implementing the interaction. This 
involves using an exchangeable data storage driver to link the context manager 
and external data storage. 
Data Storage
Context 
Manager
D
riv
er
Information flow
 
Figure 49. Data storage driver. 
Hence the data storage driver provides the interface between the internal 
workings of the context manager and the external data storage, as illustrated in 
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Figure 49. As such the context manager enjoys a uniform mechanism for storing 
and retrieving information, fully independent of the type of external data storage 
being used making the interaction between the context manager and the data 
storage seamless, as required (See above, section 4.4.3). Thus, whilst the 
context manager is in charge of handling the storage of information, it is the 
data storage driver that executes the actual storage operation. 
Data items 
To minimise the complexity of communicating with the driver, the context 
manager organises information into data items. 
A data item represents a particular piece of information and is identified using a 
category and a key. The categories separate different groups of information. For 
example one category is used for contextual data whilst others are used for data 
concerning access control etc. The key identifies an entry within a particular 
group, for example a particular context or user. Thus the category and key 
together provide a unique identifier. 
Over time however, there may be several distinct occurrences of a single data 
item. Hence to identify the value of a particular piece of information a 
timestamp must be used together with the category and key. This will then 
allow the value of a data item, at a particular point in time, to be identified. The 
resulting data hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 50. 
Category A
Key A Key B
Occur. 1 Occur. 2
Value (a) Value (b)
Occur. 1 Occur. 2
Value (c) Value (d)  
Figure 50. Data hierarchy. 
The value of the data items takes the form of serializable Java objects. Hence, 
the usage of an external data storage does not appear different from an internal 
hashtable to the Context Manager. It also makes it easier for the data storage 
driver to handle the information and convert it, if necessary, to the format 
required by the data storage. 
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Finally it should be noted that data items constitute the format in which 
information is delivered to the driver from the context manager. It is not 
necessarily how the information is physically stored. This is determined by the 
data storage and its driver. 
Datastorage driver 
The data storage driver is required to fulfil a number of criteria.  
First of all, the main driver class must be called ‘DataStorageDriver’ and have 
the package name ‘net.osbakk.pi.cm.dataStorage’. This ensures that the context 
manager can always find the driver. It also guarantees that only one driver can 
be loaded at any one time by the Java runtime environment. Both are essential 
aspects given that the driver is critical for the operation of the context manager.  
Secondly, the main driver class must also implement the data storage interface, 
‘DataStorageDriverInterface’, outlined in Figure 51. The interface stipulates the 
mandatory methods needed to initialise the driver, connect and disconnect from 
the data storage, set data, get data, delete data, etc. Full details of the interface 
can be found in the Appendix C.1. 
Finally, the data storage driver is required to support historic information. 
Hence all information stored must contain a timestamp. The timestamp can 
either represent when the information was recorded or when it is stored, the 
context producers decide which. How long information is stored and to what 
extent this length is customisable is determined by the driver implementation. It 
is therefore optional for a data storage to retain historic information. The reason 
for this is that it allows the infrastructure to operate even when storage capacity 
is limited, albeit with limited functionality. 
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Figure 51. Data storage driver specification. 
Memory/File driver implementation 
A memory/file driver has been implemented for the infrastructure. The driver 
uses internal memory to store data during runtime and a file to ensure 
persistency.  
The implementation works as follows and its lifecycle is illustrated in Figure 52. 
When initialised the driver parses the properties to read in the configuration. 
The configurable entries include the history length, the location of the data file, 
and the filename. Then once the connect method is called the driver loads the 
configured data file into memory, making any stored information available to 
the context manager. Once loaded, the context manager can perform operations, 
flush data, and disconnect the data storage. The operations work on the data 
stored in memory and provide the means for setting data, getting data, deleting 
data, etc. The flush method writes the result of any performed operations to 
disk. Finally, the disconnect method makes sure the information in memory has 
been written and closes the data file. Consequently, this makes further 
operations impossible. Hence the disconnect method is only invoked when the 
context manager is being shutdown. 
Name: DataStorageDriver 
Package: net.osbakk.pi.cm.dataStorage 
Impl. interfaces: DataStorageDriverInterface 
Methods: 
init getData getOccurences 
connect deleteData† getLastOccurencesTime 
disconnect getCategories clear 
isConnected getKeys flush 
setData getKeysTable  
Notes: The driver must support historic information. 
† 3 methods with different signatures. 
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Initialised
/ parse properties
/ open file,load data
Connected
[action = <operation>] / <operation>
[action = disconnect] / write data,close file
Disconnected
[action = flush] / write data
FlushedPerformed
 
Figure 52. Memory/File driver state chart. 
The memory/file driver implemented retains a user configurable amount of 
historic information. To minimise processing the history length is specified as 
the number of occurrences of data items to retain. The driver then uses a 
rollover stack in which the items are sorted with respect to their timestamps. 
Hence when the stack is full and a request is received from the context manager 
to store a new piece of information, the driver first removes the oldest item in 
the stack before adding the new. In this way the most recent information is 
retained. 
5.3.3.2. Synchronisation 
In addition to handling the retrieval and storage of information, the context 
manager has been implemented to support synchronisation, as required (See 
above, section 4.1.2.2). The implementation allows both contextual information 
and configurations, e.g. access control settings, to be synchronised between 
context managers. 
Process 
In the infrastructure synchronisation is always performed between two context 
managers at a time. The process is triggered when an agent sends a 
synchronisation request to a context manager. For example, this can occur as a 
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result of user interaction or be a predefined behaviour. The context manager 
receiving the request becomes the initiator of the synchronisation. It is the 
initiator that contacts the second context manager, referred to as the responder, 
and executes the synchronisation protocol. 
Synchronisation requests 
A synchronisation request is a request that contains the command ‘synchronise’ 
in the header of the context profile. This command prompts the context manager 
to perform a synchronisation. 
Each synchronisation request is required to contain a ‘reference’ to another 
context manager in the header. The reference specifies both the information 
necessary to contact the responder and the credentials of the initiator. The 
former consists of the transport protocol, cryptographic plug-in, and the address 
to be used to contact the responder. The latter is a username and password, 
given the authentication mechanism chosen (See above, section 5.3.2.1). A 
single string is used to represent this information; the exact format is described 
later (See below, section 5.4.1.1). 
The request can also specify three further optional parameters that control the 
synchronisation. Firstly, the synchronisation ‘mode’ can be specified. This 
specifies whether information should be updated at the initiator – ‘updateLocal’, 
at the requestor – ‘updateRemote’, or on both sides – ‘sync’. Hence, the 
implementation allows the flow of information during the synchronisation to be 
controlled. The default is ‘sync’. Secondly, the ‘type’ of data to be synchronised 
can be specified. The options are ‘context’, ‘data’, and ‘all’. These correspond 
to synchronising contextual information, configurations, or both types 
respectively. This enables the context manager to retain a synchronised context 
database but different configuration or vice versa. The default is to synchronise 
‘all’ types of information. Finally, it is possible to specify how any conflicts that 
arise during the synchronisation should be resolved. A conflict occur when 
concurrent occurrence with dissimilar values exist for a data item on the 
initiator and the responder. Such conflicts can be resolved by either using the 
initiators value – ‘useLocal’, the responder’s value – ‘useRemote’, or by 
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retaining the existing value on the respective sides – ‘noChange’. The default is 
to retain the existing values. 
Protocol 
To perform the synchronisation a context manager follows a certain protocol. 
To begin with the initiating context manager establishes what information is 
available. This information is represented using a synchronisation profile. The 
synchronisation profile contains the occurrences of all relevant data items, 
where the relevancy depends upon the type of data being synchronised. To 
determine what information needs to be exchanged, a synchronisation profile is 
required for both the initiator and the responder. Thus, the initiator requests a 
synchronisation profile from the responder and then builds a local profile 
themselves. 
When both the remote and the local synchronisation profile are available to the 
initiation, the profiles are compared and a list is compiled with the data item 
occurrences that are missing locally, i.e. on the initiator.  Then, provided the 
local database should be updated, the missing occurrences are requested from 
the responder and subsequently added to the local database. 
Once the local database has been updated, the initiator then compares the 
remote synchronisation profiles again. This time, though, it is to establish which 
occurrences are missing on the responder. Assuming that the remote database 
should be updated, the initiator then sends the missing information. 
Completing this protocol successfully will result in the two context managers 
being synchronised according to the specified parameters. 
5.3.3.3. Extensions 
To enable the context manager to include advanced and custom functionality the 
implementation supports the use of extensions. The extensions are executable 
units of code that are run inside the context manager. Despite being internal to 
the context manager information access from extensions is governed by the 
same privacy protection mechanism as external agents in the infrastructure. This 
ensures a subject’s privacy preferences are enforced. 
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With extensions it is possible to provide a wide variety of functionality. Later in 
this section two uses will be examined; integration with other infrastructures 
and data processing. 
Operating modes 
The context manager features two operating modes for extensions. First of all 
extensions can be run as background processes. In this mode the extension is 
invoked during the initialisation process of the context manager and is then run 
in a separate thread until either the extension or the context manager terminates. 
Running an extension as a background process can be useful if it is to perform 
actions at frequent intervals. Extensions can also be run on a per-request basis. 
In this mode an extension is only run for the period required to fulfil the 
processing of the incoming request. Extensions operating in this mode can be 
configured to be invoked on all requests or alternatively on certain specified 
requests only. It is also possible to configure whether the extension is to be 
invoked before or after the requests’ actions have been performed. Furthermore, 
an extension can be set to be triggered on certain actions only, i.e. 
read/write/history. Hence, processing can be limited to relevant situations, and 
thus minimised. Finally, it should be noted that these two modes are not 
mutually exclusive. An extension can operate in both modes simultaneously. 
Resource Extension Plug-ins 
To ensure consistency extensions are implemented as plug-ins. These are 
referred to as resource plug-ins. 
The resource plug-ins, just as others, must follow a set naming scheme. The 
scheme divides the class name into a plug-in name and a suffix. As previously, 
the plug-in name can consist of any combination of lower case letters. The 
suffix on the other hand is specific to the resource plug-ins and must be ‘REP’, 
in capital letters. Furthermore, the plug-ins must be located in the package 
‘net.osbakk.pi.cm.plugins’. 
The plug-ins must also implement the ‘REPInterface’, outlined in Figure 53. 
The interface requires three methods to be implemented by the plug-ins. These 
are a method to initialise the plug-in, another to start the plug-in as a 
background service, and a method to invoke the plug-in on a per request basis. 
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To enable the resource plug-ins to communicate efficiently with the context 
manager, the interface contains a direct link to the context manager. The context 
manager link, ‘CMLink’, is provided as an initialisation argument. Full details 
of the ‘REPInterface’ and the ‘CMLink’ class can be found in Appendix C.8 
and C.9 respectively. 
 
Figure 53. Resource extension plug-in specification. 
MobiComp plug-in 
A plug-in has been developed that enable integration with the MobiComp 
infrastructure [Ryan 2005]. The mobicomp plug-in provides two way 
synchronisation between the two infrastructures. To achieve this, the extension 
utilises both operating modes available, retrieving information at periodic 
intervals and updating information on a per request basis. It is important to 
emphasis that both of these operations are performed without modifying the 
MobiComp infrastructure. The plug-in simply interacts with an already 
available webservice. 
The MobiComp plug-in works as follows and its lifecycle is illustrated in Figure 
54. When the context managers starts-up it initialises the MobiComp plug-in. 
During the initialisation the plug-in parses the provided arguments and 
properties extracting the address of the remote services and the credentials to 
use locally. The plug-in will also build the dictionary that will be used to 
translate messages between the two infrastructures. Once initialised the context 
manager starts the plug-in as a background service, assuming it has been 
properly configured. This thread will act as a timer, prompting the plug-in at a 
configurable interval to contact the MobiComp infrastructure to retrieve 
information. When the background services has been started the plug-in sits in a 
Name: <plug-in name>REP† 
Package: net.osbakk.pi.cm.plugins 
Impl. interfaces: REPInterface 
Methods: 
init start perform 
Notes: N/A 
†<plug-in name> follows regular expression [a-z]+ 
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waiting state until it is awakened by the timer, it receives a call from the context 
manager on the perform method, or the context manager terminates. A timer 
event will cause the plug-in to contact the webservice in the MobiComp 
infrastructure with a request for relevant information. If information is received, 
it is then processed and posted to the context manager using the CMLink and 
the credentials extracted during the initialisations. A call to the perform method 
prompts the plug-in to send information to the MobiComp infrastructure 
instead. It will first post a request to the context manager for the piece of 
context giving rise to the call. This is once again achieved using the CMLink 
and the extracted credentials. The information received from the context 
manager is then processed and sent to the webservice in the MobiComp 
infrastructure. Finally, terminating the context manager will also terminate the 
plug-in, stopping the background service. 
Initialised
/ Parse properties & arguments
/ Start
Waiting
[action=timer] / sync. [action=perform] / sync.
/ terminate
 
Figure 54. MobiComp plug-in lifecycle. 
Data processing plug-ins 
The extension mechanism provides the necessary framework for context 
managers to support data processing. Whilst implementation details are 
extension specific, the basic design of all data processing plug-ins is similar. 
Firstly, as a result of the architecture, data processing can be performed at three 
different times. By configuring the plug-in to be invoked on write requests, 
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processing can occur when context information is stored. This is useful, for 
example, to validate incoming data. Similarly, if configuring the plug-in to be 
invoked on read requests, processing can occur when information is retrieved. 
This allows a just in time approach to data processing, for example transforming 
information before release. The last alternative is to configure the plug-in to run 
as a background process. This enables the plug-in to determine when processing 
shall occur, for example scheduling it at predefined intervals or during periods 
of low activity.  
Secondly, context information is accessed by issuing messages containing read, 
write, and history requests. Thus, data processing plug-ins use the same 
mechanism to access information as external agents. Consequently, requests are 
subject to access control. However, for local information the plug-ins benefit 
from being able to use the context manager link to communicate. This removes 
the need for network connectivity improving availability of data and 
performance.  
Finally, to perform the actual data processing the plug-ins can make full use of 
the features available in the platform, i.e. J2ME CDC/PP. In addition to the 
standard configuration and profile, plug-ins can also use any optional APIs and 
third-party libraries that are available to the runtime environment. Hence, plug-
ins can take advantage of device specific resources to optimise processing. 
Furthermore, using network connectivity it is possible for plug-ins to distribute 
the workload to external resources. 
5.4. Catalogue Service 
The Context Manager Catalogue Service (CMCS) is an infrastructure 
component that simplifies the addressing in the infrastructure. There can be any 
number of CMCS in the infrastructure. Each CMCS maps Context Manager 
URIs to traditional URLs and operate independently. 
5.4.1.1. Context Manager URIs 
The primary address scheme implemented in the infrastructure is URI-based 
[rfc2396][rfc2718]. The basic structure of a URI consists of two parts: a scheme 
and a scheme specific part [rfc2396], as illustrated in Figure 55. 
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<scheme>:<scheme-specific-part> 
Figure 55. Basic URI syntax 
The name of the scheme to be used in the infrastructure is ‘cm’. This 
emphasises that it is a context manager that is being referenced. The scheme 
specific part is then used to encode the address information required. This 
includes both mandatory and optional parameters, some of which are dependant 
on each other. 
The scheme specific part of the context manager URI is itself URI-based. The 
scheme specific part consists of two mandatory elements, one that specify the 
protocol and another that specify the address. It may also optionally contain user 
credentials, a reference to a context item, and a pointer to a particular 
occurrence of a specified context item. Note the use of the slashes that signify a 
hierarchal scheme. Figure 56 summarise the syntax of a CM URI. 
cm:<protocol>://[<credentials>]<address>[<context-item>][<occurrence>] 
Figure 56. CM URI syntax 
The protocol element specifies the transport plug-in and the encryptor decryptor 
plug-in. Together these therefore indicate what is required to communicate with 
the context manager on the address in question. In the protocol element the 
names of the two plug-ins are separated using a dash. For example, if the socket 
transport plug-in and the RSAAES encryptor decryptor plug-in are to be used 
the protocol element would be ‘socket-rsaaes’. 
The details of the address element are dependant on and specified by the 
transport plug-in being used. It can consist of any combination of alphanumeric, 
unreserved, and reserved characters [rfc2396]. If the address contains reserved 
characters it must be enclosed within square brackets. For example, the socket 
transport protocol takes an IP-address or a domain name as an address. 
The optional credentials in the current implementations specify the username to 
use when accessing the context manager. It can also specify the password, 
though this is not recommended. If provided, the password will be removed 
from the URI and sent within the message header when communicating with the 
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context manager. If both username and password is specified then they are 
separated using a colon. The credentials must be followed with an at-sign. 
The optional context-item element points to a particular context item at the 
context manager being referenced. The hierarchical path to the context item is 
encoded as a string that is delimited by periods, i.e. the same technique used 
when referencing items within a context profiles. A context-item element must 
be preceded with a hash. For example, to reference a user’s location the pointer 
‘#location.coordinates’ could be used. 
The optional occurrence element can be used to reference a particular instance 
of a context item. Hence, the occurrence element can only be used in 
conjunction with the context-item element. An occurrence is specified as the 
difference in milliseconds from midnight the 1st of January 1970 coordinated 
universal time. (UTC). The element is specified using digits only and must be 
preceded by a colon. 
Figure 57 shows an example of an address with all the optional elements 
included. The CM URI specifies that the socket transport protocol and the 
rsaaes encryptor decryptor plug-ins should be used. It also states that the context 
manager is located on the localhost. Furthermore, it specifies that the username 
and password that should be used are ‘user’ and ‘pass’, respectively. Finally, the 
context item of interest is ‘location.coordinates’ occurring 12th of September 
2005 at 03:35:11. 
cm:socket-rsaaes://user:pass@127.0.0.1#location.coordinates:1126488911740 
Figure 57. Example of a CM URI 
5.4.1.2. The service 
In the infrastructure the CMCS is implemented as a webservice using Java 
Servlet technology [Java Community Process 2001]. The CMCS’s creates a 
mapping between one or more CM URIs and a static well known URL. This 
serves two important functions. First of all, it provides the ability to map 
dynamic addresses onto static and well known addresses. Secondly, it makes it 
possible to reference entities without specifying the underlying transport plug-
in(s) and the encryptor decryptor plug-in(s). Hence, the CMCS plays an 
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important role in making the use of unreliable communication feasible over an 
arbitrary number of protocols and mediums. 
At the heart of the CMCS is a directory services, allowing an agent to lookup 
the context managers associated with a listed entity and their respective CM 
URIs. To aid the agent in determining which context manager to use when 
alternatives exist, each context manager is indexed with an integer. The 
recommendation is for an agent to contact the context manager with the lowest 
index possible. Each context manager listed may contain several CM URIs with 
which they can be contacted. To minimise redundancy, the CMCS list the URIs 
and ciphers separately for each context manager. If no context manager is 
associated with an entity or if all services associated are offline, the service will 
assume the entity is offline. 
The information listed by the CMCS is automatically updated by the 
appropriately configured context managers. During the start-up the context 
manager will query each of the available transport server plug-ins about their 
address. The context manager will also compile a list of the available encryptor 
decryptor plug-ins. This information is then communicated to the CMCS that 
then can update the listing. The context manager will also update the CMCS 
when it is being shutdown to notify the services it will go offline and be 
unavailable. 
Finally, the CMCS also provides a simple web interface for user management. 
The interface allows the context managers using the services to be listed along 
with their entries. It also allows a user to update their password, i.e. the 
password used by their context manager to authenticate themselves to the 
services. Furthermore, the CMCS’s administrator has the ability to use the 
interface to add and delete users. 
5.5. Proxies 
A Proxy is a component type not previously described. In the infrastructure it is 
any component through which information flows but that is neither the origin 
nor destination of the flow. From the point of view of the information source the 
proxy will appear as the destination and from the destination the proxy will 
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appear to be the source. Proxies are used to process data in transit or to relay 
messages. This enables otherwise incompatible services or unreachable 
destination to be integrated with the infrastructure. 
5.5.1. Proxy types 
The first and simplest type of proxy emulates a destination with which there is a 
one-to-one relationship. This enables the proxy to be used without requiring any 
special support by the infrastructure. The type of proxy must only adhere to the 
interfaces a context manager and agent use. In this form the proxy will be 
personal, i.e. serve only one entity. Whilst this implies that the usage is 
restricted, there are situations where a personal proxy is preferable. For 
example, this is the case when sensitive information is to be processed. A 
personal proxy, over which the subject has control, provides a trustworthy 
alternative for the processing. 
The second type of proxy supported by the infrastructure uses explicit routing 
instructions. This allows it to support multiple destinations. Hence, it does not 
require any special relationship to exist between the proxy and the destination, 
i.e. the proxy can be shared. To facilitate this second type of proxy in the 
infrastructure two additional header attributes are used. First of all, the source 
must specify the next destination after the proxy using the ‘relayTo’ header 
attribute. The destination could be the final destination or the address of another 
proxy. Secondly, the source has the option of adding the message to be relayed 
in a ‘relayMessage’ header attribute. This allows the source to fully specify the 
message being relayed including how it is encrypted. If the ‘relayMessage’ 
attribute is not present then a proxy will process and relay the incoming 
message. In addition to these two attributes each proxy can support, and even 
require, additional custom header attributes to be used. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that even though no special relationship is required between the proxy 
and the destination an implementation can limit the destinations allowed.  
5.5.2. Examples of usage 
From the point of view of the infrastructure the proxy component type is a tool 
with which external functionalities can be incorporated into the infrastructures. 
For what purpose this tool is used depends on service providers and users. The 
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possibilities are there to develop a wide range of different proxies. Three 
examples of how a proxy component can assist the infrastructure are translation 
between protocols, the anonymisation of communication, and data 
transformation.  
5.5.2.1. Protocol translation 
Under some circumstances it may be beneficial, or necessary, for different 
transport protocols to be used by an agent and a context manager wishing to 
communicate. For example, assume a user wants to minimise the number of 
protocols the context manager running on their mobile devices support without 
reducing the compatibility with agents. A protocol translation proxy can then be 
used in the infrastructure to assist the mobile context manager. 
For the infrastructure a protocol translation proxy has been implemented that 
forms a bridge between two transport protocols, HTTP and Socket. The proxy 
has been implemented as a Java Servlet [Java Community Process 2001] that 
emulates a context manager. Hence, one-to-one relationships exist between the 
proxy and an entity. It accepts requests from agents over the HTTP transport 
protocol. These requests are then forwarded to their destination over the socket 
transport protocol, e.g. to a user’s mobile context manager. Thus the context 
manager only needs to accept communication over one of the two transport 
protocols, namely the socket. To include the HTTP transport protocol in the 
updates sent to the CMCS a dummy HTTP transport server plug-in is used. The 
dummy plug-in makes the context manager aware that it can be contacted using 
HTTP and allows the address of the protocol translation proxy to be set. Note 
that the dummy plug-in does not set up any HTTP server, nor does it contain 
any such implementations. It simply provides the necessary information needed 
when updating the CMCS. Figure 58 illustrates the use of the protocol 
translation proxy.  
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Figure 58. Using a protocol translation proxy 
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5.5.2.2. Anonymising communication 
The aspect of anonymous communication has previously been described (See 
above, section 4.5.3). The idea is to break the path between the communicating 
parties. Proxy components enable this to be achieved in the infrastructure. 
Hence, using proxy components anonymous communication solutions can be 
developed. An architecture has been designed that shows how such a solution 
can look. 
In the architecture proxy components are used together with an anonymity 
network. The proxy components provide the entry and exit points to the 
anonymity network. This separates the implementation of the anonymity 
network from the infrastructure, but still allows the network to be used as an 
external component. The anonymity network’s task is to obfuscate the message 
path. For the purpose of this thesis it is assumed the anonymity network 
performs it tasks efficiently and securely. Hence, after a message has reached 
the entry point it is the responsibility of the anonymity network to route the 
message to its final destination. 
5.5.2.3. Data transformation 
Proxies provide a compliment to the support for data processing available with 
the extension mechanism in the context manager (See above, section 5.3.3.3). 
The advantage of using proxies is that they enable data to be processed in 
transit, rather than at the destination. This makes them particularly useful for 
transforming data.  
For example, take a situation in which basic positioning information is required 
in the form of longitude-latitude coordinates. Then assume that a context 
producer supplying NMEA data from an associated GPS device is available. 
From the NMEA data the current coordinates can be extracted. By using a 
proxy for the processing and placing it between the context producer and the 
context manager, a seamless transformation from NMEA data to longitude-
latitude coordinates can be achieved.  
Whilst it would be possible to obtain the same end result by using a data 
processing extension, it is not as efficient as using a proxy since it requires the 
NMEA data to be stored in the context manager for processing. It produces 
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redundant information as well as introducing an additional write and read cycle. 
Hence, for the given situation the use of a proxy is more appropriate.  
The use of proxies for data transformation, and processing in general, also 
benefits from the fact that proxies can be hosted anywhere in the network. 
Hence, operations that require special resources or are demanding can be 
offloaded. In the example above, where NMEA data is to be transformed into 
coordinates, this would not normally be the case. However, there are certainly 
situations where resource constrained devices are unsuitable or cannot perform 
desired transformations. Generally, the processing of images, video, and sound 
would be examples of such cases. 
5.6. Agents 
A number of agents have been developed to use the infrastructure, including an 
iButton Context Capture application for gathering information, a Context-
Aware Desk Display that shows information about the occupier, and a Web 
Presence application for publishing context information.  
5.6.1. Administration console 
To interact with the context manager an administrative console has been 
implemented. The console takes the form of a standalone application that 
communicates with the context managers, as illustrated in Figure 59. It can be 
used to interact with both local and remote context managers.  
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Figure 59. Administration console component. 
The console features a basic graphical user interface that allows various aspects 
of the context manager to be configured, see Figure 60. First of all the 
application provides the means for users to set up their privacy preferences 
using the role based access control mechanism. Using the console, lists of 
access controls and roles can be defined, users created, and ruleset loaded. See 
Appendix D for an example. Secondly, the administration console enables 
resources to be defined, configured, and bound to context actions. Thirdly, the 
  
 
143 
application provides the ability to perform system commands. Commands are 
available to enable the user to synchronise two context managers and to 
shutdown the connected context manager.  Finally, the console also provides 
limited means for users to manually view and change contextual information. A 
useful feature, available to the subject when viewing their own context, is the 
ability to utilise the application as a form of vampire mirror [Butz, Beschers et 
al. 1998] displaying the information disclosed with respect to registered users. 
   
Figure 60. Screenshots from the administration console. 
5.6.2. Context-aware desk display 
The Context-Aware Desk Display consists of an enclosed TINI (Board Model 
390) microcontroller [Loomis 2001] with an attached LCD and keypad, see 
Figure 61. The display has been designed with the ordinary name tag, 
sometimes found on desks, in mind. But instead of simply displaying the name 
of the person occupying the desk, the display also presents additional context 
information like the person’s email address, if they are in today or when they 
are expected to be in next. The information presented by the context-aware desk 
display originates from the person’s context manager and the application can 
easily be extended to display more information. 
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Figure 61. Context-aware desk display. 
The context-aware desk display has been designed to utilise the extensions-
architecture of the context manager. It uses a resource plug-in to detect relevant 
context changes and send updates to the display device. On the display device, 
i.e. the TINI microcontroller, a webserver with a servlet container is run. 
Deployed on that webserver is a desk display servlet that receives context 
updates and drives the LCD. Figure 62 illustrates the use of the context-aware 
desk display component.  
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Figure 62. Context-aware desk display component. 
Due to the privacy mechanism in the context manager the resource plug-in 
cannot retrieve any information by default. Consequently without further action 
no information will flow to the display. Therefore, to activate the context-aware 
desk display the user must grant the plug-in read access to location.place, 
user.business-info.next-in, and user.home-info.contact.online.email. This is 
achieved by using the administration console to create a new user account for 
the plug-in and defining a context-aware desk display role with associated 
access control list(s) containing the appropriate permissions. Should the user 
later decide to revoke access, e.g. by removing the account, the information 
flow to the display is stopped.  
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5.6.3. Web presence application 
It has long been the vision of projects such as Cooltown [Kindberg, Barton et al. 
2002] that every entity should have a web presence. The web presence 
application provides this for the entities using the infrastructure. Although the 
context manager itself can be seen to provide a form of web presence, it is not 
directly accessible by standard web browsers. The web presence application 
provides the link between a context manager and a web browser, as illustrated 
in Figure 63. 
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Figure 63. Web presence application component. 
The application has been designed to handle a high work load without affecting 
the performance of the context manager. It has therefore been implemented to 
provide a snapshot view of an entity’s context using existing web technologies. 
The information that makes up the snapshot is gathered by the application at 
regular intervals by requesting all the context information available to it. This 
information is then translated into html and/or javascript, formats compatible 
with web browsers. Once translated, the publication of the context information 
is then handled by a standard web server. 
By default the web presence application is not allowed to retrieve any 
information from the context manager. Hence, the application must be granted 
read access to the elements that should be published. For example, if the entity’s 
activity is to be published the application needs access to activity.type and 
perhaps activity.note. In general, a separate user account for the web presence 
application therefore needs to be created using the administration console.  The 
account also needs to be assigned any roles necessary to provide the application 
with access to the desired information. If at a later stage access is changed or 
revoked, this affects what information is published at the next update interval. 
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5.6.4. iButton context capture application 
The iButton context capture application uses iButtons [Dallas Semiconductor, 
Maxim 2005B] to gather context information. iButtons are small, uniquely 
identifiable, devices. They may contain memory or have abilities like 
temperature sensing. iButtons may be identified and their memory content or 
sensor values read by a PDA with an adapter [Osbakk 2006] as well as more 
novel mechanisms [Laerhoven, Schmidt et al. 2002]. Figure 64 shows an iPAQ 
equipped with an adapter for reading iButtons. 
 
Figure 64. iPAQ equipped with an iButton reader. 
The unique identities of iButtons allow context information to be logically 
linked with physical tags. This is achieved by keeping a database of known tags, 
together with their associated meaning. In this way iButtons can be used to tag 
context information including locations, objects, and even activities. Thus by 
reading iButtons context information can be captured. 
The iButton context capture application makes use of the possibility iButtons 
provide for the capture of context information. The application has been 
implemented as a standalone program to be run on PDAs. It uses a local 
database to hold tag information. The tag information is user-specific but a 
generic set may be distributed with the application. Every time a tag is read the 
database is consulted and the appropriate context is deduced. The application 
then proceeds to update the information held by the entity’s context manager(s). 
To read tags this application has been implemented to use an adapter [Osbakk 
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2006] as well as two manual fall back modes. When the adapter is used the 
application is first placed in a reading mode. After this the adapter’s connector 
is simply touched against the iButton tags to be read. The two manual modes, 
on the other hand, require the user to first bring up a list with either tag names 
or tag identifiers. Then it relies on them correctly selecting the tag to be ‘read’ 
from the presented list. Whilst the manual modes require more work to be done 
by users, they do offer alternatives to those without access to adapters. Figure 
65 shows two screenshots from the application. 
    
Figure 65. Screenshots from the iButton context capture application. 
As a context producer, the iButton context capture application must be able to 
store information in the entity’s context manager to function. By default the 
privacy mechanism prohibits access. Thus, the application must explicitly be 
granted write access to context elements linked to the iButtons tags. For 
example, if tags are used to denote room locations the application needs write 
access to location.place. Hence, a user account must be set up as well as an 
appropriate role and its associated access control list(s). This is achieved using 
the administration console. The granted access can be modified or revoked at 
any time, with changes taking effect immediately. 
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5.7. Summary 
In this chapter the implementation of the developed privacy enhancing 
infrastructure has been presented. 
As stipulated by the design in Chapter 4 the implementation consists of several 
components including a context manager, a catalogue service, data storage, and 
agents. The targeted platform for the implementation of these components has 
been the Micro Edition of the Java 2 platform, with the Connected Device 
Configuration, the Foundation Profile, and the Personal Profile. 
The main component in the infrastructure is the context manager. Much of the 
functionality has therefore been developed in conjunction with it including 
communication, privacy protection, and request fulfilment. To attain the desired 
modular design plug-ins are used to both enable and secure communication. The 
implementation includes plug-ins for socket-based communication and RSA-
AES cryptography. Plug-ins is also used to extend the functionality of the 
context manager, for example a plug-in has been developed that integrates this 
infrastructure with another. Furthermore, the plug-in architecture provides the 
necessary framework for supporting data processing.  
The communication with the context manager is request-based, where 
interaction dialogues are split into sequences of messages. Each message is 
individually processed. This includes authenticating the user using a username 
password, determining access using the implemented role based access control 
mechanism and P3P, and fulfilling valid requests.  
A number of agents has been presented that interact with the context manager 
including an administration console that allow a user to interact with their 
context managers, a context-aware desk display that provides information about 
a user’s presence, a web presence application that publish contextual 
information to the web, and an iButton context capture application that allows 
information to be gathered. Together these applications aim to demonstrate that 
the infrastructure works and is feasible to use. 
How the context manager catalogue service simplifies the addressing in the 
infrastructure has also been described. As presented the infrastructure 
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implements a URI based addressing scheme. The scheme enables the address of 
a context manager be specified along with the transport plug-in and 
cryptographic plug-in to be used with a single Context Manager URI. As an 
entity can have multiple associated context managers, each with several 
addresses, this results in each entity having many CM-URIs. The 
implementation of the context manager catalogue service makes this transparent 
by mapping an entity’s CM-URIs to standard a URL using Java Servlet 
technology. 
Introduced with the implementation is also another type of component, namely 
proxies. Proxies sit between the source and destination in a message path and 
enable in-transit processing. In the infrastructure a protocol translation proxy 
has been implemented. It has also been described how proxies can be used to 
anonymise communication and transform data. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
EVALUATION 
The aim of this work has been to improve the overall level of privacy enjoyed 
by users in context-aware environments and to make the development of 
applications quicker and easier. The hypothesis made was that this could be 
achieved through the use of a dedicated privacy-enhancing infrastructure for 
context-awareness. The work has gone on to develop and implement such an 
infrastructure as described in the two previous chapters. 
This chapter evaluates the implemented infrastructure to determine the 
correctness of the hypothesis. The evaluation first of all establishes to what 
extent the privacy protection meets the captured requirements and what the 
resulting level of control is. It then looks at the development support provided to 
establish if the infrastructure makes the development of applications easier and 
more rapid. Finally, the evaluation compares the approach taken in this work 
with related work. 
6.1. Privacy protection 
Evaluating privacy protection is not an easy task. It is complicated both because 
the perception of what constitutes a privacy violation is subjective and because 
privacy is an abstract concept that is difficult to measure.  
An action that one person finds intrusive can be acceptable to others. Hence to 
achieve an accurate understanding of how well a subject’s privacy is protected, 
each case must be individually analysed and compared against that subject’s 
preferences. Performing this type of individual analysis is not only time 
consuming, but also brings issues of its own. For example, given that each case 
comes with an individual frame of reference, i.e. the subject’s preferences, how 
then can cases be compared and data be aggregated?  
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This brings us to the second issue, that of measuring privacy. Privacy, unlike 
performance for example, does not feature a common scale by which it can be 
accurately measured. Hence privacy has no associated units in which it can be 
expressed. Furthermore, similar intrusions cannot be directly compared between 
subjects. The ‘cost’ of each privacy violation, or the ‘value’ of its corresponding 
protection, is individual and dependant on many factors. 
Given these issues, the approach taken in this work has therefore been to assess 
the degree to which the privacy requirements are met and the abilities the 
employed privacy protection mechanism provides to describe privacy 
preferences. 
6.1.1. Requirement fulfilment analysis 
There were five privacy requirements captured (See above, section 4.1.2), each 
covering a different aspect related to privacy. 
• Decentralised structure 
• Retain offline level of privacy 
• Customisable effective balance of privacy 
• Handle known and unknown recipients 
• Security 
Each of these requirements will now be analysed. 
6.1.1.1. Decentralised structure 
The chosen design of the infrastructure upholds this requirement (See above, 
section 4.4). There are no central authorities in the infrastructure, each context 
manager operates independently. The scope of the infrastructure is 
customisable. A user may choose to only allow interaction with their own subset 
of components or they may choose to cooperate with others. Either way the 
infrastructure will work the same. There are however components that can be 
argued to be centralised like the Context Manager Catalogue Service and 
Proxies.  
The CMCS provides the translation between virtual, but static, addresses and 
the actual addresses at which context managers can be reached (See above, 
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section 5.4). To do this it is necessary for the CMCS to be located at a fixed, 
known, address and be continuously operating. As such it is expected that the 
number of catalogue services will be limited, and then arguably be centralised. 
However, the use of the CMCS is not compulsory. Furthermore, a user may 
choose to operate their own catalogue service without incurring any penalties. 
Thus whilst a centralised CMCS can be used, it is at the discretion of the user.  
A similar reasoning can be used for proxies. Proxies are placed in the message 
communication path. Their job can be to provide a bridge between different 
protocols or to transform the message content (See above, section 5.5). Whilst 
there are benefits from using centralised proxies, it is not necessary that they are 
operated in this fashion. Furthermore, the use of proxies is not compulsory. 
Thus centralised proxies may be used but it is once again at the discretion of the 
user. 
6.1.1.2. Customisable effective balance of privacy 
It is required that the effective balance of privacy is customisable. This implies 
that the infrastructure must provide the subject with the means to influence their 
privacy, within the range specified by society. To reflect the scope of control in 
the privacy model, the requirement was broken down into three parts. 
First of all, an access control mechanism was found to be required with which a 
subject is able to control their own disclosures and receptiveness to information. 
In the infrastructure the context manager is responsible for providing this 
mechanism (See above, section 4.4). To fulfil the requirement the context 
manager implements a role-based access control mechanism (See above, 
sections 4.5.1 & 5.3.2.2). The extent to which the implemented mechanism is 
customisable to the user’s preferences is however limited. Since the focus has 
been on static privacy preferences only, there is currently no support for context 
sensitive access controls. Furthermore, since each role, when resolved, consists 
of a set of individual access controls it is not trivial to scale up or down the 
overall access granted (See above, section 4.5.2.2). 
Secondly, a mechanism for achieving anonymity was required to allow a subject 
to hide their identity. Even though the context managers and the agents in the 
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infrastructure have been designed to not be directly identifiable, certain 
‘features’ can be used to identify them. For example, context managers can be 
identified by the context information they contain, the address information used 
to contact them, and if cryptographic plug-ins are used from their public keys∗. 
Similarly agents can be identified from the credentials they use, by the address 
from which requests originate, and from their public keys. To tackle these issues 
a number of counter measures can be used: 
1. The context managers can use the implemented access control 
mechanism, assuming it is correctly set up, to hinder identifying 
information from being released. 
2. Agents can choose to use the username ‘anonymous’ to post requests 
without revealing their identity. 
3. The context managers and agents can regenerate their public keys at 
frequent intervals and only use dynamically changing addresses to 
avoid being identified by them. 
These counter measures provide a basic level of protection against 
identification. However, they are neither optimal nor sufficient. To, for 
example, rely on the assignment of varying dynamic addresses to attain 
anonymity is not recommended. Furthermore, the regeneration of public keys is 
time consuming and still allows the subject to be tracked within the key cycles.  
To provide anonymity, the infrastructure has been designed to use a proxy. By 
tunnelling incoming and outgoing communication through a trusted 
anonymising proxy the identity of the subject is protected. The drawbacks of 
this approach are that the proxy must be trustworthy and that it must be 
centralised to some degree. Trustworthiness is important because the proxy will 
be aware of the true identity of the subject. It may also see the contents of 
requests if they are to be transformed from being encrypted with one key to 
another. The requirement of being central is necessary for the proxy to be able 
to provide a good level of protection. A proxy that is only used by a single 
                                                 
∗ Note even if the keys do not contain any identifying information or are guaranteed to be unique, 
they are considered to provide a reasonable means of tracking a subject over time. 
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subject is of little use. With these mechanisms the infrastructure design meets 
the requirement of anonymity. It should be noted that only the basic-level of 
protection has been implemented, as of yet.  
Finally, a mechanism that allows subjects to use pseudonyms was required. This 
mechanism should enable a subject to be identified with a manufactured 
identity, with which they cannot be linked. It was also required that the 
manufactured identity, i.e. the pseudonym, could be retained over time. This 
requirement is similar to that of providing anonymity. However, the latter 
requirement makes it impossible to simply rely on the identifiable information 
to be untraceable. Hence the basic protection mechanism that renews identifying 
information such as public keys and addresses is not enough.  
To fulfil the requirement the infrastructure has therefore been designed to use 
proxies. As previously described proxies can be used to anonymise requests. A 
similar procedure is used to provide a subject with a pseudonym with the 
difference that the projected identity will remain fixed over time. Hence the 
recipients of the request will perceive them coming from the same identity, but 
do not know their true origin. When desired the subject could of course change 
the used pseudonym, either by changing the settings of the proxy or swapping 
proxy altogether.  
The drawbacks of the pseudonymity-proxy are the same as those for the 
anonymity-proxy; it needs to be trustworthy and centralised. With the 
pseudonymity-proxy the infrastructure design is able to also meet the 
requirement of pseudonymity. The implementation does however not feature 
pseudonymity yet. 
6.1.1.3. Retain offline level of privacy 
To establish if the requirement to retain the offline level of privacy is fulfilled it 
is necessary to return to the conceptual model of privacy (See above, section 
3.2). The model presents four ways in which a user can control their privacy 
offline (See above, section 3.2.3). How well the infrastructure handles each of 
these will now be established. 
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First of all, the model states that subjects are able to control their own 
disclosures. In the infrastructure this corresponds to controlling the access to 
information held in their context manager. The context manager does provide a 
mechanism with which access can be controlled (See above, sections 4.5.1 & 
5.3.2.2). There are, however, limitations to the extent this mechanism is 
customisable (See above, section 4.5.2.2). 
Secondly, the model states that subjects can control their presence or 
recognition in public spaces. In the infrastructure this corresponds to controlling 
the presence of their context managers and agents in the infrastructure and 
whether or not they are possible to identify. The former is possible in the 
infrastructure since the subject is able to control whether they run any 
components or not. The latter concerns the possibility for the subject’s 
components to remain anonymous. This feature is also supported by the 
infrastructure design and has been evaluated in Customisable effective balance 
of privacy (See above, section 6.1.1.2). 
Thirdly, the model states that a user can control their actions and links therewith 
in public spaces. In the infrastructure this corresponds to the ability to control 
their context managers’ and agents’ actions and their association with these 
components. The former is possible in the infrastructure as all actions 
performed by the subject’s context managers will be following either their 
privacy preferences or the resource configuration they have set up. Hence the 
context manager will not act autonomously in its default configuration. And 
even though it is possible for a subject to add autonomous behaviour to the 
context manager using resource plug-ins, this is then considered to be a 
conscious choice made by the subject. Similarly, the subject is able to control 
the agents they deploy in the infrastructure and their configuration. The control 
of the latter, their association with deployed components, is also supported by 
the infrastructure design through the use of pseudonyms. This feature has also 
been evaluated in Customisable effective balance of privacy (See above, section 
6.1.1.2). 
Finally, the model states that subjects are able to control their receptiveness to 
information. In the infrastructure this corresponds to controlling the ability to 
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store information in their context manager. This is achieved using the same 
mechanism that controls disclosures. 
6.1.1.4. Handle known and unknown recipients 
It is a requirement that known and unknown recipients should be handled alike. 
The requirement thus states that it must be possible to express privacy 
preferences, form agreements, and disclose information independent of whether 
the identity of the recipient is known or not. 
These requirements are fulfilled by the infrastructure through the use of the 
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) (See above, sections 4.5.2.3 & 5.3.2.2). 
The mechanism implemented in the infrastructure exploits P3P policies and 
rulesets to form the agreement between the subject and the requester without 
knowing their identity. The rulesets are defined by the users and capture their 
privacy preferences with respect to the usage of information. The P3P policies 
are defined by the requester and present their intended use of the information, 
the contract on which information may be released. By matching rulesets and 
policies the appropriate information can be disclosed. 
Whilst the use of P3P fulfils the stated requirements, it has its limitations. As 
previously discussed there is no technical mechanism available with which an 
agreement can be enforced or P3P policies verified (See above, section 4.5.2.3). 
The lack of control over the use of disclosed information is however not limited 
to the P3P mechanism. Any mechanism that releases information in a 
understandable form is open for abuse. This is why the privacy model 
emphasises trustworthiness in the process of disclosure (See above, section 
3.2.4). Another limiting factor is the lack of tools to support the creation of both 
rulesets and policies. There are 11 references listed at the standards page to 
compatible P3P editors, generators, and checkers [World Wide Web 
Consortium 2005B]. Out of these, five policy editors and one ruleset editor are 
available, see Figure 66. The majority of the available policy editors are web-
based and do not support any extension to the vocabulary. Two are applications, 
of which one has been confirmed to work with the required extension. The 
ruleset editor is an application and has been confirmed to support the 
vocabulary extension. Thus the choice of what tool to use is limited. 
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 Type Format Extension 
A) P3P Builder Policy editor  Web-based Not supported 
B) P3P Edit Policy editor  Web-based Not supported 
C) P3P Writer Policy editor  Web-based Not supported 
D) P3P Policy Ed. Policy editor Application Supported‡ 
E) P3P Editor Policy editor Application Unknown† 
F) JCR P3P … Ruleset editor Application Supported‡ 
† Unconfirmed due to unavailability. ‡ Requires custom post-processing. 
A) [P3P Builder 2005] B) [Code Infusion 2005]  
C) [P3P Writer 2005] D) [IBM alphaWorks] 
E) [Abrantix 2005]  F) [JRC P3P Resource Centre 2005B] 
Figure 66. Table with available P3P policy and ruleset editor tools. 
Overall it can be concluded that although the P3P mechanism fulfils the 
captured requirement, the solution is not optimal. For the use of P3P to be 
practical the support for the generation of both policies and rulesets needs to be 
improved. Furthermore, a mechanism also needs to be developed that deters 
misuse. 
6.1.1.5. Security 
The infrastructure is required to be secure to attain an acceptable level of 
privacy. Without adequate security even the most elaborate privacy protection 
mechanism will fail. The requirement highlighted five aspects of security, of 
which anonymity has already been evaluated in the section Customisable 
effective balance of privacy (See above, section 6.1.1.2).  The remaining 
aspects: authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and availability will now be 
discussed.  
In the implementation authentication is performed using a username-password 
mechanism. This is the simplest of the candidate mechanisms (See above, 
section 4.5.1). As discussed earlier its susceptibility to replay attack has been 
deemed to be an acceptable weakness for the purposes of this work (See above, 
section 5.3.2.1). However, the difficulty concerning key management is a 
problem. Each entity to entity relationship requires a shared secret. To ensure 
security this secret must be difficult to guess, it should therefore not be reused 
by the entities in other relationships. As a result scalability becomes an issue. 
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To ensure the confidentiality of communication cryptographic plug-ins are used. 
With the infrastructure a RSAAES plug-in has been developed that uses a 
combination of an asymmetric and a symmetric cipher to secure communication 
(See above, section 5.3.1.3). Using this plug-in the security of the 
communication will be a function of the key and its size. In the infrastructure 
implementation pseudorandom keys are generated with a default key size of 
1024-bit and 256-bit for the RSA and AES components respectively. For the 
purpose of this infrastructure this is deemed to be secure enough. However, 
whilst the use of the RSAAES plug-in is recommended, it is not mandatory. The 
confidentiality of communication can therefore vary with configurations. It is 
always possible, though, for each entity to specify their acceptable set of 
communication plug-ins, thus prohibiting unencrypted communication. 
The integrity of communication is not explicitly covered by the infrastructure. 
No mechanism for checking the integrity of messages has been implemented. 
However, when the RSAAES plug-in is used, to ensure the confidentiality of 
communication, basic integrity is implicitly provided. For the purposes of this 
work it is deemed difficult enough to tamper with the encrypted data stream 
without raising suspicion of the decrypted message. To be able to guarantee the 
integrity of messages to a specified level, further work is required. 
With respect to availability attacks the protection provided in the infrastructure 
is very limited. It focuses on minimising the workload of processing 
unauthorized requests. The filtering process, performed as a part of the access 
control (See above, section 5.3.2.2), only lets authorised actions through to 
request fulfilment. The implementation also delays replying to unauthorised 
requests on purpose to make brute force attacks less favourable. Whilst these 
actions can protect the availability of the infrastructure when subject to 
infrequent, unintentional, attacks it is not feasible to expect them to protect 
against persistent and calculated attacks. 
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6.1.2. User survey 
From the start it was recognised that the candidate access control mechanisms 
had limitations (See above, section 4.5.2). To evaluate the actual performance of 
the two primary privacy protection mechanisms presented in this work (See 
above, sections 4.5.2.1 & 4.5.2.2) a user survey was undertaken.  
The survey consisted of a series of questions and tasks, found in Appendix E.1. 
To encourage participation the survey was performed online and was 
anonymous. Hence, no identifying information about the subjects was recorded. 
It is possible though, to distinguish between individual surveys through the use 
of the completion time. To gather participants the survey was advertised in 
newsgroups∗ and an online discussion forum∗∗. 
6.1.2.1. Completion process 
First of all the subjects were asked to complete a few questions about their 
background. This included questions about their age, gender, computer literacy, 
and internet use. These are questions that can be found in other surveys as well 
[GVU's WWW Surveying Team 1998]. This survey then specifically asked the 
users about their privacy concerns both with respect to their real-life and their 
presence online. 
Then to evaluate the access control models the subjects were presented with a 
scenario. The scenario asked them to envisage that their mobile phone was 
connected to a context-aware system. The subjects were told that the system 
would be able to collect and monitor their context with location and current 
activity given as examples. They were also told that the information collected 
would be used to provide enhanced services; examples given included call 
management, navigation to points of interest, and context sharing. 
After this the subjects’ privacy preferences were captured to establish a baseline 
against which the setup of the access control mechanism could be compared. 
This was achieved by asking the subjects to indicate who they felt should be 
                                                 
∗ ukc.misc, ukc.comp-postgrad, alt.privacy 
∗∗ http://www.ntcompatible.com/thread27503-1.html 
  
 
160 
able to access information about their location, activity, and contact details 
respectively. The alternatives they were given included family member, friend, 
colleague, boss/supervisor/teacher, and anyone (public). Multiple alternatives 
could be selected. 
Once the subjects’ privacy baseline had been captured the subjects were asked 
to set up a simulation of the CCS and RBAC mechanisms to reflect their 
privacy preferences. The simulations worked the same as the real access control 
mechanisms but were limited to the pieces of context and recipients relevant to 
the scenario and did not provide any feedback. To aid them in performing the 
set task, the subjects were given some brief information about the respective 
access control mechanism as well as instructions on how to set them up. Once 
they had set up the mechanisms they were also asked to indicate how similar 
they found the mechanism to be to how they reason about privacy day to day, 
how accurately they felt they could represent their privacy preferences, and how 
easy they found it to express their preferences using the mechanisms. 
Lastly it should be said that no feedback was given during the completion of the 
survey nor once it had been completed. Hence the subjects were not told how 
accurately they managed to set up either mechanism. 
6.1.2.2. Findings 
The survey received 31 responses, compiled in Appendix E.2. The responses 
came from subjects in all of the following age groups: ≤20, 21-40, 41-60, and 
≥60 years. A majority though, fell within the bounds of the 21-40 group. The 
ratio between female/male responses were 9/22. Furthermore the sample 
showed a bias towards computer and internet literate people.  
In this sample there were some interesting findings both with respect to the 
subjects’ privacy concerns and their use of the access control mechanism 
[Osbakk, Ryan 2004B].  
Privacy concerns 
It has been assumed that the ideal level of privacy for ubiquitous computing 
systems was the same as for offline environments (See above, section 3.2.2). 
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The responses on the survey however, indicate that this may not always be 
correct. 
The sample shows that 97% of the respondents are either very concerned or 
concerned about their privacy when online. The corresponding concern for real-
life, i.e. offline, privacy in the sample is 71%. Hence, the sample shows a clear 
difference between privacy concerns online and offline. This finding is 
illustrated in Figure 67. 
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Figure 67. Proportions of subjects that reported privacy concerns. 
The cause of this heightened concern is still unclear, though we have identified 
two hypotheses. It could perhaps be that people fear the unknowns that are 
encountered with new technology. Indeed, it is only within the last decade that 
Internet technology has become widely available to households [National 
Statistics 2005]. The greater concern could also be an indicator of a lack of trust 
in online technology, its providers, and the way personal information is handled. 
Given the surge of spam [Wakefield 2005] and other malicious online activities 
such as computer viruses [Ward 2005] and internet fraud [BBC News 2005], a 
lack of trust from those on the receiving end should not be surprising. Even 
those that are lucky not to be targeted are likely to be affected by the reports in 
the media. 
Regardless of what has caused the subjects to show more concern for online 
than offline environments, this finding does not bode well. It suggests that the 
opportunity to form an early relationship of trust between the technology, its 
users, and providers has already passed. This can, potentially, negatively affect 
the acceptance and desire for ubiquitous computing by a wider audience. Hence, 
users are rightfully expected to inspect new ubiquitous systems harder than their 
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offline counterparts, if any. They may possibly also judge them harder than 
traditional systems, which is unfortunate. Overall, the finding suggests that the 
work of proving the trustworthiness of these new ubiquitous systems will at the 
very least be more difficult than anticipated. 
Access control mechanisms 
The responses to the survey also yielded some interesting findings concerning 
the tested access control mechanisms.  
When comparing the setup of the Classification and Clearance Scheme (CCS) 
against the subjects’ reported privacy preferences the average accuracy was 
found to be 79% in the sample. The respective average accuracy for the Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC) mechanism was found to be 87%. Hence the 
subjects in the sample were able to set up the RBAC mechanism more 
accurately than the CCS mechanism. This finding is illustrated in Figure 68. 
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Figure 68. The accuracy of the subjects’ access control setups. 
This result tallies with what is to be expected. Due to its limitations there are 
situations in which the CCS mechanism cannot represent the subjects’ 
preferences completely accurately. With three pieces of context and five 
potential recipients some inaccuracies are to be anticipated. The RBAC 
mechanism, on the other hand, can with the availability of 5 roles be completely 
accurately set up for the given scenario. Thus, it is anticipated that the RBAC 
mechanism should be the more accurate of the two, which the survey confirms. 
Another finding, that is perhaps more interesting, concerns the subjects’ 
perception of their ability to set up access control mechanisms. When asked 
how accurately they felt they had been able to set up the CCS mechanism, 65% 
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of the respondents stated that they had been able to express their preferences 
either very accurately or accurately. The respective figure for the RBAC 
mechanism was only 48%. Hence, the subjects in the sample felt that they had 
been able to express their privacy preferences more accurately with the CCS 
mechanism than with the RBAC mechanism, when in fact the opposite was true. 
This finding is illustrated in Figure 69. The CCS mechanism was also reported 
to have felt easier to set up by the subjects. 
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Figure 69. The subjects’ perception of the access control setups. 
This result indicates that it can be difficult for people to see the real effect of an 
access control mechanism at any particular state. It also suggests that they may 
not always be aware of how well they have managed to set up their privacy 
protection mechanism. Furthermore, the fact that the mechanism found to be the 
easiest to work with was also perceived to be the more accurately set up, seems 
to suggest that the ease of use may be misleading. 
Finally, another finding concerns the cases where the subjects in the sample 
failed to set up the access control mechanisms to represent their preferences. 
With the CCS mechanism it was found that 70% of the inaccuracies lead to too 
high an access. The corresponding figure for the RBAC mechanism was 68%. 
Thus, in the cases were the access control mechanisms were inaccurately set up, 
it was found that this most often resulted in too high an access being granted. 
This finding is illustrated in Figure 70. 
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Figure 70. The effect of inaccurate representation of privacy preferences 
This result is most worrying, especially since the other findings suggest that 
people may not always be aware of how well they have managed to express 
their privacy preferences. The overall consequence is likely to be a false sense 
of protection. This may subsequently affect people’s trust in the technology, if 
and when they become aware that their expectations have not been met. 
6.1.2.3. Validity to population 
The validity of the survey results to the population is arguable given that the 
sample size was small. Whilst 31 subjects are considered to be enough to be 
able to draw some conclusions from the survey, in particular when the 
differences are clear, a larger sample is required to statistically demonstrate that 
the result applies to the general population.  
The sample was also biased. With 70% of the respondents being male this 
gender was overrepresented in the sample. If this has affected the outcome of 
the survey is unclear, though given that the overrepresentation is relatively 
small it can be assumed that the effect also will be small. Also computer and 
internet literate users were clearly overrepresented. This is an outcome most 
likely resulting from the survey being performed online, and perhaps also due to 
its topic. This overrepresentation cannot be disregarded.  
There is, however, evidence to suggest that even with a larger size the sample 
may still have been biased. For example, the 10th WWW user survey performed 
by the GVU Center at the Georgia Institute of Technology [GVU's WWW 
Surveying Team 1998] shows a similar bias despite having a much larger 
sample size. Furthermore, it can be argued that bias towards computer and 
Internet literate people is not a disadvantage. It is expected that the users of 
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ubiquitous computing systems are both computer and Internet literate. The 
number of households with internet access also increases steadily. Between 
1998 and 2004 the proportion of UK households with internet access has gone 
from less than 10% to 52% [National Statistics 2005]. This of course will 
contribute to improve the population’s computer and Internet literacy.  
It is therefore believed that the sample provides a reasonable approximation of 
the population for the purpose of this survey. 
6.1.2.4. Limitations of results 
There are concerns with respect to how well the survey captures the everyday 
use of the access control mechanisms. Firstly, no training was given on how to 
use the mechanisms. Only a short description was provided as guidance. 
Secondly, the survey did not include any feedback of the outcome when setting 
up the access control mechanisms. In contrast when using the infrastructure, the 
administration console allows the user to view the actual outcome of the 
configuration and to fine-tune the access, if necessary. Hence, what the survey 
actually captures is the first attempt at using the mechanisms. Whilst this 
provides an indication of the initial accuracy that can be expected, it does not 
show how well the mechanisms can perform. In practise the accuracy is 
generally expected to be better, particularly with experienced users, but what 
improvement can be achieved for the respective mechanism is unclear.  
Also, the general applicability of the results for the two types of access control 
mechanisms has limitations. The survey specifically compared the CCS and 
RBAC mechanism presented in this work (See above, section 4.5.2). Associated 
with these mechanisms are simplifications. Firstly, in CCS the classifications 
are associated with the identifiers of context information, not the data. There is 
therefore an element of uncertainty when performing the classification. It also 
implies that once released information is no longer associated with a 
classification. Secondly, the RBAC mechanism employs automatic role 
invocation. In practice this means that a user always receives the best possible 
access given their current set of roles. Hence, the exact roles assigned are in 
effect not important provided the overall access is correct. These simplifications 
can affect the reasoning and process of assigning access as well as affecting the 
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results directly. For example, with the RBAC mechanism the fact that access is 
achieved by invoking the wrong role is hidden, in some situations improving the 
measured accuracy and always increasing risks from impersonation. Hence, 
when comparing the results with other mechanisms these simplifications must 
be taken into account. 
6.2. Development support 
It has been suggested that an infrastructure, in addition to providing privacy 
protection, can make the development of context-aware applications easier and 
more rapid. This hypothesis has been based on the assumption that an 
infrastructure will reduce the complexity of the application design and that 
common functions can be performed by the infrastructure. 
The approach taken to establish whether the infrastructure in fact aids the 
development of applications has consisted of a qualitative evaluation in three 
areas. Firstly, the usefulness of the feature set provided by the infrastructure has 
been evaluated. Secondly, the reduction to the code base of context-aware 
applications that can be achieved by using the infrastructure has been estimated. 
Finally, a measurement of the cost in terms of performance of using the 
infrastructure has also been made. 
6.2.1. Feature set 
To aid the development of context-aware applications the infrastructure has 
been developed to handle a number of key features. These features are now 
discussed from a developer’s perspective. The discussion draws upon the 
experience and necessities of the agents developed for the infrastructure (See 
above, section 5.6) as well as the infrastructure itself (See above, sections 5.3 & 
5.5). For each feature an analysis is made about the usefulness and the benefits 
it brings. 
6.2.1.1. Privacy protection 
The infrastructure’s ability to protect the user’s privacy has already been 
evaluated (See above, section 6.1). However, the inclusion of privacy protection 
in the infrastructure also affects the application developers and needs to be 
examined from this perspective as well. 
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Including privacy protection in context-aware systems can be a time consuming 
and costly process. The development of the privacy protection for the 
infrastructure has demonstrated this. From the requirements it can be seen that 
there are several areas that need to be covered including authentication, access 
control, anonymity, etc. In all of these areas various mechanisms must be 
chosen and implemented with care. Furthermore, from a developer’s point of 
view the time spent on privacy protection can appear to add little direct value to 
a system. Adding additional functions has a more noticeable effect, even though 
this may leave the system open for abuse.  
Given this, incorporating the privacy protection into an infrastructure is 
therefore seen to be beneficial. It removes the need for system and application 
developers to delve deep into the area. Instead the infrastructure provides a 
solution that takes care of the privacy protection and that is ready out of the box. 
And even though developers need to be careful not to void the protection, the 
factors they need to consider are minimised. This should save them time, time 
that then can be spent developing other parts of the system. Another useful 
aspect is that the responsibility for the implementation of the privacy protection 
is shifted away from each individual system or application. This minimises code 
duplication and thus also the risk of errors. Furthermore, if errors are found they 
can be corrected without having to update each individual system. 
The web presence application takes advantage of the benefits provided with the 
infrastructure based privacy protection. The application, which publishes an 
entity’s context on the web, has been developed without any access control 
mechanism itself. It simply publishes the information it can access from the 
entity’s context manager. This of course reduces the development time 
significantly. It also makes the application much more flexible and responsive 
to changes in privacy preferences. Any changes made to the privacy preferences 
held by the context manager in the infrastructure, will be reflected by the web 
presence application. Hence, the process of configuring what is published or not 
is that of granting or revoking access to the information. 
Relying on the privacy protection solution provided by an infrastructure has its 
disadvantages as well. A developer has no direct control over the privacy 
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protection mechanism. This includes the type of mechanism, its 
implementation, and how it is set up. This can be a problem under certain 
situations. For example, if it is desirable to run another access control system in 
parallel it may prove difficult to synchronise the systems. There may also be 
situations where the provided privacy protection is not appropriate. Assigning 
access per context item may for example be unnecessary. 
6.2.1.2. Context storage 
Another key feature of the infrastructure is context storage. The context 
manager in the infrastructure sits between the context producers and context 
consumers and manages the flow of information. This includes both temporary 
and long term storage of information (See above, section 5.3.3.1).  
It is common for context-aware systems to require contextual information to be 
retained for later use. Independent of the length of time the storage of 
information is required it adds an overhead to the context-aware system both in 
terms of development and operation. It is particularly troublesome if individual 
applications are to store information. Furthermore, if the storage of a subject’s 
contextual information is not coordinated this will not only lead to discrepancies 
but it will also make it difficult to control the flow of information. 
Letting the infrastructure handle the storage of contextual information therefore 
has its benefits. From a developers perspective it enables context producers and 
context consumers to be developed without having to worry about how 
information is stored. It also widens the choice of devices that can be used when 
developing sensors and applications as the storage of information is shifted onto 
the infrastructure. In a ubiquitous environment where resources are scarce this 
can be very useful. From a wider perspective a notable benefit is that data 
duplication can be minimised and thus also potential discrepancies in the data. 
Looking at the implementation, the driver approach provides a flexible solution. 
By exchanging the data storage driver used by the context manager a system 
developer can customise how information is stored in the infrastructure. This is 
useful as the environments for which ubiquitous systems are developed vary 
along with the resources they offer. The developers can also implement custom 
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storage drivers and thus take control over how information is stored in the 
infrastructure. 
All of the applications developed have benefited from the infrastructure’s ability 
to store contextual information. In fact, none of the applications developed 
implement any mechanism for storing contextual information persistently. This 
has of course simplified their development. It has also the benefit of making 
breakdowns or theft less critical from an information perspective. For example, 
if the context-aware desk display were to break down no information would be 
lost as it is stored in the infrastructure by a context manager. 
Placing the storage of contextual information in the infrastructure, however, 
comes at a cost. Even though it is possible to control how information is stored 
through the development of custom data storage drivers, the developer loses 
control over the storage process as a whole. It is only that last step, i.e. how 
information is physically stored, that can be influenced and even this is steered 
by the interface towards the context manager. Another disadvantage is that the 
storage of contextual information in the infrastructure is less efficient in terms 
of performance. Adding an intermediary infrastructure component, the context 
manager, between the context producer and context consumer removes the 
ability to subscribe to real-time streams of contextual information. The 
communication required to store and retrieve information also adds an 
overhead. Furthermore, in situations where connectivity is unreliable it becomes 
necessary to either cache information in the application or to utilise a local 
context manager. The former alternative forces developers to handle temporary 
storage of information anyway while the latter uses scarce resources. 
6.2.1.3. Communication 
Communication is a critical feature in context-aware systems. In these systems 
contextual information is generally captured, processed, and utilised by different 
components. Communication is the thread the ties them together. 
There are three key aspects of communication that a developer needs to 
consider when developing a context-aware system. Firstly, how is information 
represented so that it can be conveyed? For this they need to design a data 
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format and a scheme governing how information is represented using the 
format. Secondly, how is the information conveyed? A mechanism needs to be 
developed with which information can be transported between components. 
Thirdly, how can the flow of information be secured? The developer needs to 
carefully select a solution that provides adequate security for the 
communication. Addressing these key aspects is time consuming for a 
developer. It is also unnecessary for each system to develop custom solutions as 
the problem is seldom unique. Furthermore, to achieve interoperability between 
different systems the solutions must be standardised. 
With respect to communication the infrastructure provides developers with 
several benefits. To a large extent it removes the need for developers to consider 
communication. The infrastructure includes a predefined and extendable data 
format, saving developers design time. Embedded in the infrastructure is also a 
plug-in based communications framework that is ready to be used by 
developers. Thus developers benefit from not having to implement the 
communication. Another useful feature of the framework is that the details of 
the communication are transparent to the applications. This enables the 
developers to implement their system independent of how messages are 
transported or secured. In situations where a developer requires control over the 
communication this is also possible because of the framework’s use of plug-ins. 
Hence, a developer is able to customise how information is both transported and 
secured. 
The development of the iButton context capture application (See above, section 
5.6.4) has demonstrated the benefit of the infrastructure’s communication 
framework. Although the application is directly dependant on communication to 
function, i.e. to update an entity’s context manager with any information 
captured, it was developed without implementing any communication 
mechanism. Instead the communication framework provided with the 
development toolkit was used to handle the communication. This shortened the 
development time. It has also made it possible for users of the application to 
choose what transport and cryptographic plug-ins to use. 
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The downside of using the infrastructure and its communication framework is 
that the developer becomes locked to a specific data format. Whilst this may not 
be a problem for the development itself, the performance of a finished system 
can suffer. For example, the XML based data format is not suitable for the 
transportation of very large messages. For each message a model is created in 
memory for further processing within the infrastructure. Large quantities of data 
are better sent using other means. Furthermore, the framework restricts a 
developer’s ability to control the communication. Even though custom plug-ins 
can be developed and used, they need to comply with the guidelines of the 
framework. 
6.2.1.4. Synchronisation 
Synchronisation is another key feature in the infrastructure. Although it is a 
small part of the implementation it fulfils an important need. Furthermore, 
synchronisation between different systems can be difficult for developers to 
implement due to a lack of cooperation. 
In a distributed ubiquitous system discrepancies and data duplication are often 
unavoidable. The lack of reliable communication between systems makes it 
necessary for information to be available locally to ensure uninterrupted 
operation. To recover eventual differences that come about during periods of 
offline operation it is necessary to synchronise the systems.  In an environment 
filled with ubiquitous systems it will however not be practical for individual 
systems to handle the synchronisation of data. Implementing synchronisation 
routines for each system is a time consuming process. It also requires 
developers to know how to interface with each related system, thus placing 
unnecessarily high demands on them. 
The implemented infrastructure provides built-in support for synchronisation. 
This moves the responsibility for keeping information synchronised away from 
individual systems and their developers. Doing so has its benefits. It removes 
the need to implement synchronisation routines in the individual systems 
developed, thus reducing their development time. It also provides developers 
with one issue less to concentrate their efforts on and in this way lowers the 
demands placed upon them. The implementation also has another useful feature. 
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Although the infrastructure handles the synchronisation of information, it is 
possible for individual systems to initiate the process. This feature is 
particularly valuable in situations where it is critical that information is up to 
date and synchronised. 
In the deployed infrastructure context managers have been run both on mobile 
devices and on permanently online servers. The built-in synchronisation feature 
has been used to keep an entity’s context managers synchronised. This allows 
the systems developed for the infrastructure to be used even when there is no 
connectivity back to the main server. Even in situations where the context 
changes with the state of the connectivity, e.g. location and availability of 
hotspots, it is useful to be able to update the contextual information on the move 
as this history can be kept. A key benefit is of course that the applications do not 
need to be adapted in any way to support the synchronisation of information. 
However, implementing the synchronisation routines in the infrastructure rather 
than in individual systems is not only beneficial. A disadvantage is that 
developers lose control over the synchronisation process if they rely on the 
support provided by the infrastructure. This can be problematic as the ability to 
customise the process is limited. For example, only a very basic control is 
provided of the type of information being synchronised, data or context.  
6.2.2. Code reduction 
One way of making the development of context-aware systems easier and also 
more rapid is by reducing the amount of coding developers need to do. A 
reduction of the code base will also make maintenance less demanding, which is 
an added benefit. To estimate the extent to which the infrastructure allows 
coding to be reduced a scenario has been investigated. 
6.2.2.1. Measure 
To give a quantitative measurement of the amount of code required to 
implement a system is difficult. Several factors affect this including the design, 
choice of platform, coding style, programmer experience, etc. Hence, 
quantitative measurements of code use will be biased. This is not desirable. A 
coarser estimate of the amount of coding required has therefore been employed 
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in this evaluation. The approach taken has been to use the number of features 
required to be implemented as the indicator. 
6.2.2.2. Scenario 
Assume that a system is going to be built to make use of a network of location 
sensors deployed throughout a building. The system should initially support a 
simple application that allows a user location to be queried. But future plans are 
to make wider use of the location information collected as well as other pieces 
of context. To not discourage usage of the system it is required that individual 
users can determine for themselves who can query their location information. 
6.2.2.3. Required features 
A system for the outlined scenario requires a number of features to be 
implemented. Firstly, the system must be able to capture contextual information. 
For this a driver that can interface with the sensor network is required. This 
driver would then capture the raw location data picked up by the sensor 
network. Secondly, the system should be able to store, or at least cache, the 
captured location information so that it can be queried. Hence, the system needs 
to incorporate data storage. Thirdly, the system must contain mechanisms for 
privacy protection and security. At the very minimum authentication and access 
control is required. Hence, there need to be a information management 
component in the system. Fourthly, the system need to be able the handle 
location requests. A request handler component is thus required. The request 
handler would then interact with the information management component to 
fulfil requests. Finally, it is necessary to provide a user interface to the system. 
The user interface must allow users to express their privacy preferences and to 
post requests for location information. The interface could take the shape of a 
standalone application or perhaps be available over the web. 
6.2.2.4. Implementations 
How then does an independent implementation compare with one that uses the 
infrastructure? 
Developing an independent system for the outlined scenario will require all of 
the features listed to be incorporated. Hence, without any external support the 
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implementation must contain code for context capture, data storage, privacy 
protections, security, request fulfilment, and user interaction. 
A system developed for the same scenario, but that uses the support provided by 
the infrastructure to the full extent, instead only needs to implement two of the 
five required features, namely the context capture and the user interaction. 
Furthermore, the user interaction can also be simplified if the administrative 
console (See above, section 5.6.1) is used in conjunction with the system being 
developed as this would remove the need to provide an interface for the 
management of privacy preferences. To utilise the features of the infrastructure 
little additional code is required. Only a few lines of code are necessary to send 
and retrieve context to and from context managers, as illustrated in Figure 71. 
 
Figure 71. Using the infrastructure 
Thus, the use of the infrastructure minimises the number of features a developer 
needs to implement. Whilst no measure has been made of the reduction in terms 
of lines of code, the experience from the implementation of the features in the 
infrastructure indicates that the reduction is significant. For example, the 
unoptimised implementation of the role based access control mechanism in the 
infrastructure, excluding P3P support, alone consists of more than 2300 lines 
(80 kb) of commented source code.  
As a reference the iButton context capture application, including the graphical 
user interface, only consists of approximately 1200 lines (40 kb) of commented 
//Load communication properties 
Properties props = PropertiesReaderCcpp.readProperties(fileInputStream); 
//Create and initialise communication handler. 
ComHandler comHandler = new ComHandler(); 
comHandler.init(props); 
//Create message 
Message msg = new Message(); 
msg.setData(component,attribute-key,attribute-value); 
... 
//Post message 
Message reply = comHandler.post(username, password, address, msg); 
//Handle response 
... 
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source code. For the web presence application the source code consists of 450 
lines (15 kb). 
6.2.3. Infrastructure performance 
Performance is an important factor when determining whether it is practical or 
not to use the developed infrastructure. The performance of the infrastructure 
has therefore been evaluated. In the evaluation the round-trip times and the 
cryptographic performance has been measured and analysed.  
6.2.3.1. Platforms 
The performance test has been run on two different devices, a handheld 
computer and a laptop.  
The handheld device was an iPAQ 4150 PDA. It is equipped with an Intel PXA 
255 processor, 400mhz ARM X-Scale, and 64 Mb of RAM whereof 15 Mb was 
used for storage. Also available was additional storage in the form of a Secure 
Digital flash card with a stated maximum transfer rate of 22 Mbit/s. The 
infrastructure components were run from the flash memory and also utilised it 
for storage. The operating system on the device was Windows Mobile 2003. 
The Java virtual machine used was IBM’s J9 with the CDC configuration and 
the Personal Basis Profile.  
The laptop device was an Evo N1015. It is equipped with a Mobile AMD 
Athlon XP 2000+, 1.66 Ghz and 512 Mb of ram. The infrastructure was run 
from the hard disk and also utilised it for storage. The operating system on the 
device was Windows XP Professional SP1. The Java virtual machine used was 
Sun’s J2SE 1.3. 
6.2.3.2. Round-trip 
One measure of performance is the round trip time, i.e. the time it takes for a 
request to be fulfilled. This includes the time it takes for a request to be 
delivered, processed, and then have a reply returned. The evaluation performed 
has measured the round-trip time for both context-producers and context 
consumers with two different sized payloads. 
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To measure the round-trip times a simple test agent has been developed that first 
takes the role of a context producer and then of a context consumer. The agent 
will therefore write and read to a context manager depending on its current role. 
To measure the round-trip time a timestamp is taken directly before a request is 
sent and immediately after the response has been received. The difference 
between those timestamps is the round-trip time. To avoid any bias the payload 
written and read by the agent is pseudorandom and stays the same throughout 
the evaluation. 
The performance test was carried out in an isolated infrastructure set up 
dedicated to the test. The setup consisted of a single context manager and a test 
agent, both running locally on the device. The components were run in separate 
Java virtual machine instances and they communicated over a socket 
connection. The payload sizes used during the test were 1024-bytes and 10240-
bytes. Added to this was the overhead from the message format. For example, a 
request to write 1 Kb of data results in a message size of 2295-bytes, the 
corresponding value for 10 Kb is 14935-bytes. During the test, each operation 
was run 10 times from which an average was then calculated. Figure 72 
contains the results.  
 1024-bytes 10240-bytes 
iPAQ 4150 1785 / 784 46182 / 22488
Evo N1015v 149 / 90 6643 / 2851 
Figure 72. Write/read time in ms 
The results show that it takes approximately 1.8 seconds to write 1 Kb of data to 
the context manager on the PDA and approximately 0.8 seconds to read it back. 
For many purposes this is considered an adequate level of performance, 
particularly if context updates are infrequent. However, it is not sufficient for 
the infrastructure to serve applications that require context updates in real-time. 
Hence, in practise the application domain that can benefit from the 
infrastructure will be limited. The figures for the laptop, which are 10 times 
faster however, show that as processing power and memory increase the 
performance will improve significantly.  
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The test also shows the write operation on both types of devices to be 
significantly slower than read operation. This is to be expected with the current 
implementation. The data storage caches the available information in memory. 
Hence, data can be read quickly. The data storage will also commit data to disk 
after each write operation. Hence, the write operations are expected to take 
longer. What was unexpected though, was the detrimental effect the increased 
payload had. Increasing the payload 10 times, to 10 Kb, causes the round-trip to 
take 30 times longer. This is a significant increase that indicates that the 
infrastructure in its current state does not scale to handle large payloads. Hence, 
for optimal performance the infrastructure is best used with smaller payloads. 
To what extent careful optimisation can improve the situation is still unclear. 
6.2.3.3. Cryptography 
Given the resource constraints in ubiquitous computing systems it is important 
to establish to what degree cryptography affects performance. This will help to 
determine the right balance between performance and secrecy of 
communication. The evaluation performed has measured the cryptographic 
performance of the implemented RSAAES mechanism (See above, section 
5.3.1.3) with respect to key generation and the encryption/decryption of data. 
To test the RSAAES performance a stand-alone test application was developed 
that utilises the cryptographic library in the infrastructure. The test application 
measures the key generation time by taking a timestamp immediately before and 
after a key is generated. The difference between those timestamps is taken to be 
the key generation time. The same approach is taken to measure the time it takes 
to encrypt and decrypt data. To avoid any bias both the data and the RSA key 
were pseudorandom and constant throughout the evaluation. 
The RSAAES tests were performed on the laptop and the handheld device 
previously described (See above, section 6.2.3.1), which were temporarily 
dedicated to this task. The RSA key sizes used during the test were 512-bits and 
1024-bits. The AES key size was kept constant at 256-bits. As with the round-
trip performance test the two data sizes 1 Kb and 10 Kb were used. Each 
operation was also run 10 times from which an average value was calculated. 
The results are presented in Figure 73 to Figure 75. 
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 512-bits 1024-bits
iPAQ 4150 9532 128916 
Evo N1015v 80 1191 
Figure 73. RSA Key generation time in ms 
The RSA key generation was found to be the most time consuming operation in 
the test. This was expected as a previous benchmark [Osbakk, Ryan 2004B] has 
shown this to be the case. What was unexpected though was the length of time it 
took to generate keys on the PDA. The generation of the 1024-bit keys, the now 
recommended minimum length by RSA Laboratories [Kaliski 2003], took on 
average approximately 129 seconds. This is significantly longer than the 
approximately 4 seconds found in the previous benchmark performed on the 
same device [Osbakk, Ryan 2004B]. Since the previous benchmark both the 
RSAAES implementation and the cryptographic library used [Bouncy Castle 
2003] have remained unchanged. The only difference between the set ups is the 
Java virtual machines used. This test used IBM’s J9 whilst Insignia’s Jeode was 
used before. Hence, this indicates that the choice of JVM can make a significant 
difference to the cryptographic performance. The result also further emphasises 
the importance of reusing the RSA key pair as it would not be feasible to 
regenerate the key pair for every request or even every new session. A one off 
delay of 129 seconds for the key generation, although clearly undesirable, is still 
considered to be acceptable. It does suggest though that persistent keys must be 
generated in advance rather than upon the first request as done in the current 
infrastructure implementation.  
 512-bits 1024-bits
iPAQ 4150 157 / 529 178 / 920
Evo N1015v 4 / 14 4 / 36 
Figure 74. RSAAES encryption/decryption time in ms (1024 bytes) 
The performance test measured the time to encrypt and decrypt 1 Kb of data to 
be on average approximately 0.18 and 0.92 seconds, respectively, on the PDA. 
These operations are also slower in comparison to the benchmarks run on the 
Jeode JVM, though not to the same degree [Osbakk, Ryan 2004B]. This slow 
down makes cryptography more of an issue than previously believed. For 
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example, the encryption of a 1 Kb read request takes almost as long as the 
round-trip. However, the fact that the operations can be performed significantly 
faster on another JVM leaves room for optimisation. It should also be noted that 
on the laptop device the measured times are so short they are largely 
insignificant. Hence, as the processing power increases on ubiquitous devices 
cryptography is likely to become less of an issue. This view is supported by the 
results from the previous benchmark as it showed the cryptographic 
performance to improve approximately by a factor of 2 between an iPAQ 3660 
and an iPAQ 4150 [Osbakk, Ryan 2004B]. 
 512-bits 1024-bits 
iPAQ 4150 761 / 1235 749 / 1620
Evo N1015v 30 / 30 15 / 46 
Figure 75. RSAAES encryption/decryption time in ms (10240 bytes) 
Finally, the test also shows the encryption and decryption times to be increased 
with larger pieces of data, as expected. What is important to note, though, is that 
in contrast to the round-trip times the cryptographic performance increase at a 
slower rate than the data size. Increasing the data size by 10 times resulted in an 
increase in the order of magnitude of approximately 4 and 2 times for 
encryption and decryption respectively on the PDA. This result is in line with 
expectations as the work performed by the slower asymmetric cipher, RSA, in 
the RSAAES combination is unaffected by the data length. An increased 
payload size will therefore effectively make the latency introduced by the 
RSAAES cryptographic mechanism less significant overall. 
6.3. Comparison with related work 
In general there is more than one way of doing things. Providing privacy 
protection and development support for context-aware systems is no exception. 
It is therefore necessary to also evaluate how the developed infrastructure 
compares with related work.  
The evaluation consists of a qualitative comparison with the approaches taken in 
three related projects: the privacy awareness system, solar, and the EQUIP 
Platform [Greenhalgh 2002]. The aim is to establish if the approach taken in this 
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work can be motivated given the existence of alternative approaches. Hence, the 
evaluation has been made with respect to the background, aims, and 
requirements presented in Chapter 1 to Chapter 4.  
6.3.1. Privacy-awareness system 
The privacy-awareness system (pawS) [Langheinrich 2002], is a related 
research project also investigating a comprehensive solution for improving 
privacy in ubiquitous computing. Just as the infrastructure presented in this 
thesis, pawS, covers a wide range of issues including secure communication, 
anonymity, and access control. Furthermore, pawS also utilises the Platform for 
Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) as a supporting technology. However, the 
similarities end there. There are a number of important differences though 
compared to this work, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Firstly, the foundation for the work on privacy in pawS is six design guidelines 
concerning notice, choice and consent, anonymity and pseudonymity, proximity 
and locality, adequate security, and access and recourse [Langheinrich 2001]. In 
contrast this work is based on a model of privacy with the focus on controlling 
the release and leakage of information. A key difference is therefore the width 
of the foundation, with pawS having a broader scope. The broader scope makes 
desirable requirements, e.g. security, more evident in pawS. This is certainly 
advantageous. However, from the point of view of this project it is not 
necessary as it is not a problem to specify requirements later. 
Secondly, pawS emphasises the importance of explicitly making users, or their 
agents, aware of when data is being collected. This should be compared to the 
approach taken in this work where notice is only given during the agreement 
stage of the process of disclosure, which can occur anytime before the actual 
data collection. The advantage of the approach taken in pawS is that users can 
be made aware of potential data collection before it occurs, providing them with 
an opportunity to oppose the collection of data. Hence, the notice provides a 
mechanism enabling information leakages to be managed. An added benefit is 
that previously unknown services can be presented to a user. The disadvantage, 
however, is that this approach may provide a false sense of security when 
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systems do not follow the rules. For the purpose of this work leakage 
management is not required by the adopted privacy model. 
Finally, the privacy-awareness system’s architecture assumes the presence of 
Internet connectivity. This is necessary because a user’s mobile privacy 
assistant offloads the decision making onto a personal privacy proxy situated on 
the Internet. In contrast the infrastructure developed in this work is not 
dependent on Internet connectivity for it to work. The infrastructure can run 
locally on a disconnected network or just on a device. The advantage of 
offloading demanding operations to a proxy on the Internet is that the mobile 
clients can conserve their resources. The disadvantage, however, is that the use 
of the system becomes limited to where there is connectivity. This hinders 
ubiquitous operation, which is essential for the infrastructure developed in this 
work. 
6.3.2. Solar 
The Solar system [Chen, Kotz 2002] [Minami, Kotz 2002], like this work, 
provides a privacy enhancing infrastructure that supports the development of 
context aware applications. Furthermore, Solar also focuses on access control as 
the means of improving privacy. Thus there are clear similarities between the 
projects. However, once again there are a number of important differences 
compared to this work, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Firstly, the Solar system uses a subscription model to distribute contextual 
information whilst this work has employed a request-based model. The 
advantage of the subscription model approach is that contextual changes 
propagate to the listening applications in the system when they occur. It also 
removes the need for applications to poll for contextual information or to add 
their own subscriptions support. However, to manage the subscriptions a central 
authority, a star, is used. This centralisation, although possible in environments 
with reliable connectivity, does not allow the system to fully support ubiquitous 
operation where connectivity is limited and unreliable. A request-based 
approach, as employed in this work, is more suitable there. 
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Secondly, in Solar the processing of contextual information is integrated within 
the data flow. Operators are used to filter, transform, merge, and aggregate 
information between the source and the application. These operators can be 
distributed in the network and they interact by subscribing and publishing event 
streams. Furthermore by chaining operators a sequence of transformations can 
be performed. In contrast the approach taken in this work typically results in the 
processing being centralised to the context managers. Context producers deliver 
information directly to a subject’s context manager. Information is then 
processed by the context manager itself or by services which return their output 
to the context manager again. The advantage of Solar’s approach is that it 
allows complex operations to be distributed and performed by a graph of 
simpler operators. As transformations are performed by the operators in the 
system it ought to also support reuse of transformation sequences better. The 
disadvantage of Solar’s approach, though, is that the flow of information cannot 
be controlled between processing steps. Thus in Solar access to information is 
first enforced at the root of a subscription tree, as the last step before passing on 
an event to an application. This is not compliant with the requirements of this 
work. A subject must be able to control the flow of information about them.  
Thirdly, a difference exists not only in how access is enforced but also in how 
access controls are used. As previously described (See above, section 2.6.4) 
each event in the Solar system is tagged with an access control list (ACL) upon 
creation. The ACL is then modified appropriately if and when the event is 
transformed by operators. Hence, the ACL associated with an event published 
by an operator is derived from the ACLs of the events forming the input. In 
addition to deriving access, operators can restrict the access further and users 
can ease the control. This should be compared to the access control mechanism 
in this work that requires users to explicitly set permissions for each context 
item. The advantage of Solar’s approach is that it scales better. As the number 
of context items sensed in the environment increases it becomes increasingly 
difficult to individually control access to them. Thus deriving access control 
settings from those initially set by the source is beneficial. Once again though, 
Solar’s approach provides the users with less than full control over the flow of 
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information. Although users are able to affect how the access control is derived 
at each operator, their customisation is limited to attaching their own relaxation 
functions. The consequence of the assumptions made in this work is that full 
control is required. 
Finally, in Solar neither authentication nor secrecy of communication is directly 
addressed in conjunction with privacy. These issues are instead assumed to be 
provided by the system as a whole. In contrast the approach taken in this work 
has been to address authentication, access control, and secrecy of 
communications together. Whilst focusing on access control separately may 
allow more progress to be made in this specific area, it is believed to be more 
beneficial for a system as a whole to provide a more encompassing solution. 
6.3.3. EQUIP 
The EQUIP software platform [Greenhalgh 2002], developed within the 
EQUATOR Interdiciplinary Research Collaboration, is another project that has 
opted for an infrastructure approach. Whilst there are some basic similarities to 
the infrastructure presented in this work, the design of the EQUIP platform 
differs significantly. 
Firstly, EQUIP uses the notion of dataspaces to hold shared information. In 
contrast this work uses context managers to hold information about their 
associated entity only. Furthermore, in EQUIP any application is allowed to 
create a dataspace server and share information whilst in this work the 
information sharing is separated from the applications. The advantage of using 
dataspaces is that it allows multiple applications to work on the same data. This 
allows for better collaboration, less redundancy, improved scalability, and more 
independent services. The disadvantage is that the ownership of information is 
not clear, which raises the question of who should control access. Given the 
requirements of this work the use of dataspaces with shared information is 
therefore considered inappropriate. 
Secondly, the EQUIP platform employs an event-based model with state sharing 
to distribute information whilst this work implements a request-based model. 
The advantage of an event based mechanism is similar to that found with the 
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subscription model used by Solar (See above, section 6.3.2). It allows changes 
to information to propagate to listening applications, removing their need to 
constantly poll for updates or add custom subscription support. Furthermore, in 
contrast to Solar, EQUIP does not rely on a central authority for managing 
subscriptions but associates them with the dataspace. Operation in ubiquitous 
computing environments with potentially unreliable communication is therefore 
possible.  A disadvantage of the event-based model can be argued to be the 
overhead required to retrieve information, though this is only valid in situations 
where updates are not required. It must therefore be concluded that an event-
based model, like that used by EQUIP, is advantageous. However, from the 
point of view of this project a request-based model is sufficient to fulfil the 
requirements. 
Thirdly, EQUIP supports distributed computation natively. The items being 
shared in the dataspaces are software objects capable of both holding data and 
providing methods for computation. In comparison the messages sent in the 
infrastructure presented in this work are only bearers of information. Distributed 
computation is achieved through the use of agents, proxies, and resource 
extension plug-ins. The advantage of embedding methods for computation 
directly in the data items is that this functionality is available to all applications 
using the dataspace without additional configuration. The disadvantage is that 
limitations are placed on what devices can be used with the platform. The 
devices must support a runtime environment compatible with the data items. 
Furthermore, it may not be possible for the producer of a data item to foresee all 
types of distributed computations required by applications. Which approach is 
the most suitable therefore depends on how the infrastructure is intended to be 
used. In this work an emphasis is placed on maximising device compatibility. 
Finally, another important difference between EQUIP and the infrastructure 
presented in this work is how privacy and security issues are handled. The 
former provides limited security and no privacy protection whilst the latter 
addresses both areas. What is available in EQUIP is the ability to protect access 
to the dataspace using a shared secret (password); no further access control is 
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provided1. The advantage of not providing a more extensive mechanism for 
privacy and security is that the complexity of the platform is reduced. Also 
performance should, in theory, be better as less processing is required. The 
disadvantage is that subjects are not able to control the flow of information 
about them. Furthermore, the platform becomes dependent on an appropriately 
configured network for security. The level of protection available in EQUIP is 
therefore not sufficient to meet the requirements of this work. 
It should be noted that on the whole EQUIP focuses on a different, but related, 
problem; that of sharing information between ubiquitous computing devices and 
virtual environments. Thus, the existence of fundamental differences is to be 
expected. 
6.4. Summary 
In this chapter the developed infrastructure has been evaluated. In particular the 
evaluation has examined the privacy protection, the development support, and 
how the infrastructure compares with related work. 
A qualitative examination of how well the privacy requirements have been 
fulfilled revealed an overall positive result with all requirements being 
considered by the infrastructure design. There are limitations though to the 
solutions provided and the circumstances under which they work. In particular 
further work in the areas of anonymity/pseudonymity and security would be 
beneficial. Interesting results were also found with the user study evaluating the 
performance of the candidate access control mechanisms. Although the role 
based access control model implemented in the infrastructure was found to be 
the more accurately set up, as expected, the study showed a mismatch between 
the actual and perceived accuracy.  This indicates a difficulty in seeing the real 
effect of an access control mechanism. 
To evaluate the development support a qualitative evaluation of the features set 
was performed where the implemented agents served as case studies. The 
investigation concluded that the features included in the infrastructure are 
                                                 
1 Confirmed by C. Greenhalgh in an email communication on 26 April 2007. 
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indeed useful and will benefit developers. However, it was also recognised that 
each feature imposes distinct limitations on the system being developed. Hence, 
the ease of development comes at cost. An estimate of the reduction in code the 
use of the infrastructure can bring was also made by examining a hypothetical 
scenario. It showed that a significant reduction is possible. Furthermore, to 
establish whether the use of the infrastructure is feasible its performance was 
measured. The results revealed that for small messages (~1 Kb) decent 
performance is attained, with read and write operation taking less than 1 and 2 
seconds respectively on a mobile device. Also the use of RSAAES 
cryptography was found to be feasible. The infrastructure is however not 
suitable for use in real-time systems or with large messages. 
To establish whether the approach taken in this work can be motivated, given 
the existence of other approaches, a qualitative comparison was conducted with 
three related projects: the privacy awareness system, solar, and EQUIP. The 
comparison was made with respect to the background, aims, and requirements 
of this project. In the evaluation several differences were identified, each with 
there own advantages and disadvantages. In the context of this work however, it 
has been concluded that the approach taken can be motivated even if there are 
areas that can be improved upon.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK 
Privacy is a matter of utmost importance and surveys have shown it to be a real 
concern in our information society. Ubiquitous computing and context-
awareness further heighten these concerns. The work presented in this thesis has 
taken some steps towards improving the situation through the development of a 
privacy enhancing infrastructure.  
This chapter concludes this thesis. It begins by providing a summary of the 
work presented. After this some areas of further work are discussed that 
originate from the limitations of the project and the results found. Finally, the 
initial goals are revisited and an overall conclusion presented. 
7.1. Summary 
In Chapter 1 the background for the work in this thesis was presented. This 
included work in the fields of ubiquitous computing, context-awareness, and 
privacy. From the background it has been concluded that the early work on 
ubiquitous computing still largely guides the research in the field. Context-
awareness was shown to be an integral part of ubiquitous computing, allowing 
enhanced services to be provided. Privacy was established as a long standing 
desire made more acute with the introduction of ubiquitous and context-aware 
computing. Recent work concerning privacy on the web has helped to bring the 
issue to life. Thus, the need to combine the work of the three fields was found. 
In Chapter 2 the project that forms the basis of this thesis was outlined. The 
need for improved privacy protection and development support for context-
aware systems was substantiated and described as the motivation for the project. 
The research was fixed to focus on applied research performed iteratively. An 
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infrastructure approach was established to be advantageous for the work. 
Results from related work were also examined and taken onboard. 
In Chapter 3 two conceptual models were presented, one with respect to context 
and another to privacy. Context was defined in terms of the existence of 
relationships between entities and data values. Arbitrarily complex networks of 
relationships were demonstrated to exist. Privacy was defined in terms of 
information flow and control. It was assumed that the ideal level of privacy in 
online environments is equal to that experienced offline. Furthermore, it was 
demonstrated that a subject’s control is limited to controlling their own 
disclosures, presence, actions, and receptiveness. The use of the models was 
also clarified using a scenario. 
In Chapter 4 the privacy enhancing infrastructure was introduced. Requirements 
were extracted from the project’s aim, the background of the work, and the 
conceptual models. The need to prioritise privacy and to use a modular design 
was shown. It was also established to be necessary to restrict the depth of the 
context model and to target a subset of devices. In order to uphold these 
preconditions a decentralised infrastructure was presented. Furthermore, 
alternatives for the privacy protection were discussed and the issue of context 
communication addressed. 
In Chapter 5 the implementation of the privacy enhancing infrastructure was 
presented. The target platform and the advantages of a platform independent 
implementation were described. How the context manager handles the storage 
and protection of contextual information was demonstrated, including its use of 
exchangeable modules. It was also shown how the use of catalogue services and 
proxies provides the means to simplify the addressing of entities, translate 
between protocols, and provide anonymity. Furthermore, a number of agents 
utilising the infrastructure to store and retrieve contextual information were 
presented. 
In Chapter 6 the infrastructure developed was evaluated. A qualitative 
requirements fulfilment analysis showed the privacy requirements to be met 
with the design of the infrastructure. From a user survey performed it was 
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concluded that the role based access control mechanism was the more accurate 
mechanism of the candidates presented in Chapter 4. Evidence was also found 
that indicate it is difficult for users to see the real effect of an access control 
mechanism. An analysis of the features in the infrastructure, from a developer’s 
perspective, showed them to be useful. Examining a hypothetical scenario it was 
also demonstrated that a reduction of application code is possible when using 
the infrastructure. Furthermore, measuring the performance of the infrastructure 
showed it to be sufficient for the purposes of the agents developed, but not for 
applications demanding real-time context updates. Finally, with respect to the 
preconditions of this project it was found that the approach taken in this work 
can be justified in comparison with approaches taken in related work. 
7.2. Contributions 
The intentions of this work were to contribute in four areas relating to the 
development of privacy-friendly context-aware systems. 
Firstly, the overall level of privacy in context-aware systems was to be 
improved. In this work it has been shown how a subject’s privacy can be 
protected by providing means of controlling the disclosure of information. The 
privacy-enhancing infrastructure developed demonstrates the use of this 
approach in context-aware systems. The infrastructure also demonstrates the 
feasibility of using cryptography to ensure the confidentiality of information in 
transit even in ubiquitous computing environments. 
Secondly, different access control mechanisms were to be evaluated. In this 
work a classification and clearance scheme and a role based access control 
mechanism have been evaluated, revealing the latter to be the more accurate 
both in theory and in practise. Worth noting though, is that the users perceived 
their performance with the classification and clearance scheme to be better. 
Furthermore, the work has also shown how the Platform for Privacy Preferences 
Project (P3P) [World Wide Web Consortium 2002A] can be used to support 
access control with respect to previously unknown users, though due to poor 
tools this mechanism proved impractical. 
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Thirdly, support for easy and rapid development of privacy-friendly 
applications was to be provided. This work has addressed this issue with the 
development of the privacy-enhancing infrastructure. It has been shown how the 
infrastructure minimises the development effort by providing common features 
required by context-aware applications. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated 
that it is feasible to utilise an infrastructure approach for general purpose 
applications even with resource constrained devices. 
Finally, third-party infrastructures were to be protected. In this thesis it has been 
described how resource extension plug-ins can be used to integrate with other 
infrastructures, thus protecting access from the outside. A plug-in has also been 
developed that demonstrates the integration between the privacy enhancing 
infrastructure developed in this work and the MobiComp infrastructure [Ryan 
2005]. 
7.3. Further work 
There are many aspects to the development of a privacy enhancing 
infrastructure for context-awareness. The scope of this work, however, has 
implied that only a selection of the relevant aspects has been covered. 
Furthermore, the evaluation also highlights some issues that need to be 
addressed.  
The key candidates for further work will now be discussed. 
7.3.1. Access control 
Access control plays a central role in providing privacy. In this work a 
classification and clearance scheme and a role based access control mechanism 
have been evaluated. From the experience gained, three aspects have been 
identified as candidates for further work.  
Firstly, neither of the two access control mechanisms evaluated handle dynamic 
privacy preferences. This implies that it is not possible to describe privacy 
preferences that are context sensitive, a feature that is deemed desirable. An 
investigation, however, has shown promising initial results concerning an 
extension to the current role based access control addressing dynamic 
preferences using the concept of a privacy invasive value [Osbakk, Ryan 
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2004A]. Further work, examining the extension and how it performs with 
respect to related work on dynamic access control [Covington, Long et al. 2001] 
[Zhang, Parashar 2004], is believed to be warranted.  
Secondly, from the user survey undertaken to evaluate the classification and 
clearance scheme and the role based access control mechanism, it was 
concluded that difficulties exist for people to see the real effect of an access 
control mechanism. When this causes too high an access being granted, as it 
was found to do in the majority of the cases examined, it leads to a false sense 
of protection. This is clearly undesirable and further work is necessary to attain 
an understandable, yet powerful, access control mechanism. 
Thirdly, this work has not investigated how to represent the access controls in a 
standardised form. Instead solution specific alternatives have been used. Whilst 
this has worked well for the purposes of this research, the use of a standardised 
format would be desirable in cases of public deployment. Research by others 
has shown good results using X.509 attribute certificates with Role Based 
Access Control [Chadwick, Otenko et al. 2003][Chadwick, Otenko 2004], 
making it attractive an alternative. A candidate for further work is therefore to 
investigate the use of X.509 certificates, particularly in conjunction with a 
privacy invasive value approach. Another alternative to investigate is the use of 
a custom but publicly specified role definition language, as used by others 
[Mascone 2002]. 
7.3.2. User interaction 
The privacy enhancing infrastructure developed focuses on the technical aspects 
involved when building privacy-friendly context-aware systems. User 
interaction has therefore not been prioritised. However, the discrepancy found 
in the undertaken survey between the actual and perceived performance in 
setting up the access control mechanism emphasises the need for informative 
interfaces. Furthermore, the lack of tools found even for standardised 
mechanisms such as P3P indicates that it is not possible to rely on external 
tools. An important piece of further work is therefore to increase the scope to 
include user interaction.  
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There are different directions future work on user interaction can take. Firstly, 
the use of traditional graphical user interfaces can be optimised to improve their 
performance. For example, the work others have performed on their user 
interfaces for privacy control highlights several issues [Lau, Etzioni et al. 1999] 
[Lederer, Hong et al. 2003] and has shown that significant improvements can be 
achieved [Brostoff, Sasse et al. 2005]. Secondly, research into the use of more 
novel interfaces for privacy control is called for. After all a key aspect of 
ubiquitous computing is to change the way we interact with computational 
devices, so should this not also include privacy control? 
7.3.3. Trust management 
In the context model presented, and subsequently the infrastructure, an 
important factor in determining whether or not to release information is the 
recipient’s trustworthiness. Unfortunately, given the time constraints of this 
project it has not been feasible to study the formation and management of trust. 
Instead the work has relied on existing social mechanisms. Trust management is 
therefore a candidate for further work. 
Within the area of trust management there are several aspects that are of interest 
to the further development of the infrastructure. Firstly, it would be useful to 
study the processes involved in the formation and management of trust in 
everyday offline situations. This information may then be used to evolve the 
conceptual model of privacy. Secondly, it would be interesting to evaluate the 
effect of using trust management tools in conjunction with the infrastructure’s 
access control mechanism. Could they perhaps be used as an alternative to P3P 
when interacting with previously unknown participants? Finally, the current 
infrastructure does not provide any mechanism to discourage improper use of 
information once disclosed, but relies on existing social mechanisms. Research 
into the use of trust management as an enforcement mechanism in the 
infrastructure is therefore another candidate for further work. 
7.3.4. Security 
For privacy protection to be effective, a system must be secure. With the 
privacy enhancing infrastructure a basic level of security is provided. However, 
as discussed in the evaluation, the employed security mechanisms are limited 
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and have scalability issues. The improvement of security within the 
infrastructure is thus a candidate for further work. 
Given the scalability issue with the current authentication mechanism, 
improving the authentication is a priority. In particular further work into the 
usage of a public key infrastructure is deemed important. With digital 
certificates entities could securely authenticate themselves in a uniform manner 
within the privacy enhancing infrastructure. It is recognised that intermittent 
connectivity and resource constrained devices, both common properties in 
ubiquitous computing, pose a problem. Connectivity is required to validate 
certificates and the signing/verification of digital signatures are computationally 
intensive. However, given that connectivity is also required to distribute context 
and that the communication already uses public keys to ensure confidentiality it 
is believed these issues can be addressed. 
Further work securing the integrity of communication and the availability of the 
infrastructure is also desirable. However, for the purpose of the infrastructure 
these areas are not prioritised. 
7.4. Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that there is a need for privacy protection and 
development support for privacy-friendly context-aware systems. The 
hypothesis presented was that this could be provided with a privacy-enhancing 
infrastructure.  
To investigate the validity of the hypothesis a privacy enhancing infrastructure 
for context-awareness has been developed and implemented. The infrastructure 
is decentralised and is capable of ubiquitous operation on handheld devices. It 
supports the development of applications by handling the storage and privacy 
protection of contextual information and by providing desirable features like 
synchronisation. To protect the privacy of its users the infrastructure provides 
authentication, access control, confidential communication, and support for 
anonymity. 
The evaluation shows that the privacy enhancing infrastructure developed is 
capable of providing a reasonable level of privacy protection in line with the 
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requirements of the conceptual model of privacy. It also shows that the 
infrastructure provides significant support for the development of privacy-
friendly applications and that it can be used with resource constrained devices. 
Hence, the hypothesis is concluded to be verified as true.  
Nevertheless, significant limitations and issues have also been found in this 
investigation. Further work is therefore clearly desirable, particularly with 
respect to access control, user interaction, trust management, and security. It is 
hoped that the initial steps taken in this work will inspire further research into 
these aspects of privacy protection. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A Context vocabulary 
A.1 Components 
User 
user.name <string> 
The user’s name. 
  
user.name
 
middle
 
family
 
given
 
suffix
 
prefix
 
nickname
  
 
user.bdate <string> 
The user’s birthdate. 
user.bdate
 
ymd
 
hms
  
 
user.home-info <string> 
The user’s private contact information. 
user.home-info
 
telecom
 
online
 
postal
  
 
user.business-info <string> 
The user’s professional contact information. 
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user.business-info
 
telecom
 
online
 
postal
  
 
Business 
business.name <string> 
The entity’s name. 
business.name
  
 
business.contact-info <string> 
The entity’s contact information. 
business.contact-info
 
telecom
 
online
 
postal
  
 
Activity 
activity.type <string> 
The type of activity. 
activity.type
  
 
activity.note <string> 
Further description of the activity. 
activity.note
  
 
activity.start <string> 
When the activity commenced. 
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activity.start
 
ymd
 
hms
  
 
activity.end <string> 
When the activity expect to finish. 
activity.end
 
ymd
 
hms
  
 
Location 
location.coordinates <string> 
The location expressed in coordinates. 
location.coordinates
  
 
location.place <string> 
The location expressed as a place name. 
location.place
  
 
location.contact <string> 
The location specific contact details. 
location.place
 
telecom
 
online
 
postal
  
A.2 Attributes 
General 
value <string> 
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The component’s value. 
 
timestamp <long> 
The value’s timestamp. (Specified as the difference in milliseconds 
between current time and midnight 1 January 1970 UTC). 
 
Content 
content-type <string> 
The MIME type of the data. 
 
content-transfer-encoding <string> 
The encoding of the data. 
 
Quality 
accuracy <integer> 
Estimate of the data’s accuracy.  
 
confidence <integer> 
Confidence in estimated accuracy. 
 
Validity 
lifetime <long> 
The estimated lifetime of data. (Specified as milliseconds after the 
timestamp). 
B Context-profile extension 
B.1 Header attributes 
General 
status <1-2> 
The request’s status. 
1) ok – request performed without errors. 
2) error – errors occurred when performing the request. 
 
command <1-3> 
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The command to be performed. 
1) availableData – lists the data available. 
2) sycnhronise – performs a synchronisation. 
3) legacyCommand – performs a legacy command. 
 
Authentication 
username <string> | <1> 
The requestor’s identity. 
1) anonymous – request from an anonymous agent. 
 
password <string> 
Password authenticating the claimed identity. 
 
onBehalfOf <string> 
Indicates that the request is forwarded by a privileged user responsible for 
authenticating the requestor. 
 
view <string> 
Allows an administrator to assume the identity of a user. 
 
Confidentiality 
publicKey <string> 
Holds public key in plug-in dependant binary format (Base64 encoded). 
 
cipher <string> 
The name of the cipher for which a public key is valid. 
 
encrypted <string> 
Indicates the presence of encrypted data with the name of the employed 
cipher. 
 
encryptedData <string> 
Holds encrypted data. (Base64 encoded). 
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P3P 
p3pId <string> 
The requestor’s identifier as referred to in P3P rulesets. 
 
p3pUri <string> 
URI to the requestor’s P3P policy. 
 
p3pPolicy <string> 
The requestor’s P3P policy. (Base64 encoded) 
 
Synchronisation 
reference <string> 
The URI to the remote Context Manager. (CM URI). 
 
syncMode <1-3> 
The mode of synchronisation. 
1) synchronise – update local and remote information (default). 
2) updateLocal – update local information only. 
3) updateRemote – update remote information only. 
 
syncType <1-3> 
The type of information to be synchronised. 
1) all – synchronise context and data (default). 
2) context – synchronise only context. 
3) data – synchronise only data. 
 
syncConflictResolution <string> 
The method by which conflicts are resolved.  
1) noChange – no change (default). 
2) useLocal – use the local information. 
3) useRemote – use the remote information. 
B.2 Body attributes 
General 
action <1-3> 
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The action to be performed. 
1) read – retrieves the context item (most recent). 
2) write – stores the context item. 
3) history – retrieves a historic context item. 
 
status <string> 
The context item’s status. 
1) ok – action performed without errors. 
2) error – error occurred when performing the action. 
 
Data list 
current <long> 
The timestamp of the most recent occurrence of the context item. (Specified 
as the difference in milliseconds between current time and midnight 1 
January 1970 UTC). 
 
 
historic <long> | <bag> 
A timestamp or bag of timestamps of the context item’s historic 
occurences. (Specified as the difference in milliseconds between current 
time and midnight 1 January 1970 UTC). 
 
C Interface specification 
C.1 Datastorage driver interface 
 
net.osbakk.pi.cm.dataStorage  
Interface DataStorageDriverInterface 
 
public interface DataStorageDriverInterface 
The DataStorageDriverInterface defines the methods the DataStorageDriver 
class must implement.  
 
Method Summary 
 void clear()  
          Clear datastorage. 
 void connect()  
          Activates the datastorage. 
 void deleteData()  
          Deletes data. 
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 void deleteData(java.lang.String category)  
          Deletes data. 
 void deleteData(java.lang.String category, 
java.lang.String key)  
          Deletes data. 
 void deleteData(java.lang.String category, 
java.lang.String key, java.lang.Long time)  
          Deletes data. 
 void disconnect()  
          Inactivates the datastorage 
 void flush()  
          Flushes queue. 
 java.util.Vector getCategories()  
          Retrieves categories. 
 java.lang.Object getData(java.lang.String category, java.lang.String key, 
java.lang.Long time)  
          Retrieves data. 
 java.util.Vector getKeys(java.lang.String category)  
          Retrieves keys. 
 java.util.Hashtable getKeysTable(java.lang.String category)  
          Retrieves keys. 
 java.lang.Long getLastOccurrencesTime(java.lang.String category, 
java.lang.String key)  
          Retrieves last occurrence. 
 java.util.Vector getOccurences(java.lang.String category, 
java.lang.String key)  
          Retrieves all occurrences. 
 void init(java.lang.String identifier, 
net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties)  
          Initialises the datastorage. 
 boolean isConnected()  
          Returns the current connection state. 
 void setData(java.lang.String category, java.lang.String key, 
java.lang.Object data, java.lang.Long time)  
          Stores data. 
   
Method Detail 
init 
public void init(java.lang.String identifier, 
                 net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties) 
          throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                 java.lang.NullPointerException, 
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                 java.lang.Exception 
Initialises the datastorage. 
Parameters: 
properties - the properties. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if already initialised. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
connect 
public void connect() 
             throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                    java.lang.Exception 
Activates the datastorage. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if already connected or not initialised. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
disconnect 
public void disconnect() 
                throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                       java.lang.Exception 
Inactivates the datastorage 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
isConnected 
public boolean isConnected() 
Returns the current connection state. 
Returns: 
connection state (true/false). 
 
setData 
public void setData(java.lang.String category, 
                    java.lang.String key, 
                    java.lang.Object data, 
                    java.lang.Long time) 
             throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                    java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                    java.lang.Exception 
Stores data. Adds the provided piece of information to the datastore. Note:  
- The category + key always yield a unique key.  
- The data is always a serializable object.  
- The timestamp is represented as seconds relative to 1 January 1970 UTC.  
- If the timestamp is null the current time must be used.  
- If the history length has been reached, or historic data is not supported, the 
oldest data item must be removed to make space. 
Parameters: 
category - The data category. 
  
 
204 
key - The key. 
data - The data. 
time - The timestamp or null. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category, key, or data is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
getData 
public java.lang.Object getData(java.lang.String category, 
                                java.lang.String key, 
                                java.lang.Long time) 
                         throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                                java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                                java.lang.Exception 
Retrieves data. Retrieves the requested piece of information from the datastore. 
Note:  
- The category + key always yield a unique key  
- The data is always a serializable object  
- The timestamp is represented as seconds relative to 1 January 1970 UTC.  
- If the timestamp is null the most recent occurrence must be retrieved.  
- If the data item does not exist then null must be returned. 
Parameters: 
category - The data category. 
key - The key. 
time - The timestamp or null. 
Returns: 
The data item or null. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category or key is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
deleteData 
public void deleteData(java.lang.String category, 
                       java.lang.String key, 
                       java.lang.Long time) 
                throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                       java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                       java.lang.Exception 
Deletes data. Deletes a previously stored data item. Note:  
- The category + key always yield a unique key  
- The timestamp is represented as seconds relative to 1 January 1970 UTC.  
- If the timestamp is null the most recent occurrence must be deleted. 
Parameters: 
category - The data category. 
key - The key. 
time - The timestamp or null. 
Throws: 
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java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category or key is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
deleteData 
public void deleteData(java.lang.String category, 
                       java.lang.String key) 
                throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                       java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                       java.lang.Exception 
Deletes data. Deletes all occurrences of a certain category + key. Note: 
- The category + key always yield a unique key 
Parameters: 
category - The data category. 
key - The key. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category or key is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
deleteData 
public void deleteData(java.lang.String category) 
                throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                       java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                       java.lang.Exception 
Deletes data. Deletes a stored data category with all its keys and occurrences. 
Parameters: 
category - The data category. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occured. 
 
deleteData 
public void deleteData() 
                throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                       java.lang.Exception 
Deletes data. Deletes all stored data. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occured. 
 
getKeysTable 
public java.util.Hashtable getKeysTable(java.lang.String category) 
                                 throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                                        java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                                        java.lang.Exception 
Retrieves keys. Retrieves the keys and timestamps for a given category. Note:  
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- The keys must be returned in a Hashtable with keys as keys and the latest 
update time as values.  
- The update timestamp must be represented as seconds relative to 1 January 
1970 UTC.  
- If the category does not exist null must be returned. 
Parameters: 
category - The data category. 
Returns: 
The keys and last update times or null. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
getOccurences 
public java.util.Vector getOccurences(java.lang.String category, 
                                      java.lang.String key) 
                               throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                                      java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                                      java.lang.Exception 
Retrieve occurrences. Retrieve the occurrences for a given category + key. 
Note:  
- The category + key always yield a unique key  
- The occurrences must be returned as timestamps in a Vector.  
- The timestamp must be represented as seconds relative to 1 January 1970UTC. 
- If the category + key do not exist null must be returned. 
Parameters: 
category - The data category. 
key - The key. 
Returns: 
The occurences or null. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category or key is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
getKeys 
public java.util.Vector getKeys(java.lang.String category) 
                         throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                                java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                                java.lang.Exception 
Retrieves the keys for a given category. Note:  
- The keys must be returned in a Vector.  
- If the category does not exist null must be returned. 
Parameters: 
category - The data category. 
Returns: 
The keys or null. 
Throws: 
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java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occured. 
 
getCategories 
public java.util.Vector getCategories() 
                               throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                                      java.lang.Exception 
Retrieves all categories. Note:  
- The categories must be returned in a Vector.  
- If no category exist null must be returned. 
Returns: 
The categories or null. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occured. 
 
flush 
public void flush() 
           throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                  java.lang.Exception 
Flushes queue. Flushes the data in the queue. After being called changes are 
guaranteed to be permanent. Note:  
- The data in the queue must be saved/deleted permanently when called. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
clear 
public void clear() 
           throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                  java.lang.Exception 
Clear datastorage. Clears the datastorage. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
getLastOccurrencesTime 
public java.lang.Long getLastOccurrencesTime(java.lang.String category, 
                                             java.lang.String key) 
                                      throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                                             java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                                             java.lang.Exception 
Retrieves the last occurrence. Gets the time of the last occurrence of a category 
+ key combination. Note:  
- The category + key always yield a unique key  
- The timestamp must be specified as seconds relative to 1 January 1970 UTC.  
- If the category + key do not exist null must be returned. 
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Parameters: 
category - The data category. * @param key The key. 
Returns: 
The occurrence timestamp or null. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if category or key is null. 
 
C.2 TCP interface 
 
net.osbakk.pi.cm.client  
Interface TCPInterface 
 
public interface TCPInterface 
The TCPInterface defines the methods the Transport Client Plug-in classes must 
implement.  
 
Method Summary 
 void init(java.lang.String address, 
net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties)  
          Initialises the Transport Client Plug-in. 
 java.lang.String post(java.lang.String message)  
          Posts a 'message' to the recipient. 
   
Method Detail 
init 
public void init(java.lang.String address, 
                 net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties) 
          throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                 java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                 java.lang.Exception 
Initialises the Transport Client Plug-in. Note:  
- One instance of the TCP is created per recipient.  
- The format of the recipient's address is plug-in specific. 
Parameters: 
address - The address. 
properties - the properties. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if already initialised. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if address or properties is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
post 
public java.lang.String post(java.lang.String message) 
                      throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                             java.lang.NullPointerException, 
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                             java.lang.Exception 
Posts a 'message' to the recipient. Note:  
- The message is encoded using the communication format.  
- The response must be encoded using the communication format.  
- The communication format is based on CC/PP. See separate description for 
full details. 
Parameters: 
message - The message. 
Returns: 
The response. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not initialised. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if message is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
C.3 TSP interface 
 
net.osbakk.pi.cm.server  
Interface TSPInterface 
 
public interface TSPInterface 
The TSPInterface defines the methods the Transport Server Plug-in classes must 
implement.  
 
Method Summary 
 void addComEventListener 
(net.osbakk.pi.cm.server.ComEventListener listener)  
          Adds a communication event listener. 
 void connect()  
          Activates the Transport Server Plug-in. 
 void disconnect()  
          Inactivates the Transport Server Plug-in. 
 java.lang.String[] getAddresses()  
          Retrieves the addresses associated with this TSP 
plug-in. 
 void init(net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties)  
          Initialises the Transport Server Plug-in. 
 boolean isConnected()  
          Returns the current connection state. 
 void reply(ComEvent event)  
          Responds to a request. 
   
Method Detail 
init 
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public void init(net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties) 
          throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                 java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                 java.lang.Exception 
Initialises the Transport Server Plug-in. Note:  
- One instance of the TSP plug-in is created per protocol. 
Parameters: 
properties - the properties. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if already initialised. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if properties is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
connect 
public void connect() 
             throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                    java.lang.Exception 
Activates the Transport Server Plug-in. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if already connected or not initialised. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
disconnect 
public void disconnect() 
                throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                       java.lang.Exception 
Inactivates the Transport Server Plug-in. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
isConnected 
public boolean isConnected() 
Returns the current connection state. 
Returns: 
connection state (true/false). 
 
getAddresses 
public java.lang.String[] getAddresses() 
                                throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                                       java.lang.Exception 
Retrieves the addresses associated with this TSP plug-in. Note:  
- The addresses must be returned as an array of Strings, where each address is 
one entry.  
- The format of the addresses is plug-in specific. 
Returns: 
the addresses. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
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java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
reply 
public void reply(ComEvent event) 
           throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                  java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                  java.lang.Exception 
Responds to a request. Note:  
- The response to the request is contained with in the event. 
Parameters: 
event - The event. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if event is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
addComEventListener 
public void 
addComEventListener(net.osbakk.pi.cm.server.ComEventListener listener) 
                         throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                                java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                                java.lang.Exception 
Adds a communication event listener. Note:  
- Multiple concurrent listeners must be supported.  
- Upon receiving a request the TSP plug-in must create an event and call the 
listener’s ‘comEventOccured’ method with it. 
Parameters: 
listener - The listener. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not connected. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if listener is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
C.4 Communication event listener 
 
net.osbakk.pi.cm.server  
Interface ComEventListenerInterface 
All Superinterfaces:  
java.util.EventListener 
 
public interface ComEventListenerInterface 
extends java.util.EventListener 
The ComEventListenerInterface defines the methods the ComEventListener 
implement.  
 
Method Summary 
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 void comEventOccured(ComEvent event)  
          Dispatches an event to the Context Manager. 
   
Method Detail 
comEventOccured 
public void comEventOccured(ComEvent event) 
                     throws java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                            java.lang.Exception 
Dispatches an event to the Context Manager. 
Parameters: 
event - The event. 
Throws: 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if event is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
C.5 Communication event 
 
net.osbakk.pi.cm.server  
Class ComEvent 
java.lang.Object 
  | 
  +--net.osbakk.pi.cm.server.ComEvent 
 
public class ComEvent 
extends java.lang.Object 
The ComEvent class is a wrapper for events, i.e requests and responses.  
 
Constructor Summary 
ComEvent(java.lang.String message)  
          Constructs a Communication Event. 
   
Method Summary 
 java.lang.Object 
getEventDetails()  
          Sets the event details. 
 java.lang.String getMessage()  
          Retrieves the message. 
 void setEventDetails(java.lang.Object details)  
          Sets the event details. 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
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clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, 
wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 
ComEvent 
public ComEvent(java.lang.String message) 
         throws java.lang.NullPointerException 
Constructs a Communication Event. Note:  
- The message holds the request/response. It is encoded using the 
communication format.  
- The communication format is based on CC/PP. See separate description for 
full details. 
Parameters: 
message - The message. 
Throws: 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if message is null. 
Method Detail 
getMessage 
public java.lang.String getMessage() 
Retrieves the message. Note:  
- The message holds the request/response. It is encoded using the 
communication format.  
- The communication format is based on CC/PP. See separate description for 
full details. 
Returns: 
the message. 
 
setEventDetails 
public void setEventDetails(java.lang.Object details) 
Sets the event details Note:  
- The details of the event are protocol specific.  
- The details may be null. 
Parameters: 
details - The details. 
 
getEventDetails 
public java.lang.Object getEventDetails() 
Sets the event details Note:  
- The details of the event are protocol specific.  
- The details may be null. 
Returns: 
The details. 
 
 
 
C.6 EDP Interface 
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net.osbakk.pi.cm.cryptography  
Interface EDPInterface 
 
public interface EDPInterface 
The EDPInterface defines the methods the EDP classes must implement.  
 
Method Summary 
 void decrypt(java.io.InputStream input, 
java.io.OutputStream output, byte[] privateKey)  
          Decrypts data using the provided key. 
 void encrypt(java.io.InputStream input, 
java.io.OutputStream output, byte[] publicKey)  
          Encrypts data using the provided key. 
 Keypair generateKeys()  
          Generates a new set of keys. 
 void init(net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties)  
          Initialises the Encryption Decryption Plug-in. 
   
Method Detail 
init 
public void init(net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties) 
          throws java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                 java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                 java.lang.Exception 
Initialises the Encryption Decryption Plug-in. Note:  
- One instance of the EDP plug-in is created per Plug-in. 
Parameters: 
properties - the properties. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if already initilised. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if properties is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
generateKeys 
public Keypair generateKeys() 
                     throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                            java.lang.Exception 
Generates a new set of keys. Note:  
- The generated keys must be returned as a keypair. 
Returns: 
the keypair. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not initialised. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
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encrypt 
public void encrypt(java.io.InputStream input, 
                    java.io.OutputStream output, 
                    byte[] publicKey) 
             throws java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                    java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                    java.lang.Exception 
Encrypts data using the provided key. Note:  
- The unencrypted data, to encrypt, is provided with an inputstream.  
- The encrypted data must be returned with an outputstream.  
- The public key refers to the key required for encryption. 
Parameters: 
input - the inputstream. 
output - the outputstream. 
publicKey - the public key. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not initialised. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if input, output, or publicKey is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
decrypt 
public void decrypt(java.io.InputStream input, 
                    java.io.OutputStream output, 
                    byte[] privateKey) 
             throws java.lang.NullPointerException, 
                    java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                    java.lang.Exception 
Decrypts data using the provided key. Note:  
- The encrypted data, to decrypt, is provided with an inputstream.  
- The decrypted data must be returned with an outputstream.  
- The private key refers to the key required for decryption. 
Parameters: 
input - the inputstream. 
output - the outputstream. 
privateKey - the private key. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not initialised. 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if input, output, or privateKey is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
C.7 Key pair 
 
net.osbakk.pi.cm.cryptography  
Class Keypair 
java.lang.Object 
  | 
  +--net.osbakk.pi.cm.cryptography.Keypair 
All Implemented Interfaces:  
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java.io.Serializable 
 
public class Keypair 
extends java.lang.Object 
implements java.io.Serializable 
The Keypair class is a wrapper for private and public keys.  
See Also:  
Serialized Form 
 
Constructor Summary 
Keypair(byte[] privateKey, byte[] publicKey)  
          Constructs a Keypair. 
   
Method Summary 
 byte[] getPrivateKey()  
          Retrieves the private key. 
 byte[] getPublicKey()  
          Retrieves the public key. 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, 
wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 
Keypair 
public Keypair(byte[] privateKey, 
               byte[] publicKey) 
        throws java.lang.NullPointerException 
Constructs a Keypair. Note:  
- The private key refers to the key used for decryption.  
- The public key refers to the key used for encryption. 
Parameters: 
privateKey - the private key. 
publicKey - the public key. 
Throws: 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if privateKey or publicKey is null. 
Method Detail 
getPrivateKey 
public byte[] getPrivateKey() 
Retrieves the private key. Note:  
- The private key refers to the key used for decryption. 
Returns: 
the private key. 
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getPublicKey 
public byte[] getPublicKey() 
Retrieves the public key. Note:  
- The public key refers to the key used for encryption. 
Returns: 
the public key. 
 
C.8 REP Interface 
 
net.osbakk.pi.cm.server  
Interface REPInterface 
 
public interface REPInterface 
The REPInterface defines the methods the Resource Extension Plug-ins classes 
must implement.  
 
Method Summary 
 void init(java.util.Hashtable arguments, CMLink cmServiceLink, 
net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties)  
          Initialises the Resource Extension Plug-in. 
 void perform(java.lang.String contextItem)  
          Invokes the resource extension for this request. 
 void start()  
          Starts the resource extension in the background. 
   
Method Detail 
init 
public void init(java.util.Hashtable arguments, 
                 CMLink cmServiceLink, 
                 net.osbakk.pi.util.properties.Properties properties) 
          throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                 java.lang.Exception 
Initialises the Resource Extension Plug-in. 
Parameters: 
arguments - The arguments. 
cmServiceLink - The cmservicelink. 
properties - The properties. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if already initialised. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occured. 
 
perform 
public void perform(java.lang.String contextItem) 
             throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                    java.lang.Exception 
  
 
218 
Invokes the resource extension for this request. 
Parameters: 
contextItem - The context item prompting the action, or null if not disclosed. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not initialised. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
start 
public void start() 
           throws java.lang.IllegalStateException, 
                  java.lang.Exception 
Starts the resource extension in the background. 
Throws: 
java.lang.IllegalStateException - if not initialised. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
C.9 Context manager link 
 
net.osbakk.pi.cm.server  
Class CMLink 
java.lang.Object 
  | 
  +--net.osbakk.pi.cm.server.CMLink 
 
public final class CMLink 
extends java.lang.Object 
The CMLink class provides an internal communication link to the context 
manager.  
 
Constructor Summary 
CMLink(net.osbakk.pi.cm.server.ContextManager contextManager)  
          Constructs a context manager link. 
   
Method Summary 
 net.osbakk.pi.cm.common.Message postRequest(java.lang.String message) 
          Posts a message. 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, 
wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 
CMLink 
public CMLink(net.osbakk.pi.cm.server.ContextManager contextManager) 
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       throws java.lang.NullPointerException 
Constructs a context manager link. 
Parameters: 
contextManager - The context manager. 
Throws: 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if contextManager is null. 
Method Detail 
postRequest 
public net.osbakk.pi.cm.common.Message 
postRequest(java.lang.String message) 
                                       throws java.lang.NullPointerException 
Posts a message. The message is sent to the context manager for processing. 
Parameters: 
message - The message. 
Returns: 
the context manager's reply. 
Throws: 
java.lang.NullPointerException - if message is null. 
java.lang.Exception - if an unexpected exception occurred. 
 
D Configuring access 
D.1 Scenario 
Assume that Alice wants to allow her friend, Bob, to retrieve basic location 
information from her context manager. To enable this she needs to set up an 
account for Bob with read access to location.place. Since it is likely she will 
want to allow other friends to retrieve the same information the access should be 
defined using a role.  
D.2 Procedure 
The administration console is used to configure access to the context manager. 
The procedure can be broken down into three steps. 
Firstly, an access control list (ACL) for basic location information must be 
created. For the scenario outlined, the ACL only needs to contain a single access 
control (AC), location.place, that grants read access to the corresponding 
context element. The screenshots below show, from left to right, the ACL for 
basic location being created and the AC for location.place being defined. 
  
 
220 
   
Secondly, a role for friends must be created. According to the scenario the role 
should grant read access to basic location information. Thus, the role needs to 
be associated with the access control list for basic location. The screenshot 
below shows the role Friend being defined.  
 
Finally, a user account for Bob must be created. The account should be 
associated with the role Friend and specify an initial password for 
authentication. To enable the account to be used it must also be activated. The 
screenshots below show, from left to right, Bob’s account being created and the 
resulting access being granted. 
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E Privacy survey 
E.1 Questions 
Introduction 
This study is done as part of my research as a PhD student at the University of 
Kent where I research privacy protection for context-aware systems. Context-
aware systems use information about us and our environments to provide 
enhanced and new services. One example of an existing commercial application 
is a location service that allow us to find nearby places and people. Location, 
though, is only one of many pieces of information that may be used by a 
context-aware system, others include: activity, contact details, weather 
information etc. The research I undertake aims to improve the level of privacy 
users of such system enjoy by allowing privacy preferences to be expressed and 
enforced. For example you may want to allow some people to know where you 
are but not others.  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate two different protection mechanisms 
that allow privacy preferences to be described. It should only take 
approximately 10 minutes to complete. All the information is collected 
anonymously and will not be personally identifiable. The results may be 
published.  
If you have any questions do not hesitate to contact me.  
Thank you,  
Patrik Osbakk  
Computing Laboratory 
University of Kent 
Canterbury, Kent 
CT2 7NF 
pjo2@kent.ac.uk 
Background 
Age:  ___ 
Gender: ○Male ○Female 
How comfortable are you using computers?  
 ○Very comfortable ○Comfortable ○Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 
 ○Uncomfortable ○Very uncomfortable 
How comfortable are you using the Internet? 
 ○Very comfortable ○Comfortable ○Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 
 ○Uncomfortable ○Very uncomfortable 
How concerned are you about your privacy in real-life (your right to control the 
flow of your personal information)? 
 ○Very concerned ○Concerned ○Neither concerned nor unconcerned 
 ○Unconcerned ○Very unconcerned 
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How concerned are you about your privacy when online (your right to control 
the flow of your personal information)? 
 ○Very concerned ○Concerned ○Neither concerned nor unconcerned 
 ○Unconcerned ○Very unconcerned 
Scenario 
Assume that your mobile phone connects you to a context-aware system that 
collects and monitors your context, e.g. your location and current activity. This 
information is used to provide a number of enhanced services to you. For 
example when you are busy, e.g. in a meeting, calls can automatically be 
forwarded to your voicemail or the callers can be asked to call back later when 
convenient for you. Other services would allow you to find nearby places such 
as restaurants, shops, sights, etc. or even to be interactively guided to a named 
place. Furthermore imagine that your context information is shared with others, 
allowing you to both be located and to be able to locate others.  
Given this scenario:  
Who of the following should be allowed to access your location (Tick all the 
appropriate)?  
   Family member,   Friend,   Colleague 
   Boss/Supervisor/Teacher,   Anyone (public) 
Please tick the box(es) of those you feel should be able to find out where you 
are when they desire.  
Who of the following should be allowed to access your activity (Tick all the 
appropriate)?  
   Family member,   Friend,   Colleague 
   Boss/Supervisor/Teacher,   Anyone (public) 
Please tick the box(es) of those you feel should be able to find out where you 
are when they desire. 
Who of the following should be allowed to access your contact details (Tick all 
the appropriate)? 
   Family member,   Friend,   Colleague 
   Boss/Supervisor/Teacher,   Anyone (public) 
Please tick the box(es) of those you feel should be able to find out where you 
are when they desire. 
Mechanisms 
Continue to assume that you are connected to the context-aware system 
previously described and that it shares your context information with others. 
Two different protection mechanisms will now be presented and you are asked 
to set them up to match your previously indicated preferences as close as 
possible.  
Protection Mechanism 1: Classification and Clearance Scheme - CCS 
This mechanism focuses on the sensitivity of information and works like this: 
You  tell the system how sensitive (private) you feel a piece of information is, 
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i.e. you classify it. You also tell the system how sensitive (private) information 
different people should be able to retrieve, i.e. you give people a clearance level. 
The system can then use this information to ensure that only those you want can 
find out where you are, what you are doing, and how to contact you.  
Here each piece of context is classified on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is the 
most insensitive (public) and 100 is the most sensitive (private). Information 
that anyone should be able to find out should be classified with 0. Similarly 
each person that should be able to retrieve information is given a clearance level 
on a scale of 0 (only allowed to access public information) to 100 (can access 
everything). Please note that information is shared if the person has a clearance 
equal to or greater than the corresponding classification. 
Please classify the context pieces below:  
 Location: ___ 
 Activity: ___   
 Contact Details: ___ 
Please enter a value between 0 (public) and 100 (private) that represent how 
sensitive you feel the information is.  
Please assign the people below the desired clearance (Anyone always has a 
level of 0, thus it cannot be changed):  
 Family member: ___ 
 Friend: ___ 
 Colleague: ___ 
 Boss/supervisor/teacher: ___ 
 Anyone (public): ___ 
Please enter a value between 0 (public) and 100 (private) that represent how 
sensitive information you feel that person should be able to retrieve.  
How similar is this mechanism to how you reason about privacy day to day? 
 ○Very similar ○Similar ○Neither similar nor unsimilar  
 ○Unsimilar ○Very unsimilar} 
How accurately do you feel you have been able to express your preferences 
using this mechanism? 
 ○Very accurately ○Accurately ○Neither accurately nor inaccurately 
 ○Inaccurately ○Very inaccurately 
How easy did you find expressing your preferences using this mechanism? 
 ○Very easy ○Easy ○Neither easy nor difficult ○Difficult ○Very difficult 
Protection Mechanism 2: Role Based Access Control - RBAC 
This mechanism focuses on what role a person has, where every role allows 
certain pieces of context information to be shared. The mechanism works like 
this: You first identify what roles you need, i.e. what roles do people around you 
have. You then tell the system what information a person having a specific role 
should be able to retrieve. After this you tell the system what roles people have. 
The system can then use this information to ensure that only those you want can 
find out where you are, what you are doing, and how to contact you. 
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Here each role can allow a combination of location, activity, and contact details 
to be retrieved including all and none of them. The roles are labelled Role 1 
through to Role 5 so you are free to think of a role, e.g. Role 1, to represent any 
role you would like, e.g. friends. In this survey you can setup at most 5 roles. If 
you don't need all of them just leave the ones you don't need blank. Each person 
that should be able to retrieve information then has one or more roles 
associated. Please note that information is shared using the roles in the best 
possible way so that a person that has multiple roles can access the 'sum' of the 
roles. 
Please setup what information should be shared with each role:  
 Role 1:   Location,   Activity,   Contact Details 
 Role 2:   Location,   Activity,   Contact Details 
 Role 3:   Location,   Activity,   Contact Details 
 Role 4:   Location,   Activity,   Contact Details 
 Role 5:   Location,   Activity,   Contact Details 
Please tick the box(es) of a particular role to allow the information in question 
to be released. For example a tick in the location box of Role1 would later allow 
anyone associated with Role1 to retrieve where you are. 
Please assign roles to the following persons: 
 A family member:    Role1,   Role2,   Role3,   Role4,   Role5 
 A friend:    Role1,   Role2,   Role3,   Role4,   Role5 
 A colleague:    Role1,   Role2,   Role3,   Role4,   Role5 
 Your boss/supervisor/teacher:    Role1,   Role2,   Role3,   Role4,   Role5 
 Anyone (public):    Role1,   Role2,   Role3,   Role4,   Role5 
Please tick the box(es) of a particular person to associate this person with the 
role in question. For example a tick in the Role1 box of A friend would allow 
this friend to retrieve the information Role1 allows. 
How similar is this mechanism to how you reason about privacy day to day? 
 ○Very similar ○Similar ○Neither similar nor unsimilar  
 ○Unsimilar ○Very unsimilar 
How accurately do you feel you have been able to express your preferences 
using this mechanism? 
 ○Very accurately ○Accurately ○Neither accurately nor inaccurately  
 ○Inaccurately ○Very inaccurately 
How easy did you find expressing your preferences using this mechanism? 
 ○Very easy ○Easy ○Neither easy nor difficult ○Difficult ○Very difficult 
Submission 
Please press the button below to submit the study. 
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E.2 Responses 
Age
… - 20
21 - 40
41 - 60
60 - …
No answer
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
… - 20 7
21 - 40 20
41 - 60 3
60 - … 1
No answer 0  
Gender
Female
Male
No Answer
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
Female 9
Male 22
No Answer 0  
How comfortable are you using computers?
Very comfortable
Comfortable
Neither comfortable nor 
uncomfortable
Uncomfortable Very uncomfortable No anwser
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
Very comfortable 19
Comfortable 9
Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 3
Uncomfortable 0
Very uncomfortable 0
No anwser 0  
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How comfortable are you using the Internet?
Very comfortable
Comfortable
Neither comfortable nor 
uncomfortable
Uncomfortable Very uncomfortable No anwser
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
Very comfortable 19
Comfortable 10
Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 2
Uncomfortable 0
Very uncomfortable 0
No anwser 0  
How concerned are you about your privacy in real-life (your right to control the flow of your personal 
information)?
Very concerned
Concerned
Neither concerned nor 
unconcerned
Unconcerned
Very unconcerned No anwser
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
Very concerned 7
Concerned 15
Neither concerned nor unconcerned 8
Unconcerned 1
Very unconcerned 0
No anwser 0  
How concerned are you about your privacy when online (your right to control the flow of your personal 
information)?
Very concerned
Concerned
Neither concerned nor 
unconcerned
Unconcerned Very unconcerned No anwser
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
Very concerned 14
Concerned 16
Neither concerned nor unconcerned 1
Unconcerned 0
Very unconcerned 0
No anwser 0  
  
 
227 
Overall accuracy
CCS accurate
RBAC accurate
CCS inaccurate
RBAC inaccurate
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
CCS accurate 78.92%
RBAC accurate 87.31%
CCS inaccurate 21.08%
RBAC inaccurate 12.69%  
Overall effect of inaccuracy
CCS too high access
CCS too low access
RBAC too low access
RBAC too high access
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
CCS too high access 70.41%
RBAC too high access 67.80%
CCS too low access 29.59%
RBAC too low access 32.20%  
CCS Access
Accurate, 78.92%
Too high, 14.84%
Too low, 6.24%
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RBAC Access
Accurate, 87.31%
Too high, 8.60%
Too low, 4.09%
 
How similar is this mechanism to how you reason about privacy day to day?
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
CCS 2 11 12 2 4 0
RBAC 4 10 10 2 4 1
Very similar Similar Neither similar nor unsimilar Unsimilar Very unsimilar No anwser
 
How accurately do you feel you have been able to express your preferences using this mechanism?
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
CCS 2 18 5 5 1 0
RBAC 4 11 8 5 2 1
Very accurately Accurately Neither accurately nor inaccurately Inaccurately Very inaccurately No anwser
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How easy did you find expressing your preferences using this mechanism?
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
En
tr
ie
s
CCS: 5 14 9 2 1
RBAC 4 10 10 4 1 2
Very easy Easy Neither easy nor difficult Difficult Very difficult No anwser
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